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Abstract
Though we are inclined to think those who have acted wrongly should feel bad, we also
worry that feeling bad may be futile: that it may only make things worse. I argue that
we ought to feel bad not as a way to secure good outcomes, but because feeling bad is
part  of  what  it  is  to  be  respectful  and  to  value  our  ethical  standing.  Employing
Aristotle's  method  of  appearances,  I  provide  an  account  which  can  explain  our
confident judgements and resolve cases we find puzzling. In Part One I consider our
initial intuitions and puzzles, and explain my method and assumptions. In Part Two I
analyse the emotions of guilt, shame, regret and remorse, arguing that each of these
emotions are appropriate in different circumstances. In Part Three, I use this analysis
to explain the clear cases and resolve the problem cases.
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Part One: Introduction
Chapter 1: The question, and how to answer it
1.1 The Question
The question of this thesis is 'What is the virtuous emotional response to wrongdoing?' 
I have in mind one's own wrongdoing, not the wrongdoing of others. I am therefore
interested in emotions like guilt or regret, rather than emotions like resentment. Aside
from that I understand wrongdoing broadly: I am interested in wrongs both serious and
slight, self-regarding and other-regarding, vicious and accidental. I shall often consider
specific examples of wrongdoing, as the virtuous response is often affected by the
details of the particular case; still, I will also draw general conclusions. 
1.1.1 The Easy Answer
So how should you feel after you've done something wrong? That's easy: you should
feel bad. Everybody knows this. 
There are two problems with this easy answer. First, it is light on detail. There are lots
of ways to feel bad, so which are appropriate? How bad should we feel? Should we feel
bad forever, and, if not, when should we stop? Second, it is not so obviously true as we
might at first suppose. 
Considering the first problem, we may note that the question was very light on detail
too. If we add details to the question, it isn't so hard to add in some plausible details to
the easy answer. Some principle of proportionality seems to apply: the worse what you
did was, the worse you should feel afterwards, and the longer you should feel bad for.
What  exactly  you did also  suggests  which emotions you should feel.  For instance,
regret appears more appropriate after an accident or if you only hurt yourself, whereas
if you hurt somebody else, especially deliberately, guilt or shame is more appropriate.
It also seems that our emotional response ought to be linked to action, otherwise we
appear self-indulgent or insincere. Our guilt should motivate us to apologise and try to
make amends, for example. This suggests requirements we should meet before we
stop feeling bad: we ought to have apologised, received forgiveness, made amends,
reformed and so on.
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The more detail we add to the easy answer, the more the second problem looms: it
may not be true that everybody knows it. We face the nagging worry that feeling bad
doesn't accomplish anything, and considered on its own feeling bad can seem to have
little to recommend it. It might appear better to act correctly in response to what we
have done – to make amends, and to change our future behaviour – and to simply
leave it at that. While this worry is plausible, I will argue that it is mistaken. That one
should feel bad after acting wrongly is not so obvious a claim that we do not need to
defend it; it is not like the claim that wanton murder is wrong. My first goal in the
thesis is therefore to defend and make rigorous the best version of the easy answer.
1.1.2 Problem Cases
As well as these general worries, there is a particular sort of case in which I think the
easy answer struggles. This is the sort of case where what has been done is very bad
indeed, but where there is only a little that the agent can do about it. A good example
of this sort of case is a wrongful killing: it is obviously extremely serious, and since the
victim is dead, there isn't anything significant that can be done to make amends to
them. Perhaps the killer should apologise to the victim's family, turn themselves in to
the police, and of course refrain from further killing. But all of this might be done very
quickly, especially if the killing was completely out of character – perhaps committed
under the influence of mind-altering drugs, or in extremely distressing circumstances.
In such a case, the killer's having done what he should have done in response to his
crime doesn't seem to mark the point at which he should stop feeling bad, as it simply
comes too soon. We might think that enough time must pass before normal feelings
become  appropriate  again,  as  well  as  the  killer  doing  everything  he  ought  to  in
response. This seems reasonable, but how much time it takes, and why it takes that
long, is no longer easy for us to say. As a result, it is not clear when a return to normal
feeling, or something like it, would be appropriate. 
1.2 How I will answer the question
I will divide this thesis into three parts. The first part will be preparatory. In Chapter
Two I set out and defend my methodological assumptions. In Chapter Three I present
some preliminary arguments regarding emotions in general. In Chapter Four I argue
that the past does matter when it comes to questions about how we should feel in the
present. 
In Part Two I develop, make rigorous and defend the easy answer. I consider different
emotional  responses  to  wrongdoing  and  ascertain  when  and  why  they  would  be
appropriate. It is noteworthy that we use many words to express our expectation that
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those  who  have  acted  wrongly  should  feel  bad.  We  say  that  people  should  feel
regretful,  ashamed,  guilty,  remorseful,  sorry,  contrite,  penitent,  terrible  or  even
horrified. I  shall  argue that in many cases we use these different words to express
different  claims  with  different  justifications,  and  I  shall  present  analyses  of  four
emotions (guilt, shame, regret and remorse) which highlight the normatively salient
differences between them. It  is  not my intention to provide analyses which are as
faithful  as  possible  to  our  actual  use  of  language.  Rather,  I  aim  to  provide  an
unambiguous  conceptual  framework  with  which  to  answer  my  normative  question
clearly. Of course, this still requires analyses faithful enough to ordinary use not to be
misleading. 
By the end of Part Two I will have dealt with the general worry that we don't ever have
good reasons to feel bad because feeling bad doesn't help anything. In Part Three, I
will  apply  the  account  of  Part  Two  to  some  problem  cases,  and  argue  that  the
resolution this yields is satisfactory. I take the resolution of the problem cases to be of
interest in itself,  but also consider a successful  resolution of  the problem cases to
provide further support to the account of part two.
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Chapter 2: Assumptions
2.1 Two types of assumptions
In this chapter I set out the assumptions that I will be using for this thesis. I distinguish
between  necessary  and  informative  assumptions.  The  necessary  assumptions  are
those assumptions without which the thesis would not be able to proceed satisfactorily.
If these assumptions are mistaken, the thesis will not prove that its conclusions are
true – only that they follow from the truth of the necessary assumptions. However, I do
not need to make many necessary assumptions, and those I  do make enjoy broad
support.
The informative assumptions are not required for the thesis to proceed satisfactorily:
the thesis makes a compelling case for its conclusion even if these assumptions are
not taken as given. I  discuss these assumptions here to distinguish them from the
necessary assumptions, and as an aid to clarity.  
Often the reason that the informative assumptions are not necessary assumptions is
that  the  success  of  my  thesis  would  itself  provide  good  evidence  for  them.  For
instance, I assume that there are situations in which we ought to feel some emotion.
From my point of view, that assumption motivates the enquiry of this thesis. From the
other point of view, the success of my thesis will itself prove that there are situations in
which we ought to feel some emotion. 
2.2 Necessary assumptions
2.2.1 Cognitivism about emotions
I  assume  as  little  as  possible  about  what  emotions  are,  so  that  my  normative
conclusions  do  not  depend  upon  any  particular  view  within  philosophy  of  mind.
However,  it  is  necessary to  say something about  what  I  take  emotions to  be.  My
assumption is that the emotions I consider can be understood broadly cognitively. This
means that they involve some close relation between a cognition and a felt affect,
understanding  both  concepts  widely.  I  do  not  need  to  assume  that  all  emotions
whatsoever can be understood in this way, nor that everything that can be understood
in this way is therefore an emotion. 
By a wide understanding of cognition, I mean any kind of thought directed at any kind
of  object:  not  necessarily  conscious  thought  or  belief  in  a  proposition.  I  am here
assuming  what  John  Deigh  terms  traditional  cognitivism  and  distinguishes  from
Page 10 of 140
contemporary cognitivism. Traditional cognitivism understands emotion as involving 'a
concept of thought broad enough to apply to all states of mind with objective content'
including things like perceptions, imaginings and memories. Contemporary cognitivism
understands emotion as involving a 'narrower concept whose application corresponds
to  the  grammarians'  complete  thought  and  the  logicians'  proposition.'1 The  main
assertion  of  traditional  cognitivism,  and  all  that  I  require  for  this  thesis,  is  that
emotions  are  about things.  This  assertion  is  still  true  according  to  contemporary
cognitivism.
We can usefully describe the sort of cognition involved in an emotion and the sort of
object the emotion must be about. However, I do not assume that the instances of one
type of emotion must necessarily share one object or mode of cognition in common,
nor that the cognitions involved in our emotion are always known to us. I shall typically
describe  an  emotion's  cognition  by  saying  that  the  subject  of  the  emotion  takes
something to be the case. This way of putting it is intended to be silent on the type of
cognition involved – whether the state of affairs is perceived, believed, imagined or in
some other way thought of as obtaining. In particular, it is intended that one can take
something to be the case at the same time as disbelieving it (for example by imagining
it, or considering it, or supposing it).
By affect, I mean the felt character of our emotion, the way it feels. An emotion always
has an affect: when we experience an emotion we always feel  something. I assume
that we may usefully describe affect in various ways, though this is often difficult.
Affect can be described fairly literally as good or bad, or as weak or strong. We can
also describe affect more metaphorically, for example as gentle or violent, or as deep
or shallow. Some affects are usefully compared to bodily sensations: they are visceral,
giddy, painful, warm or suchlike. We also have a good grasp of the way many emotions
feel, so it can be helpful to describe an affect in comparison to those, for instance by
describing terror as feeling similar to fear, only stronger, or dread as similar to fear,
only more visceral. I shall not assume any more controversial thesis about affect, such
as that we are always capable of identifying the affect we are feeling correctly, or that
each instance of  a  given emotion always involves the  same kind of  affect.  I  shall
typically describe affect by saying that the subject of the emotion feels a certain way. 
Finally, by claiming that there must be a close connection between the cognition and
the  affect,  I  mean  that  the  emotion  must  involve  some  kind  of  important,  non-
accidental relation between the two elements. I do not want to commit to a particular
account  of  this  relation,  but  I  suspect  that  it  will  be  one  of  causation  or
1 Deigh, John, “Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions”, Ethics, 1994, vol.104, pp824-
854. p827 
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characterisation. For instance, Deigh's description of the James-Lange theory identifies
the relation as causal: '[emotion is] constituted by certain feelings that are aroused by
the  thought  or,  as  he  says,  perception  of  an  exciting  object.'  Alternatively,  his
description  of  Broad's  cognitivism  considers  it  as  characterising:  'Emotions  … are
thoughts that have a felt quality or tone'.2 Some close relation is required to prevent
any arbitrary pair of cognition and affect from qualifying as an emotion. For instance, if
I believe that 2+2=4 and also feel upset, this is just a coincidence, unless I am upset
that  or  because  2+2=4. To refer to this connection without committing to a particular
account  of  it  I  will  say  that  the  subject's  affect  is  about or  towards  the  emotion's
cognition. 
Putting my proposed ways of speaking together, I will analyse experiencing an emotion
as taking something to be the case, and feeling some way about (or towards) this. For
instance, a possible analysis of fear is that to feel  fear is to take something to be
dangerous and to feel distressed and averse towards it. 
It is helpful to compare emotions to mental states that do not involve both cognitions
and felt affects in the way that the broadly cognitivist picture sets out. On the one
hand there are mental states that have felt affect but do not involve cognitions. Some
pains and pleasures are like this. A very severe pain located in a specific body part
may be tightly connected to a cognition about that body part being damaged or one
being in danger, but a pain that is only slight and diffuse is probably not. Deigh gives
the example of the pleasure of a warm bath as feeling a certain way but not involving
cognition or intentionality.3 Another example of a state like this is that of a mood:
sometimes we just wake up feeling happy, without feeling happy about anything. On the
other hand there are cognitions that do not involve felt affects, such as those involved
in mathematical reasoning. 
That the emotions I discuss involve cognitions is a necessary assumption because I
take the objects of  the emotions I  discuss to carry normative implications in some
cases.  For  instance,  it  is  often  inappropriate  to  feel  an  emotion  if  its  cognition  is
inaccurate. Similarly, it is a necessary assumption that the emotions I consider involve
felt affect, and again this is primarily for normative reasons. In many situations, one
ought to feel a certain way, but having an undirected mood will not do. If I ought to
feel  guilty,  I  ought to feel  guilty  about  what  I  did,  and this  requires a non-accidental
connection between my feeling  and my cognition.  If  the  emotions I  discuss  didn't
involve  cognition  and  affect  then  these  normative  moves  would  be  mistaken.
Furthermore,  the  truth  of  my  normative  conclusions  –  such  as  that  we  ought
2 Deigh, pp828-829
3 Deigh, p826
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sometimes to feel guilty – doesn't itself provide strong evidence for cognitivism about
emotions.  
2.2.2 Aristotle's method of appearances, or reflective equilibrium
I will take it as a starting point that we already know quite a lot about the virtuous
emotional response to wrongdoing. Very briefly, the common answer to the question of
how one should feel after doing something wrong is that one should simply feel bad. In
some contexts, we are willing to make more specific judgements. In other contexts, we
are puzzled: unsure what to say or wanting to say contradictory things. 
I assume that a careful analysis of what we are confident about and why can be used
to helpfully address the problem cases, and that showing an analysis to be capable of
both solving the problem cases and explaining the easy cases is good evidence for it. 
This  is  similar  to  Aristotle's  method  of  appearances:  first,  'we  must  set  out  the
appearances'4, which are what we know about cases, as 'we ought to begin from things
known to us.'5 Then, we must explain the puzzling cases, while remaining consistent
with as many of the appearances as possible: 'For if the objections are solved, and the
common beliefs are left, it will be an adequate proof.'6 The method is similar to Rawls'
reflective equilibrium, where we iteratively approach an acceptable theory by moving
between our considered judgements about cases and the principles that provide the
best explanation of them.7 
This sort of approach can be contrasted with top-down approaches, where the starting
point is a general normative theory or principle. For instance, it would be possible to
apply  an  act  utilitarian  principle  to  my  question  by  working  out  the  expected
consequences of various emotional responses to wrongdoing. Any sufficiently general
and comprehensive normative theory could be used in this way. 
The  availability  of  this  very  different  approach  explains  why  my  assumption  is  a
necessary one. If the utilitarian method is the correct way to decide matters, a position
worked  out  according  to  Aristotle's  or  Rawls'  method  would  not  have  much  to
recommend it  –  it  would  start  from somewhere  plausible,  and end up somewhere
plausible, but this would not guarantee the truth of its conclusions. Furthermore, the
success  of  my  project  –  its  being  able  to  explain  the  problem  cases  without
4 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Irwin, Terence, trans. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1999, 1145b1-10
5 Aristotle, 1095b1-5
6 Aristotle, 1145b5-10
7 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 1971. pp46-
53
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significantly  revising  our  firm  starting  opinions  –  does  not  by  itself  provide  good
evidence that the utilitarian (or any other) top-down approach is mistaken. 
Nonetheless I am very confident in this assumption. For if we cannot begin with some
normative judgements in which we are confident,  it is hard to see where we could
begin at all. It seems unlikely that we could begin from nowhere and pull ourselves up
by our bootstraps, and more unlikely still that we could warrantably consider ourselves
to have produced a successful normative theory if it did not confirm a lot of the beliefs
we are already confident of. 
2.2.3 Only as much precision as is warranted by the subject matter
As well as counselling us to begin with the appearances, Aristotle cautions us that we
should only attempt to 'make things perspicuous enough to accord with the subject
matter; for we would not seek the same degree of exactness in all arguments alike.'8
Our subject matter, ethics, is one where exactness is not to be expected, especially
when considering normative theory rather than particular cases. 
The consequence of this assumption for my thesis is that I will frequently conclude my
arguments with positions that must be stated using thick normative terms9, or which
point  to  vague  or  potentially  competing  considerations  without  a  fixed  rule  for
establishing  priority  or  settling  borderline  cases.  This  does  not  explain  everything:
important normative work is left to be completed by agents once they are faced with
particular circumstances calling for a decision or judgement. But to leave some things
unexplained is not always a failure; if our results provide helpful advice to agents we
will have been successful even if what we have said is not complete in every detail. My
thesis is intended to be useful in practice by directing agents to many of the relevant
features of situations they face, not to be action-guiding in the extremely precise and
direct way that a codified theory such as act utilitarianism can be. This is again in line
with Aristotle's approach; he notes that his arguments will be useless to us if we are
not already a decent person who is either experienced or willing to seek the advice of
those who are.10 
This assumption is also a necessary one, because it concerns the conditions for the
8 Aristotle, 1094b10-15
9 I mean terms like respectful, kind, or honest. I find these terms a helpful way make 
acceptably vague statements in ethics; all that is required is that you can apply 
them, not that you analyse them in some specific way.  In particular I do not think it
matters for my purposes whether or not they might be reducible to thin normative 
terms and descriptive content.
10 Aristotle, 1095a1-15. The appropriate person to give advice on a particular case is 
not a philosopher, but a virtuous person acquainted with the details of the case in 
question. 
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success  of  my  thesis.  If  conclusions  in  ethical  philosophy  ought  to  be  completely
precise then many of my conclusions will be unsatisfactory. Furthermore, my success in
producing  somewhat  imprecise  conclusions  cannot  be  taken  as  evidence  that  we
should not demand fully precise conclusions in ethics. However, it is once again an
assumption I am very confident of, especially with regards to my particular question.
When it comes to emotion, unlike when it comes to action, there is a possibility of
taking two paths at once. If I must decide whether to pull the lever in a trolley problem,
then at least my decision must be precise – I either pull it or not. The question of what
to do might be very difficult, but if we can resolve it, the resolution will be clear-cut.
But if something has happened that I might sensibly feel happy or sad about, there will
also be the possibility of my having ambivalent feelings, of feeling both sad and happy
at the same time. So even if a greater degree of precision is to be expected when it
comes to questions of what we ought to do, we should not expect an equally precise
account of what we ought to feel. 
It may seem at that I am relying on the content of an Aristotelian ethical theory as well
as an Aristotelian method, because the thick terms I use to state my conclusions and
advance  my arguments  include  Aristotelian  terms  –  such as  virtue,  prudence  and
eudaimonia – as well as more everyday terms such as respect or concern. However,
while  I  find  the  vocabulary  of  virtue  ethics  very  helpful  to  the  project  and use  it
frequently, I do not rely in this thesis on any claims unique to virtue ethics. I do not
need to assume any of the controversial tenets of some forms of virtue ethics, such as
the priority of  virtuous character over right action,  the unity of  the virtues, or the
grounding of ethics in human nature. Instead, all I require is that the terms I use are
meaningful, which is a much less controversial position. 
2.2.4 Summary
These are the only assumptions which are necessary to my thesis. If you agree that it
is  not  confused  to  talk  of  emotions  as  involving  both  felt  qualities  and  cognitive
objects, nor to talk of virtue and eudaimonia, then we are safe from the risk of talking
past each other. If you also accept my method, this is enough for the thesis to proceed.
Accepting  my  method  requires  accepting  that  we  may  begin  by  taking  our  most
confident normative judgements as a starting point, and that we may be satisfied with
conclusions that leave some normative work still to be done by the agent, rather than
generating complete and determinate answers to every possible case. 
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2.3 Informative assumptions
2.3.1 Particular considered judgements
Because I intend to begin with the appearances, I am of course taking as a starting
point  some considered judgements  about  when and why one should feel  guilty  or
ashamed or suchlike, some of which are my own considered judgements and others of
which  are  drawn  from philosophical  writing  on  the  subject.  These  judgements  are
significant to the thesis, so I will address them at length in the second part, rather than
here. But what should be said here is that they are not necessary assumptions for this
thesis. First of all, some of them will have to be altered or rejected as a result of my
arguments. Second, the thesis will serve as a vindication of the judgements that are
retained, by providing arguments for them, and by showing that problem cases can be
addressed without revising them.
2.3.2 Objectivity
I assume that ethics is objective in the sense of being truth-apt and in some sense
mind-independent, and this informs the sorts of claims I think can be usefully made in
a normative argument. However, I do not take this to be a necessary claim for the
thesis to proceed – I suspect that a sophisticated subjectivist in either sense will likely
be  able  to  express  my arguments  in  their  preferred  terms.  On the  other  hand,  a
straightforward rejection of objectivity (such as normative scepticism) is a position that
the success of my thesis provides evidence against, if my necessary assumptions are
correct. 
2.3.3 Morality, ethics and prudence
I  also  assume that  ethics is  fundamentally  one subject  matter,  one discourse:  the
discourse about how one should live. What I mean by this is that I do not distinguish
sharply  between  moral  requirements  and  prudential  requirements.  When  I  say  an
agent ought to do something, I just mean that it is the thing for them to do, all things
considered.  You  ought  to  help  others,  you  ought  to  set  aside  some  money  for
emergencies, and you ought to read  The Great Gatsby. These are all the same sort of
claim. 
Probably the most controversial implication of this position is that there is a sort of
harmony within the normative sphere: there will not be a situation where there is one
thing that it would be most in your self-interest for you to do and another thing that
you morally ought to do. This can be pressured either as being too optimistic, because
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doing the right thing may seem unlikely to always work out to one's advantage, or as
too egoistic, because something's being to one's advantage may seem a dubiously
selfish reason to think that it is the right thing to do11. However, the position does not
imply that all of ethics is harmony, for it is consistent with the possibility of ethical
dilemmas: situations where there everything we could do will be in some way seriously
bad. This means that situations which seem to involve a conflict between prudential
and moral considerations, between what would be good for us and what we ought to
do, can still be seen as involving a conflict of a different sort: one between two things
that are both worth pursuing, but cannot both be pursued. 
That  ethics  is  one  subject  matter  is  not  a  necessary  assumption  because  my
arguments do not depend on it.  I  think treating the normative sphere as unified is
helpful, but doing so is not essential for this thesis.
2.3.4 Emotions are ethically important
I also begin with the assumption that there are emotions which we ought to feel and
emotions which we ought not to feel. Many virtues place clear importance on how one
feels: the kind person is sympathetic, empathetic, and glad to be of help; the brave
person is the person who doesn't feel unduly afraid as well as the person who acts
rightly even when she is afraid. This is an informative assumption because the success
of my thesis would demonstrate its truth, a fortiori. 
I  will  not  attempt  to  prove  that  emotions  matter  up  front,  but  I  can  make  the
assumption more attractive by saying a little about one very common objection to it.
The objection is that we cannot choose what emotions to feel, and that if we ought to
do something we must be able to choose to do it. The objection thus relies on the
common claim that 'ought implies can'.
I agree that we cannot (at least not at all usually) simply choose how to feel.  However,
the objection treats evaluating emotions as simply the same as evaluating actions, and
we don't have to treat emotions in this way to see them as ethically relevant. There
are two sensible alternatives. The first is that evaluating someone's emotions can be
seen as an appraisal of their character. When we say that someone ought to feel more
concerned for a friend, we impugn their kindness and imply that a kinder person would
feel concerned in their situation. The second option is that emotions may be appraised
directly, but in a way more analogous to the appraisal of belief than of action. We
appraise  beliefs  for  their  accuracy,  rationality  or  charitableness,  even  though  we
cannot simply choose what to believe, and sometimes our appraisal is an ethical one:
11 I say a little about the egoism worry in section 4.5.2
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we are comfortable blaming or praising people for their beliefs, and comfortable saying
that  people  ought  to  believe  certain  things.12 Emotions can be subject  to  a  direct
ethical appraisal in a similar way.  
Another problem with the objection from 'ought implies can' is that it trades on the
idea that emotions are beyond our control, which can be challenged. While we cannot
simply choose to have kind feelings, the other choices we make will, over the medium-
term, affect whether we are kind or not, and in turn what sorts of feelings we have. 13
So it is reasonable to praise or blame people for their kind or unkind emotions. We can
see the analogy between emotions and beliefs again here. We are happy to praise or
blame people for their beliefs, even though they cannot simply choose what to believe,
because  they  can  improve  their  beliefs  indirectly  by  improving  their  intellectual
abilities or acquiring more evidence. 
2.3.5 Mental health
The appropriateness of appraising emotions could be challenged in cases of mental
illness. For instance, a person with an anxiety disorder will feel afraid much more easily
than most, but we probably wouldn't say that they were cowardly, or that their fear
was vicious (though we would say that it was unfitting). A sociopath or severely autistic
person might not empathise well  with others, but we wouldn't necessarily say that
they were inconsiderate or otherwise criticise them for this. A depressed person might
be  unenthused about  much that  it  is  worth  being  excited  about,  but  we wouldn't
criticise them for their sadness or say they were miserly or lazy. We would just say they
were depressed. 
However, I don't think cases like this show that we shouldn't ordinarily be appraised for
our emotions. Instead, they show that the evaluation of emotion and the relationship
between emotion and character is complicated and dependent on context. Of course
we  shouldn't  just  mechanically  appraise  a  person's  emotional  life  using  an
indiscriminate rule. But this doesn't mean we can't make reliable appraisals if we do so
properly aware of the context. 
As far as this thesis is concerned, I am going to limit myself to considering mentally
healthy,  neurotypical  people.  Interesting  further  work  would  need  to  be  done  to
consider just how broadly its conclusions apply and what adjustments might need to
be made in other cases.
12 Owens, David, Reason without Freedom, London: Routledge, 2000, pp115-117.
13 Aristotle, 1113b-1114a
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Chapter 3: Emotions
In this chapter I present some preliminary considerations regarding emotions which I
will argue for rather than assume. 
3.1   Terminology for the appraisal of emotions
I am going to use two sets of terms to help describe the ethical dimension of emotions.
First, I shall say that emotions are appropriate, inappropriate or neither to describe
whether they are virtuous or vicious in a certain situation:
1. Appropriate emotions are those that are virtuous in a given situation. Feeling
them is part of what it is to be virtuous, and evidence that one possesses some
relevant virtue.
2. Inappropriate emotions are those that are vicious in a given situation. Feeling
them is part of what it is to be vicious, and evidence that one possesses some
relevant vice.
3. An emotion can be neither appropriate nor inappropriate in a given situation, in
which case it is not virtuous or vicious to feel it, and feeling it would not be
evidence that one possesses any virtue or vice. Because of this possibility, to
say that an emotion is not appropriate does not imply that it is inappropriate,
and to say that it is not inappropriate does not imply that it is appropriate.
There  can  be  more  than  one  appropriate  emotional  response  to  a  situation.
Sometimes, several  emotions are appropriate together:  when entering a dangerous
situation  for  a  good  reason,  it  seems  appropriate  to  feel  a  mixture  of  fear  and
determination.  Other times, competing emotions are each virtuous on their own: if
people are needlessly suffering,  either sympathy or anger could be an appropriate
reaction. 
Second,  I  shall  say  that  emotions  are  fitting  or  unfitting  to  describe  whether  the
cognition that forms part of the emotion is accurate. For example, if feeling afraid is to
take something to be dangerous and to feel distressed and averse towards it, then it is
fitting to be afraid of something if and only if it really is dangerous. If the cognition
involved in the emotion has a normative component, this will have to be accurate as
well for the emotion to be fitting. Thus, if feeling proud involves taking oneself to have
accomplished something praiseworthy, then pride will be fitting if and only if one really
has accomplished something which really is praiseworthy. I  borrow this terminology
form D'Arms and Jacobsen14, who stress that emotions which are inappropriate can still
14 D'Arms, Justin and Jacobsen, Daniel, 'The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 
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be fitting – for instance, amusement at a cruel joke may be fitting, if the joke really is
funny, but still inappropriate, if it would be unkind to be amused by the joke in the
context in which it has been told.  I do not assume any necessary connection between
fittingness and appropriateness in this thesis. 
3.2 Different types of felt affect
3.2.1 Good and bad feelings
As  we saw in  considering  the  easy  answer,  there  seems to  be  a  clear  distinction
between emotions that feel good and emotions that feel bad. In considering how we
should feel after acting wrongly, I will be examining emotions that feel bad. It is worth
noting that the intuitive distinction between good and bad emotions may not be solely
to do with how they feel, but also to do with their cognitions. Robert Gordon argues
that  there  is  an  intuitive  distinction  between  negative  emotions  (such  as  'fear,
embarrassment, and anger') and positive emotions (such as 'pride or gladness'), and
that this distinction is not, at bottom, a distinction in how they feel. For while positive
emotions are typically pleasant, attractive feelings and negative emotions are typically
unpleasant, repellent feelings, 'there seems no reason to rule out the possibility that
someone might  find it  pleasant,  and therefore  attractive,  to  be  sad or  angry,  and
unpleasant, and aversive, to be proud'15. As well as this, Gordon claims that the fact
that certain  emotions tend to  feel  good while  others tend to feel  bad calls  for  an
explanation.  The  explanation  he  offers  is  that  the  way  emotions  usually  feel  is
influenced by their cognitive component. Negative emotions involve wishing the world
to be otherwise than one takes it to be, and naturally this wish frustration feels bad.
Positive emotions involve wishes that are satisfied by the world, and so naturally feel
good16. Gordon's distinction between emotions involving positive cognitions and those
involving negative cognitions is useful, but doesn't displace the distinction between
emotions that feel good and those that feel bad.  After all, the person whose anger
feels  unusually  good  or  whose  pride  feels  unusually  bad  is  feeling  importantly
differently from the more usual cases, and this difference is a difference in felt affect. 
Focusing in particular on the distinction that we can draw between good and bad felt
affect, rather than positive or negative cognition, how much can we helpfully say about
it? One approach is to identify good feelings with pleasant feelings, and bad feelings
with painful feelings, or at least to liken them. There are two ways this comparison
'Appropriateness' of Emotions', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 
LXI, No. 1, July 2000, pp65-90
15 Gordon, Robert, The Structure of Emotions: Investigations in Cognitive Philosophy, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987, p28
16 Gordon, p31
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could  go:  either  pleasant  and  painful  feelings  are  understood  as  similar  to  bodily
sensations, or as the sort of feelings involved in enjoying or disliking something. 
There  are  instances  of  felt  affect  which  are  quite  similar  to  bodily  sensations  of
pleasure or pain. Some good feelings are similar to pleasurable sensations, particularly
the pleasure of warmth: we can describe someone as feeling a “warm glow” when they
feel proud of themselves or a loved one. However, most good feelings are not like this:
excitement,  amusement,  and  joy  are  not  usually  similar  to  pleasant  physical
sensations. It is easier to think of sensation-like bad feelings: many bad feelings are
fairly literally uncomfortable, feelings of dread can feel painful and visceral, and we
describe anger as “hotheadedness”. When a person is sad or discouraged they may
feel weary. However, there are counterexamples here too. Loneliness and spite are not
usually similar to physical pains, and sadness doesn't always feel similar to tiredness.  
Understanding  good  and  bad  feelings  as  similar  to  feelings  of  enjoyment  and  its
opposite runs in to the problem Gordon identified: we sometimes enjoy bad feelings,
and sometimes dislike good feelings. This point still stands when we are focusing only
on what the emotions in question feel like rather than whether they seem like good or
bad emotions overall: when you enjoy getting a fright at the cinema, there is a sense
in which the fear you experience still feels bad, even at the same time as you enjoy it.
Similarly, someone who finds themselves amused at a stranger's misfortune still has a
feeling that in some sense feels good, even at the same time as they dislike having
that reaction. Should these cases be explained as cases of mixed feelings? We dislike
the fright itself,  but enjoy the relief that comes soon after;  we enjoy watching the
stranger's misfortune, but dislike the self-critical feelings that follow. Following Gordon,
I'm not convinced that such strategies will  apply to every case17.  Our fright at the
cinema can feel bad and provide an enjoyable rush all at once, and in such cases it
would be wrong to say that we dislike it and enjoy it at the very same time – the
feeling is not bad in the sense that we dislike it but in some other sense. 
So there is a sense in which a feeling can feel good (or bad) which comes apart from
the feeling being pleasant or enjoyed (or painful  or disliked). This accords with our
intuitive picture: a feeling's being a good or a bad feeling seems to be something basic
which  it  is  very  hard  to  say  anything  more  about.  Nonetheless,  we  can  capture
something of what we are getting at indirectly, in three ways. First, we should consider
why, as Gordon suggests, it seems natural that negative emotions should feel bad, so
that an emotion's negative cognition could provide an explanation of why it tends to
feel bad. So an emotion's feeling good or bad is apt to be explained by its positive or
negative cognition.
17 Gordon, p29
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Second, our having a good or bad feeling about something provides a prima facie, pro
tanto reason to favourably or unfavourably evaluate the object of the emotion that
feels that way. If I  feel happy about something that has happened to me, this is a
reason to think it was a fortunate occurrence. (Though of course it may not be a very
significant reason, there may be other reasons that tell against it, and there may be
some unusual explanation of my happiness that undermines such a reason entirely). It
might be objected that only the overall emotion provides this reason, not its felt affect,
but this is not the case. If I were experiencing an unusual emotion whereby I took what
had happened to be fortunate but felt  bad about  it  –  perhaps because I  feel  it  is
undeserved, or perhaps not for any reason I am aware of – this would not provide as
strong a reason to think things were going well for me. And if I were experiencing an
undirected  mood  that  felt  good,  this  would  still  provide  a  reason  to  think  that
something somehow were going well for me. 
Third, good feelings are normally good good for us, and bad feelings are normally bad
for us. There are clear exceptions, such as when it is appropriate for us to feel bad, or
when we enjoy being frightened by a scary movie. However, there are explanations for
why it is good to feel bad in these cases. In the absence of such an explanation, it is
clearly better for us to feel good, and worse for us to feel bad. 
To point out these features of good and bad feeling is not to directly describe them; it
isn't quite right to say that feeling distraught is to feel like something is going badly for
you, or that it feels concordant with that thought. Whether good and bad feelings have
some  essential  felt  characteristic  in  common,  or  whether  they  are  simply  sets  of
feelings, I therefore leave an open question. However, an indirect description of good
and bad feelings can still help us to to form a judgement in a case which isn't clear to
us. We should ask whether feeling a certain way seems concordant with a positive (or
negative) cognition? Does it seem like a reason to think something is going well (or
badly)? Is feeling it in itself good (or bad) for the person feeling it?
We can test our intuitions on these points heuristically by placing a description of the
felt affect in a statement that describes it as having the features of good or bad felt
affect in as general a way as possible, and seeing how that sentence strikes us. For
instance, to test for whether an affect feels bad, we could use the following:
He feels (…). It seems like things are going badly for him. 
He feels (…). Perhaps something is wrong.
He feels (…). He probably takes it that something is wrong. 
The first is designed to get at our sense that feeling bad is normally bad for the person
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feeling it; the second, to get at our sense that feeling bad is a reason to evaluate the
object of the emotion unfavourably; the third, to get at our sense that bad feelings are
concordant with negative cognitions. 
In  the  case  where  (…)  describes  a  way  of  feeling  bad  we  should  come  out  with
sensible-looking sentences, such as:
He feels (sick to his stomach). It seems like things are going badly for him. 
He feels (aggravated and bitter). Perhaps something is wrong.
He feels (hot and bothered). He probably takes it that something is wrong. 
In the case where (…) describes a way of feeling good, we come out with odd-looking
sentences, such as:
He feels (warm and fuzzy). It seems like things are going badly for him. 
He feels (pumped up and excited). Perhaps something is wrong.
He feels (glad). He probably takes it that something is wrong. 
However, this is a fairly rough and ready approach, not a perfect test: sometimes the
sentences will still sound a little unnatural even in a case where the feeling really is
bad:
He feels (irritated and antsy). It seems like things are going badly for him.
 He feels (irritated and antsy). Perhaps something is wrong.
He feels (irritated and antsy). He probably takes it that something is wrong. 
In this case, our background knowledge of how easy it is to be irritated when nothing is
really wrong (and even when we know it!) makes us hesitant. Nonetheless, reflecting
on why it sounds wrong can help us correct for this, and it doesn't sound nearly so bad
as when we were describing good feelings. A reasonable test for this is whether small
adjustments can make the sentences sound better while still keeping them faithful to
the features they are supposed to test our intuitions about. In the case of irritation, but
not of warm and fuzzy feelings, this can be done:
He  feels  (irritated  and  ansty).  It  seems  like  things  could  be  going  better  
for him.
 He feels (irritated and antsy). It's possible something is wrong.
He  feels  (irritated  and  antsy).  He  probably  wishes  something  were  
different.
Page 23 of 140
Similar heuristics can be provided for good feelings:
She feels (…). It seems like things are going well for her. 
She feels (…). Perhaps something is going well.
She feels (…). She probably takes it that something is going well. 
3.2.2 Strong and weak feelings
The second distinction I wish to consider is that between strong and weak feelings: this
is the distinction we make between feeling frightened and terrified, or between feeling
pleased and overjoyed. It is also the distinction we make between feeling very angry,
quite angry, and a little angry, or when we say that one person was more or less angry
than another.
The felt affect of an emotion can be strong or weak independently of its cognition:
some people are strongly afraid of mice, but this isn't usually because they take mice
to be very dangerous. Rather, they take mice to be a little dangerous, but experience
strong feelings of fear about them. 
There are several ways in which a feeling can be strong. A strong fear may be intense,
but quickly pass, as when we are “given a terrible fright”, or it may be less intense, but
lingering or preoccupying, as when we dread an upcoming exam. These two sorts of
fear feel quite different but both are strong feelings.
I  find it  helpful  to  apply  parts  of  Bentham's  hedonic  calculus  here18.  Although the
calculus aims to establish the value of a pleasure or pain, rather than its strength,
most of its considerations are relevant to strength. First of all, an intense feeling is
certainly a stronger feeling. It is also natural to describe feelings of longer duration as
stronger:  if  we are both upset by something and experience sadness of  the same
intensity, but I am sad for a week and you for a day, then we would say that I was
more upset by what happened than you. 
The certainty and propinquity of feelings are not relevant to their strength. Bentham
includes these factors because he is concerned with the value we should place on
uncertain or distant pleasures. 
The fecundity and purity of a feeling (its tendency to be followed by feelings of the
same kind, or not to be followed by feelings of a different kind) also contribute to its
strength. Sometimes we are upset by something, but don't realise how strongly we
18 Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Chapter 4. 
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really feel. We don't feel intensely sad, and we don't feel sad about what has happened
for very long, so we think that we were just a little upset. But over the next few days
we feel sad and frustrated rather more easily than usual, and don't enjoy ourselves like
we normally would. Sooner or later, we realise what we are really upset about, and
that our first reaction was stronger than we originally realised.
It  might  be  objected  that  our  feelings,  including  strong  ones,  are  frequently
ambivalent. A person might be very glad that a friend is doing well, but at the same
time very envious of them. Does this really mean that each feeling weaker, because it
is impure? Now, certainly each feeling can be very strong, but I think this is because
they can clearly both be intense or long-lasting feelings. The feelings could also both
be fecund, though this seems less likely: perhaps this person will experience the same
sort of ambivalent feelings a lot over the next few weeks. Nonetheless, it is correct to
infer that the person we are imagining is neither as glad for their friend nor as envious
as they might be, because their feelings are impure. We wouldn't say that the friend
was whole-heartedly glad, precisely because of their ambivalent feelings, and, other
things equal, a whole-hearted gladness is a stronger gladness.
3.3. Occurrent and dispositional emotions
It is clear that we speak of emotions dispositionally as well as occurrently, just as we
speak of beliefs dispositionally and occurrently. Imagine that Daisy's parents are about
to take her on her first trip abroad. We ask her parents whether she feels excited or
nervous about the trip, and they say that she is excited about it. This can be true even
if Daisy isn't gripped by excitement at the moment we have the conversation: she
could be sound asleep, or engrossed in a book. What makes the parents' claim true is
that Daisy does feel excited about the trip enough of the time, and when she thinks
about the trip in particular.
I will usually talk about emotions dispositionally in this thesis. When I say an emotion is
appropriate without specifying the appropriate time to feel it, I don't meant that the
agent ought to feel it constantly. Instead, I mean that the agent ought to feel it some
of the time. When I describe an emotion as inappropriate without specifying a time, I
mean the opposite: that the agent ought never to feel it. This is the most suitable
approach because it is unreasonable to expect wrongdoers to feel bad about what they
have done constantly, or on a precise schedule. It is enough that they feel bad about
what they have done some of the time, rather than not at all, and that they feel bad
about  what  they  have  done  while  attending  to  it.  Firstly,  this  is  because  feeling
constant guilt, or shame or remorse would be to feel extremely strongly about what
had happened;  this  would  almost  always  be  to  feel  too  strongly.  Secondly,  this  is
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because there will be other emotions the wrongdoer ought sometimes to feel instead,
such as glad when their friends are doing well. While we can feel several emotions at
once, it isn't always appropriate to do so. As I argued in the previous section, feeling
ambivalent  gladness  is,  other  things  equal,  feeling  a  weaker  gladness,  and  one
sometimes ought to be very glad for one's friends. 
3.4 Arguments that I will be avoiding
To present the strongest case in the face of doubts about the ethical  relevance of
emotions,  in  Part  Two  I  will  be  avoiding  the  use  of  certain  arguments  for  the
appropriateness of emotions which fall short of being decisive. 
The first sort of argument I will avoid relies on the instrumental benefits of emotion.
For  instance,  emotions  frequently  motivate  us  to  do  something  we  ought  to  be
motivated to do, and when that is the case it can be a reason for us to feel those
emotions. As another example, emotions frequently serve to direct our attention in
beneficial ways, as when fear alerts us to danger. The first weakness of this sort of
argument is that it is very likely that there will be another way to receive the benefit
which doesn't rely on feeling that emotion. It may seem that what is really important is
just the benefit, not the emotion itself: the instrumental benefits of an emotion do not
make it any more appropriate than other ways of securing the same benefits. A second
weakness is that the instrumental benefits of the emotion will not usually be essential
to  it.  It  is  an  instrumental  benefit  of  fear  that  it  often  causes  us  to  retreat  from
dangerous situations, but fear can cause us to freeze up instead. It can therefore be
argued  that  the  better  way  to  secure  the  benefit  of  retreating  from  dangerous
situations is to be alert to danger and knowledgeable about how to react, so that we
can freeze or retreat as appropriate, rather than as fear prompts us to. 
The second set of arguments I will be avoiding as indecisive are those that argue an
emotion  is  appropriate  because  human  nature  is  such  that  virtuous  people  are
disposed to feel it in certain situations. For instance, we might argue that even though
guilt and remorse in a case where we cause a terrible outcome faultlessly are not
fitting, we are right to judge agents who do not feel such reactions harshly, because
that is just what well-adjusted, virtuous, mature humans do feel in such situations. In
such situations feeling guilty is a mark of virtue, and not feeling it is a mark of vice. 
The weakness of this sort of argument is that it is really only an epistemic argument,
not a normative one. If virtuous people tend to exhibit anger in some situations then
this can justify our judging people who don't get angry poorly, and suggest that anger
is  appropriate,  but  it  is  not  itself  the  reason  that  anger  is  appropriate.  Without
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identifying why anger is appropriate, the connection between anger and virtue seems
merely contingent.  Furthermore, this sort of argument cannot bear much weight in
particular  cases.  Imagine  we  are  blaming someone for  not  feeling  angry,  because
human nature is such that good people get angry in a situation like theirs. They could
always reply that they are an exception to that general fact about human nature, since
they don't get angry in situations like this but are otherwise similar to virtuous people.
We must provide a further normative argument to show that anger really is appropriate
in their situation to defeat this response.  
3.5 Arguments from valuing
One sort of argument I  will  rely on is that feeling a certain emotion is appropriate
because it is a part of what it is to value or to care about something we ought to value
or care about. I call these 'arguments from valuing'.
Arguments  from  valuing  draw  on  a  general  claim  defended  by  Samuel  Scheffler.
Scheffler argues that valuing involves being 'emotionally vulnerable': disposed to react
emotionally to various situations involving that which we value. Scheffler proposes that
this emotional vulnerability is what makes the difference between valuing something
and merely desiring it, or between valuing something and merely believing it to be
valuable.19 Caring about something also involves emotional vulnerability in the same
way; the main difference between them is that valuing something implies a positive
judgement or attitude towards what we value, while caring or being concerned does
not, since we can care about things like poverty or injustice.20 It is not important for my
purposes whether Sheffler's account is true for all cases of valuing and caring; it is only
important whether it is true in the particular cases I consider. The cases that I rely on
in Part Two are valuing our virtue, valuing living a good life, and caring about people
we have wrongly harmed. I will argue that Scheffler's thesis is particularly strong in
these cases.
However, the fact that valuing something involves emotional vulnerability to it is not
by itself an argument that we ought to feel any particular emotion about it. On its own,
it is only an argument that it would be inappropriate not to feel anything. To argue that
a particular emotion is appropriate because of the role it plays in valuing something, I
will argue that being vulnerable to that emotion is part of the best way of valuing it,
and that other patterns of emotional vulnerability would be inappropriate.
19 Scheffler, 'Valuing', in his Equality and Tradition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
pp15-40
20 Scheffler, pp25-6. Scheffler only considers caring; I take concern to be the same or 
a very similar concept. However, speaking of concern for a person does not have 
the same connotation of a close personal relationship that speaking of caring about
them does, which is helpful for my purposes. 
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Chapter 4: When does the past matter?
4.1 Mattering
Something matters if it makes a difference; hence, what matters always matters to
something. We can ask if something matters when it comes to right or wrong, or to
what a particular agent ought to do: “does it matter that Harold's oath to William was
coerced?”. We can ask if something matters to how a person's life is going: “does the
spelling bee really matter?”. Or we can ask if something matters to the outcome of a
football match: “is this a match where the players' endurance will matter?”. 
In this thesis I consider the ways in which our past wrongdoing matters to how we
ought to feel now. In asking this question, it  is assumed that how we feel matters
ethically. I have already said a little in defence of this assumption, in section 2.3.4. It is
also assumed that some facts about the past matter to how we ought to feel in the
present.  In  this  chapter,  I  defend the  general  principle  that  a  fact  about  the  past
matters to how someone ought to feel if and only if it affects their eudaimonia. I call
this the Eudaimonia Principle. 
Before defending the Eudaimonia Principle I will consider and criticise some alternative
approaches.  I  will  then explain  the  Eudaimonia Principle  and how it  addresses the
weaknesses of  the  alternatives.  Finally,  I  present  an  argument  for  the  Eudaimonia
Principle and defend it from objections. 
4.1.1 Mattering and reasons
In some cases, mattering is connected to reasons. It seems clear that if something
matters to what Fred ought to do, then it provides a reason for Fred to do it. Similarly,
if something matters to what Sally ought to feel, then it provides a reason for Sally to
feel that way. 
However, I won't be analysing mattering in terms of reasons, because the strength and
extent of  the connection is controversial.  For example, is it  true that if  Fred has a
reason to do something, then that reason matters to what Fred ought to do? On the
one hand, it seems close to a tautology to say that our reasons to do things to matter
to what we ought to do.  But on the other hand,  if  we already have overwhelming
reasons to do something, a new, small reason not to do it may not seem to matter, if
it's too small to make a difference. 
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4.2 Alternatives to the Eudaimonia Principle
4.2.1 The past doesn't matter
Perhaps the past simply doesn't matter to how we should feel. On this view, the past is
how it is, our feelings won't change it, and getting all het up about it is foolishness. It is
better for us to move on than to fruitlessly feel bad about things we can't change, and
it  is  better  for  us  to  keep  moving  forward  than  to  idly  feel  good  about  past
accomplishments. How we ought to feel is determined by present considerations. 
This leaves some room for the past to matter indirectly, because the past of course
makes a difference to how the present turns out. I ought to feel excited or glad when I
am about to meet a friend I haven't seen in a while. That I will meet my friend soon is
what matters here, but the fact that we are friends, and that their visit is a special
occasion, depends on how things were in the past. However, if the past only matters in
this way, how we ended up in the position we are now in never makes a difference to
how we should feel about it.
This approach carries some initial plausibility because we often think that people would
do better if they let go of the past – if they “let bygones be bygones” – especially when
the present consequences of keeping hold of it are bad. Similarly, people who obsess
over past glories while achieving nothing new seem to do poorly for that reason. Still,
the approach should be rejected because it contradicts too much of what we take to be
clear. For example, we ought to be proud of our achievements, if we accomplished
them in the right way. Building a successful business is something to be proud of, and
it matters that one built it, not just that one owns it. Inheriting a business wouldn't
make the same sort of difference to how we should feel. Nor is the consideration that
matters whether one is  talented and industrious,  rather  than whether one owns a
business. While it is good to be talented and industrious, simply having the potential to
accomplish  something is  not  the  same as  actually  accomplishing it,  and does not
warrant  the  same degree  of  pride.  As  another  example,  if  our  house  burnt  down
accidentally, we should feel sad. If an arsonist set it ablaze, we should feel angry. It
matters how we got to where we are today.
4.2.2 The past is like the present
At the other extreme, perhaps there is no real difference between the past and the
present when it comes to what matters to how we should feel. On this view mattering
is something that is determined once and for all. If I needed some help on Monday, it
mattered to you on Monday: it was a reason for sympathy (and for helping me). If it
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mattered on Monday it will still matter on Tuesday. If you helped me, it will be a reason
for you to feel pleased with yourself; otherwise, it will be a reason to feel contrite, or
glad that someone else could help.  In the distant future it  will  still  matter. Though
presumably  less  important  and less  urgent,  you  will  still  have reasons  to  respond
happily or sadly if you remember the incident.
This view is unpersuasive because it makes the past matter much too frequently and
for far too long. On this view, if a fairground ride which you took aged five was thrilling
enough to matter to you then, it still matters to you now, however long it has been.
Even if you can't remember it anymore, it still matters to how you ought to feel, and
you are at a small risk of feeling the wrong way if you have forgotten it. Similarly, if
you ate a tasty meal yesterday, if it was tasty enough that you should have enjoyed it
(you'd  have  been  intemperately  denying  yourself  pleasure  otherwise),  then  it  still
matters to you today as well. Don't forget about it when someone asks you how you
feel this morning!
4.2.3 Gardner's Continuity Thesis
Another possibility I take from John Gardner. Gardner's Continuity Thesis is proposed as
a general truth about reasons: that 'reasons await full conformity'. This means that 'If
one does not conform fully to a reason […] the reason does not evaporate […] Instead
it now counts as a reason for doing the next best thing'.21 Gardner also holds that when
full conformity to a reason is impossible, the reason now counts as a reason to regret
not having fully conformed: 'Regret is the rational response to any measure of non-
conformity with any reason, and the reason for the regret is the very same reason that
was  incompletely  conformed  to  (coupled,  of  course,  with  the  fact  of  incomplete
conformity to it)'22.
As well as ceasing to exist if we conform to them fully, Gardner holds that hypothetical
reasons can cease to exist if our goals or desires change23. If my goal is to watch every
Hollywood action movie, then showings of such movies at cinemas will matter to me. If
I  fail  to  conform to  the  reasons  I  have to  attend those movies,  they  will  become
reasons  to  regret  not  having  seen  them yet.  But  if  I  abandon  my  goal,  the  past
showings won't give me those reasons any longer. A categorical reason, on the other
hand,  will  always  await  full  conformity,  whether  you  like  it  or  not.  However,  just
because they are still around does not mean they will be decisive: they will often be
21 Gardner, John 'Wrongs and Faults', in A. P. Simester, Appraising Strict Liability, Oxford 
University Press, 2005. p57
22 Gardner, p58
23 Gardner, p59
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outweighed24.
The Continuity Thesis is not intended as an account of when the past matters to how
we should feel. However, it suggests a natural modification to the view that the past is
like the present:  that the past matters to how we ought to feel only until  we fully
conform to the reasons it provides, or until those reasons cease to exist because our
goals or desires change. After that, it doesn't matter any more. On this account the
past matters much less frequently (and for not nearly as long) than if mattering is once
and for all. This is because facts which once mattered to us will frequently (though not
necessarily) stop mattering once we have fully conformed to the reasons they provided
us with, or once our goals and desires change. To return to the previous example, if
you enjoyed the fairground ride or the tasty meal at the time, thus conforming to your
reason, then those things don't continue to matter afterwards. 
Despite not generating so many instances of the past mattering as the view that the
past  is  like  the  present,  this  account  is  still  vulnerable  to  the  same  objection:  it
generates too much mattering. Suppose that I need your help, and this gives you a
reason to help me. If you don't help me, that reason awaits conformity, and becomes a
reason for you to regret not helping me (and perhaps to apologise). But suppose that
you don't feel any regret, and don't apologise. The reason will keep waiting, however
stubborn you are. If  you never conform to the reasons provided by the fact  that I
needed help, then that fact will always be a reason for you to feel something. This
remains the case no matter how much time passes and no matter how small the effect
on either of our lives is, as long as the reasons involved are categorical, or as long as
your relevant goals haven’t changed.
I  am not  convinced that  a small  reason to  help somebody can last  for  most  of  a
person's lifetime, if they continually fail to conform to it. It doesn't make a difference to
this  case that our  goals will  have changed.  Even though it  isn't  very weighty,  the
reason to help a stranger read a map is categorical: we have a reason to be helpful
whether  we want  to  or  not.  Because it  is  a  small  reason,  it  may be permanently
outweighed, so Gardner is not committed to the conclusion that we  ought  to regret
failing to help the stranger. But we still need to justify the assertion that there is such
an outweighed reason for regret, rather than no such reason at all.
The persuasiveness of the Continuity Thesis could itself be seen as the explanation of
such  a  reason:  the  mere  passing  of  time  doesn't  explain  why  a  reason  should
evaporate, and we do not want to make the mistake of thinking 'that at every moment
24 Gardner, p59
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we start  again  from  tabula  rasa,  rationally  speaking.'25 However,  there  is  an  ample
middle  ground  between  Gardner's  position  and  the  view  that  past  reasons  are
completely irrelevant. There is also considerable reason to doubt the Continuity Thesis
itself. It is not literally true in the ontological sense: after non-comformity to a reason,
the fact that provides the reason changes, because we must add to it the fact of our
non-comformity, and the action recommended by the reason changes, because it is
now  a  reason  to  do  the  next  best  thing.  If  both  of  these  things  have  changed,
everything about the reason has changed: it is a new reason. It is clearly right that
failures to conform to reasons are usually themselves reasons to do the next best
thing, but why should we agree that this is always the case, rather than usually?
Setting aside the Continuity Thesis, I cannot see an explanation of why we have a
reason to feel bad about not helping a stranger read a map forty years ago. Forty years
ago, the original reason might be explained by the benefit of helping them, by the
importance of generosity, or by a duty to be helpful. Shortly afterwards, a reason to
regret not helping might be explained by the fact that they might now be lost, by the
virtue of generosity, or by our recent breach of duty. But what explains why it is still a
reason today, forty years later? Generous people, or those on their way to becoming
generous, don't usually regret small, forty-year old mistakes. The stranger is certainly
not lost any more, and almost certainly has forgotten the whole affair. To say a forty
years passed breach of duty is a reason for regret would be extreme. 
Suppose,  however,  that  Gardner  is  correct about  reasons.  In this  case,  we can no
longer assumer that the past matters to us for as long as it gives us some reason. On
this view, we would have very many reasons grounded in facts about the past, but only
a subset of those reasons would matter to how we ought to feel now. Many of the
reasons, like the reason to regret not helping a stranger map-read forty years ago,
would be so weak that we ought simply to ignore them. If we take this view, we still
need an explanation of when the past provides a strong enough reason to matter to
how we ought to feel. 
4.2.4 Gradually fading importance
One possible explanation is that facts about the past gradually matter less and less,
until after a suitable time they no longer matter at all. A very important consideration
will endure for a long time in this way, but a slight consideration will not last very long.
Thus,  we will  not  be  faced with small  considerations  from our  pasts  continuing to
matter as we grow old – only something very important will  matter that long. This
move is appealing because it reconciles our intuitions that the past clearly matters in a
25 Gardner, p58
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lot  of  cases,  but  rarely  matters  for  a  very  long  time.  It  therefore  addresses  the
objection that the previous two accounts create too much mattering.
This account is a reasonable default position, but it is vague in several respects. Just
how long does it take for importance to fade out? Does the importance of different
sorts of considerations fade out at a uniform rate? Is there anything about the past
that  could  matter  forever?  And  while  it  seems  roughly  right  that  how  important
something is fades over time, it is a little mysterious exactly why this should be so.
These  objections  aren't  enough  to  rule  out  this  view,  but  I  will  argue  that  the
Eudaimonia Principle provides us with a more precise account and a better explanation
of why things stop mattering after enough time has passed.
4.3 The Eudaimonia Principle
The Eudaimonia Principle is that a fact about the past matters to how someone ought
to feel if and only if it affects their eudaimonia. Just what this means will depend on our
account of eudaimonia, and the ways in which facts about the past can affect it. 
4.3.1 Eudaimonia
I have in mind Eudaimonia as Aristotle uses the concept in the Nicomachean Ethics.
Eudaimonia is the good life for a human: a life filled with virtuous activity.26 It is living
and doing well. As well as virtue, a modest supply of external goods (food, shelter,
health, friends etc.) is necessary for eudaimonia, but is insufficient for it on its own.27
We  will  lack  eudaimonia  if  our  life  is  marred  by  catastrophic  misfortune,  but
eudaimonia is resilient to minor misfortunes, and, similarly, not further enhanced by
minor fortunes.28 Whether or not someone is eudaimon is primarily a judgement we
make of their life as a whole.29
I have in mind an inclusive interpretation of eudaimonia. This means that eudaimonia
is a life that accords with all the virtues.30 The contrasting dominant interpretation is
that  eudaimonia is  a  life  filled  with action that  accords  with  the  highest  virtue  of
wisdom. I also have in mind a pluralist interpretation of eudaimonia. This means that
there are many ways to live a good life: there are often many ways to live virtuously,
and what the virtuous action is sometimes depends on who you are, or what situation
you find yourself in. For instance, eudaimonia requires that we pursue productive or
26 Aristotle, 1098a15-20
27 Aristotle, 1099a25-b10
28 Aristotle, 1100b20-35
29 Aristotle, 1098a15-20
30 Ackrill, J. L., 'Aristotle on Eudaimonia', in Rorty, Amelie, ed., Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, 
Berkeley: Univeristy of California Press, 1980, pp 15-34 
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creative projects in a committed way, striving for excellence. I write philosophy and
cook,  but you could live a good life  conducting scientific research and playing the
violin. Eudaimonia also requires us to be brave. But the actions that would be brave for
me are different to those that would be brave for a police officer or fire fighter. 
Finally,  I  have in  mind an interpretation  of  eudaimonia  whereby  it  is  not  an ideal
standard, a perfect target at which we aim but never hit. Eudaimonia is achievable for
humans: there are people who live good lives. Thus, at some point we have enough
external goods, and our actions are virtuous enough, that our lives just are good ones.
Aristotle says eudaimonia is 'lacking in nothing'.31 As I interpret this, it means not that
the eudaimon person “has it all”, that nothing could improve their life in any way, but
rather that they have enough, and their life is not going badly because of a lack of
anything. Eudaimonia is therefore not the same thing as welfare. My welfare could
always be increased a little further. The tomato in my salad could be a little fresher,
my dreams could be a little sweeter, my lifespan could be a little longer. In contrast, at
some point  I  cannot be more eudaimon:  my actions are virtuous and my external
goods are ample. There is an upper bound to eudaimonia. It might seem like we could
always be a little more eudaimon by being a little more virtuous, but this is to consider
eudaimonia as a perfect ideal and not as something achievable. There may be such an
ideal, but I am not talking about it here.
4.3.2 Affecting eudaimonia
How does the past affect our eudaimonia? It can have a direct effect: whether or not
our life is going well of course depends on what has happened in it so far. It can also
have indirect effects of two kinds. First, facts about the past affect what is virtuous (or
vicious) in the present. This in turn affects eudaimonia because virtuous (or vicious)
actions affect our eudaimonia, as eudaimonia is a life of virtuous activity. Second, facts
about the past affect what we need for eudaimonia, and whether we have what we
need. 
The past can have a direct effect on our eudaimonia in a few ways. Most importantly,
our past behaviour affects our eudaimonia. Eudaimonia is a life of virtuous activity. If I
have done  anything  especially  virtuous  in  the  past,  or  if  I  have a  long history  of
virtuous behaviour, that will mean my life is more eudaimon. If I have done anything
especially  vicious,  or  if  I  have  a  long  history  of  vicious  behaviour,  I  will  be  less
eudaimon. If my record is generally virtuous, that is a reason to be pleased, satisfied,
and proud. If not, that is a reason to feel regret. However, as eudaimonia is viewed
over a whole lifetime, and as it does not demand perfection, some parts of my history
31 Aristotle, 1097b5-25
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will not affect it. Like most children, I was sometimes quite unkind growing up. But as
long as I learn to be kind and live my adult life kindly, I can still be eudaimon, and I
oughtn't to regret the vices of my youth, just as you oughtn't to criticise me for them.
In this way, a threshold of significance is built into the concept of eudaimonia.
It is also important how certain things have turned out for us. Suppose I am committed
to the goal of writing a collection of poetry. If I  have produced a good collection of
poetry,  then my life  is  better  for  it,  and it  is  something to  be  proud of.  And it  is
something to be proud of beyond the virtuous activity that produced it: if the poems
are destroyed in a fire, my life would be worse for their loss, even though it would still
be true that I had written them. For another example, it makes a difference to my
eudaimonia whether my close friends and family are doing well. Even if their doing
poorly is no fault of mine, my life goes better when those I share it with do well too.
The past has an indirect effect on eudaimonia by determining what is virtuous now.
The example of the promise illustrates one way in which something about the past can
determine what is virtuous in the present. The virtue of faithfulness (usually) requires
me to keep my promises, so if I promised to meet you then that (usually) makes my
meeting you virtuous. As well as itself determining what action is virtuous, the past is
also epistemically relevant. Suppose I am deciding whether to eat a second slice of
cake. I ought to consider how I felt afterwards, the last time I had two slices of cake. If
it made me feel ill, then it would definitely be temperate of me to abstain this time.
But that it made me ill last time isn't what  makes  taking a second slice intemperate.
Instead it is evidence that two slices is too much cake.
The other indirect effects of the past on eudaimonia are those that affect what we
need  for  eudaimonia,  and  whether  or  not  we  have  it.  I've  already  argued  that  it
matters to our eudaimonia whether we are successful in our goals. However, this isn't
just a matter of what our goals are right now. While our goals can change, they remain
partly determined by our past actions and intentions. If I struggle for thirty years to
produce a poetry collection and fail, I may through my hands in the air and say “bah, I
don't care about poetry anymore, I give up!”. However, even if I'm completely sincere,
this isn't sufficient to make poetry irrelevant to my eudaimonia. My life goes better if in
the end I regain my ambition and succeed as a poet. Similarly, it is important that my
friends do well. But even though we do drift apart from old friends and make new ones,
the past still matters when it comes to the question of who my friends are. A history of
close friendship can make it  the case that our eudaimonia is affected by how our
friend's life goes. The significance threshold built into eudaimonia operates here too:
not all of our projects and relationships affect what we require to live a good life even
after we give them up – only those that are particularly important. 
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Finally, the past clearly affects our supply of external goods, which can in turn affect
our eudaimonia, if the difference is significant enough. If I suffer a bad period of illness
while young, I may be more prone to ill-health throughout my life and this could make
me less eudaimon. If I win the lottery, and manage the windfall carefully, I will be safe
from  financial  hardship  from  then  on,  and  this  will  make  it  easier  for  me  to  be
eudaimon. 
4.4 Defending the Eudaimonia Principles
I will defend the Eudaimonia Principle by defending each of the narrower claims that it
implies. The Eudaimonia Principle is that the past matters to how we ought to feel if
and only if  it  affects our eudaimonia.  Since the past can affect  our eudaimonia in
several ways, the principle claims that each of these effects is sufficient for the past to
matter to how we ought to feel, and that their disjunction is necessary for the past to
matter. I will defend each of these points in turn. 
4.4.1 A direct effect on eudaimonia is sufficient for the past to matter
Why does everything about our past that affects our eudaimonia matter to how we
should feel? This position cannot be defended by the particular arguments that I will
make later as to why one should feel guilt, or shame, or any other particular emotion
in certain sorts of cases. These arguments are not sufficiently general.
An argument from valuing is sufficiently broad. I ought to care about my eudaimonia:
not  much seems more important  to  me than whether  or  not  I  live  my life  well.32
Therefore,  I  ought to react emotionally to the things that make my life go well  or
poorly. For example, I should be proud of my accomplishments, and I should feel sad if
my friends are doing badly. If I don't, then it seems that I don't really care about those
things, and they are things that I ought to care about. 
It may seem that this would lead to a very backward-looking life, and that this may not
be the best way to live. However, it is only a dispositional emotion that is required to
care about something. If I ought to care about my poetry then I ought to feel proud of
it,  or  to  get  excited  about  performing  it,  but  obviously  I  shouldn't  feel  this  way
constantly. That my feelings are usually directed towards other things isn't by itself a
good reason to doubt that I care about my poetry.
As well as this, the Eudaimonia Principle doesn't claim that we always have a reason to
32 Dworkin, Ronald, Justice for Hedgehogs. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011. 
pp202-209
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feel, for instance, proud of all of the virtuous actions we have ever performed. Only
those  actions,  or  collections  of  actions,  that  are  significant  enough  to  affect  our
eudaimonia  provide  such  reasons.  This  significance  threshold  is  a  considerable
advantage of the eudaimonia principle over accounts that take mattering to be once
and for alI, or that are based on Gardner's Continuity Thesis. For example, if I have
always  been scrupulously  punctual  then that  matters,  and I  will  have a reason to
sometimes feel proud of having always been so reliable. I don't have a reason, not
even  an  outweighed  one,  to  be  proud  of  having  arrived for  the  bus  on  time  this
morning, even though that was virtuous of me. It doesn't matter, because it just isn't
significant to my life as a whole.
Finally, even if I am wrong that those things which have made our lives better or worse
are things we should care about and be emotionally vulnerable to, surely the fact that
something directly affects our eudaimonia at least makes it less inappropriate to feel
proud of it, or sad about it, or to feel some other fitting emotional response. Even if
feeling proud of our accomplishments was a waste of time, it would be much worse to
feel  proud of  something utterly insignificant,  or of  our worst  failings.  This  is  a still
significant normative difference.
4.4.2 Affecting what we need for eudaimonia and whether we have it is sufficient for 
the past to matter
The argument from valuing, which I used to show that a direct effect on eudaimonia
matters to  how one should feel,  can be extended to  effects  on what  we need for
eudaimonia and whether we have what we need. It is clear that we should care about
whether or not we have enough to live the good life – it would be odd to care about
living  a  good  life  but  not  about  having  the  prerequisites.  Since  valuing  involves
emotional vulnerability, we ought to feel something about having what we need, or
not. 
However, it is very important to remember that not all that much is needed to live a
good life. We need some good friends, but we don't need to be exceptionally popular.
We  need  secure  access  to  life's  necessities,  but  we  don't  need  to  be  fabulously
wealthy. As such, I ought to be grateful for growing up in the UK in the late 20th and
early 21st century: I benefit from education, freedom, wealth and security that make
my eudaimonia more easily attainable. This degree of good fortune matters. But it's
not the case that I ought to be grateful for how sunny it was last Thursday afternoon. It
was pleasant, but viewed on its own it didn't affect my eudaimonia. My life would have
gone just as well  if it had been overcast.  Last week's sunshine doesn't matter any
more.
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4.4.3 Affecting what is virtuous in the present is sufficient for the past to matter
It is clear that the effect of the past on what is virtuous in the present sometimes
matters to what we ought to do. The past can make a normative difference, as when
you ought to babysit for your colleague, because you previously promised that you
would. It can also provide a relevant epistemic consideration: your friend has always
gotten very anxious about exams, so the kind thing to do is to spend time with them to
help keep them calm, even before they get anxious about the exam coming up. 
The Eudaimonia Principle is in two ways stronger than this clear starting point. First, it
holds that the effect of the past on what is virtuous matters to how we ought to feel as
well as how we ought to act. Second, it holds that the effect of the past on what is
virtuous always matters in this way, rather than that it sometimes does. 
The effect of the past on what is virtuous matters to how we feel as well as how we act
because feeling is also an important part of what it is to be virtuous and to live a good
life. When you help your friend, there are appropriate and inappropriate ways for you
to feel about that. Depending on the details of the case, it could be appropriate to
enjoy their company, or to feel concerned or worried for them, to feel confident, or to
feel  glad to be of help.  But it  would be inappropriate to resent them for being so
feeble, to feel bored, or contemptuous, or to enjoy their discomfort. 
There are times where virtue calls for us to feel very little, as when careful, technical
judgement  is  needed.  There  are  also  times  where  most  emotions  seem  neither
appropriate nor inappropriate. If an atrocity has occurred, it could be acceptable to feel
any of a wide range of reactions – sadness, fear, resentment, anger, numbness, shock,
pity – none of which we would call appropriate because it isn't a failure of virtue not to
feel them. However, what is virtuous in these cases still matters to how we ought to
feel: virtues can recommend feeling dispassionate, or explain why many emotions are
all acceptable. The same is true regarding actions: sometimes a virtue matters to what
we do by recommending that we do nothing, and sometimes it matters by making
many actions permissible. 
Finally,  virtue  matters  to  action  and  feeling  even  if  it  is  outweighed  by  another
consideration. Perhaps, all  things considered, you oughtn't to help your friend with
exams, and you oughtn't to worry about them – you are busy with your own exams,
and  perhaps  studiousness  outweighs  kindness  in  this  situation.  Still,  it  is  less
inappropriate  to  worry  about  them than it  would be  if  they were always cool  and
collected about exams, and in this way it still  matters that past exams have made
them anxious.
Page 38 of 140
4.4.4 Some effect on eudaimonia is necessary for the past to matter
So far I've shown that an effect on eudaimonia is sufficient for the past to matter to
how we ought to feel. But why is an effect on eudaimonia necessary for the past to
matter?
In  considering  alternative  approaches  to  mattering,  we  saw  that  taking  things  to
matter  once  and  for  all,  or  for  as  long  as  the  reasons  they  provide  await  full
conformity,  led  to  too  much  mattering.  Because  nothing  affects  our  eudaimonia
without being significant, the necessary condition of the Eudaimonia Principle prevents
this  problem,  by  setting  a  threshold  of  significance  below which  the  past  doesn't
matter to how we should feel. The best alternative response to the problem is to hold
that the importance of the past gradually fades. Many things will matter to how we
ought to feel for a little while, but only important things will continue to matter for very
long. So the question becomes: why prefer the Eudaimonia Principle to this account? I
will  argue  that  the  Eudamonia  Principle  has  greater  explanatory  power,  and  that
gradually fading importance gives the wrong account in some cases.
That the importance of the past to how we ought to feel gradually fades explains some
of our intuitions about when the past matters. We agree that it matters to whether you
should feel upset with your partner if they argued with you yesterday, but we don't
think the same argument will  still  matter twenty years later  – not unless it  was a
devastating  argument  in  the  first  place.  This  sort  of  pattern  seems  to  hold  quite
generally,  so  the  general  principle  that  the  importance  of  past  occurrences  fades
seems a good explanation of it.
However,  while  gradually  fading  importance  explains  the  general  observation  that
things that happened long ago tend to matter less than similar things that happened
recently,  it  doesn't  explain  anything  more  than  this.  We  also  want  to  know  why
importance fades at the rate it does, whether that rate is uniform or variable, and how
important something has to be to matter forever.
The Eudaimonia Principle explains both the general observation and the answers to
these  further  questions.  This  is  because  something  has  an  affect  on  a  person's
eudaimonia only if it is significant in the context of their life as a whole. Consider a
young person who is rude, unkind, and inconsiderate, and who often acts on these
vices. Their life seems to be going worse as a result, and this matters importantly to
how they should  feel:  they ought  to  be  concerned,  to  regret  their  behaviour,  and
perhaps to be ashamed of themselves. But as they grow older, they become more
virtuous, and the effect of their youthful viciousness on their eudaimonia is reduced. To
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start with, they are praiseworthy for their efforts to improve, but there is still a risk that
they will fall back into bad habits which they may not have completely left behind.
Once it is clear that they have become virtuous, their vicious childhood matters a lot
less. Then, finally, we judge that their childish vice is irrelevant to their eudaimonia,
relegating  it  to  a  mere  youthful  indiscretion.  As  the  effect  of  childhood  vice  on
eudaimonia is gradually reduced, it matters gradually less to how we ought to feel.
Once it no longer affects eudaimonia at all, it no longer matters to how we ought to
feel.
This approach also explains the rate at which importance fades: it fades at the same
rate as its influence on eudaimonia. Importantly, this will vary with the context. If a
person quickly becomes very kind indeed after their misspent youth, the effect of their
past vice on their eudaimonia will fall off faster than if they improve themselves slowly,
or only manage to become fairly kind. For someone who instead becomes more and
more vicious, growing up to be a thoroughly unkind person, their vicious childhood
remains important for a lot longer, because the role it plays in their life as a whole is
now that of the beginning of a vicious streak that mars their whole life, instead of
being a simple misstep.
It  might  be  objected  that  this  is  equivalent  to  gradually  fading  importance  with
eudaimonia inserted into the middle: what happened long ago tends to matter less
because it affects our eudaimonia less, but the reason what happened a long time ago
affects our eudaimonia less might just be that the importance of the past to our lives
gradually  fades  out.  But  it  is  not  true  that  what  has  happened  always  becomes
gradually less important to our lives.
First, some of what happens to us remains as important to our lives as it ever was. For
example, when a couple marry, they make promises to each other which are intended
to remain just as important to their lives as time passes. Though perhaps they may
become less important if the marriage is terribly unhappy, it would be odd to think of
marriage vows as becoming gradually less important to one's life simply because of
the passing of time. Some achievements also make a difference to a life that doesn't
fade in importance as time passes: I have in mind the sort of achievement that would
be  considered  a  'life's  work',  such  as  painting  a  masterpiece  or  successfully
negotiating the end of a long conflict. According to the Eudaimonia Principle, whatever
has an undiminished effect on eudaimonia remains of undiminished importance to how
one ought to feel. This is the correct result. If someone is proud of the peace they have
negotiated, then as long as the peace has not faltered it would clearly be churlish to
object that the negotiations were a long time ago and don't matter so much any more.
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Second,  some of  what  happens  will  be  important  for  some time,  before  suddenly
becoming much less important, because of other changes in one's life. For example,
consider someone who loses a lot of money on foolish investments, leaving them in
considerable financial difficulty. This will have an indirect effect on their eudaimonia,
because it will make them less secure, reduce their options, and perhaps deprive them
of some of what they need. If they cannot turn their finances around, the effects of
their  mistake  will  compound.  Even  if  we  place  of  a  lot  of  the  blame  on  all  the
incremental  poor decisions or  misfortunes that prevent them from recovering their
finances, it is clear that their initial mistake remains important. But if they later come
into a large, sudden windfall, the financial aspect of their situation could be turned
around  at  a  stroke.  If  this  happens,  the  mistake  quickly  becomes  less  important.
Although it was still foolish, and the agent may have missed opportunities because of
it, its continuing indirect effect on eudaimonia is suddenly and dramatically lessened.
4.5 Objections and replies
4.5.1 Is it true that affecting what is virtuous is sufficient to matter to how we ought to 
feel?
I  have  claimed that  not  every vicious  or  virtuous  action  we  perform is  significant
enough to affect our eudaimonia on its own. So imagine that I have promised to meet
you,  and  that  it  is  just  an  ordinary,  friendly  meeting.  There  will  be  no  unusually
significant consequences to my missing the meeting, and you would not be especially
offended if I did. Suppose that I  do miss the meeting, because I forget about it.  It
seems like this won't make me less eudaimon: it is just an ordinary and forgiveable
error, the sort even the best of us make occasionally. It doesn't mean that my life is
going less well.  And here is the problem: it  seems that whether or  not I  keep my
promise  doesn't  affect  my  eudaimonia,  and  so  by  the  Eudaimonia  Principle,  my
promise to meet you doesn't matter to how I ought to feel. This would be the wrong
result: my promise does matter to how I ought to feel even though it is just an ordinary
promise. It counts in favour of regretting being late and against resenting you for being
irritated with me.
The problem with this objection is that it considers only the direct effect of the promise
and breaking it on our eudaimonia, when the indirect effects are also important. First
of all, if I always forget my promises, then I will not be making ordinary forgiveable
errors any more, and my eudaimonia will be affected. But it is not the case that one of
my promise-breakings will  be the first one that counts, that starts making me less
eudaimon, while the ones before that don't matter. Rather, it is that promise-breakings
affect eudaimonia directly in some contexts but not in all contexts. But they all have
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the indirect effect of forming the relevant context. Even if we have a long history of
faithful promise keeping behind us, if we were ever to begin breaking trivial promises
frequently,  it  wouldn't  take all  that long before someone who knew what we were
doing would consider us unfaithful or at least unreliable. Being an unfaithful person
counts against our eudaimonia,  and so our trivial  promises can affect how our life
goes.
What if our promise breaking is infrequent? What if we do some philosophy, discover
how often we can break promises of various importance and still be eudaimon, and
then carefully keep to a chart, breaking just that many, on the occasions where doing
so  would  be  most  beneficial  to  our  other  interests?  Well,  actually  performing that
elaborate ruse would itself be vicious and make us less eudaimon, so let us set that
aside. If we instead honestly and coincidentally forget just that many promises on just
that schedule it would not make us less eudaimon, but living so close to the line has a
clear indirect effect on our eudaimonia: it would mean that we are close to the vices of
unfaithfulness and unreliability, and that our virtue is not as secure as it could be. This
doesn't necessarily mean that we should feel anxiety or regret over the promises we
have broken, but it does make feeling that way less inappropriate than it would be for
a thoroughly reliable person. 
All this might invite another objection. If this is the story we tell about what affects
eudaimonia, then even seemingly trivial past actions of mine will matter, because they
could come to  affect  my eudaimonia if  I  make a habit  of  them. Ordinary youthful
indiscretions would matter after all, and must provide a reason for regret, or wariness
of  a  relapse,  or  something  else.  Surely  this  will  lead  to  too  many  trivial  things
mattering to how we should feel?
On the contrary, what we have said helps to further explain when and why past vices
(or virtues) matter. The same youthful vices can either be an insignificant blemish on
what is clearly a good life overall, or a revealing beginning of a life lived badly (or
anything in between). Suppose they are insignificant. Later on in the agent's life, we
will be in a position to know this, because the circumstances in which eudaimonia is
affected have been ruled out. At this time, they will not matter any more. Earlier in
their life, even though the agent is improving, the youthful vices could still affect the
agent's  eudaimonia if  the agent slips back into them, revealing them as part  of  a
significant pattern of behaviour rather than an insignificant blip. At this time, they will
still matter. Your youthful indiscretions as a 17 year-old matter to you at age 18 but not
at age 50, but only as long as you don't fall into the habit of repeating them. This is the
correct  result,  but  not  the  result  suggested  by  the  gradually  fading  importance
account.
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4.5.2 Triviality
Perhaps the Eudaimonia Principle  is  true,  but too close to trivially  true to  be very
informative. If the past matters to how we should feel when it affects our eudaimonia,
and if  eudaimonia is living well,  then the Eudaimonia Principle  holds that the past
matters to how you should feel you when it affects whether you are living well. This is
close to the claim that the past matters to how we should feel when it matters to us.
This isn't a trivial claim, because it is is possible that it simply doesn't matter how we
feel, but it might not seem very informative either. We would be wrong to think so,
however. 
First,  the  principle's  claim is  made informative  by the  account  of  eudaimonia  that
underpins it. This account of eudaimonia is compelling, but certainly not trivial. That
virtuous activity is the main component of a good life is not a trivial claim, and neither
is the claim that the good life is best understood as having an achievable upper bound,
rather than as a life which is simply close enough to a perfect life. That the good life
includes many virtues rather than just the best one, and that it should be understood
pluralistically, are less controversial, but still informative. These considerations affect
the application of the eudaimonia principle: that the good life has an achievable upper
bound explains why each happy moment and each small display of virtue does not
continue to matter long after the fact, and that virtuous activity is important to the
good life (rather than just, say, pleasure) explains why we it matters if we break our
promises. 
Second, the claim that what matters to how we should feel is what matters to our
eudaimonia is informative in its own right. At its heart, the Eudaimonia Principle is a
claim about how different things that matter relate to each other. It holds that the past
matters to how we should feel when it matters to our living the good life. There are
other ways in which things can matter: we might ask what matters to everyone, to
anyone, to the way the world is, or just to the things we happen to care about. The
Eudaimonia Principle denies that mattering in these other ways is sufficient to make
the past matter to how we should feel – an effect on our eudaimonia is also required.
What matters to how we should feel must be significant enough to make a difference
to a life, and it must make a difference to our life in particular. 
Is this requirement too egoistic? I don't think it is. While the reason the past matters to
how you should feel will be that it affects how well your life goes, how well your life
goes is not a matter of narrow self-interest. Your life goes well if it is a virtuous one,
one filled with excellent activity pursued for its own sake. It is not a life of selfishness.
The kind person is well aware that their life goes better for helping others, but that is
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not the only reason they see for doing so.
Since the virtues are not egoistic, many past occurrences which do not have a direct
effect on our eudaimonia still affect what is virtuous in the present. For example, we
think that it is important to learn about and commemorate the terrible consequences
of past wars, and the sacrifices made by those who fought. That we take those past
events to require this response today shows that we take them to have at least an
indirect effect on our eudaimonia. This means that they matter to how we ought to feel
now.
The requirement that the past must have some effect on our eudaimonia to matter to
how we feel now is not too egoistic. It is still a meaningful requirement, however: many
very bad and very good occurrences have happened in the past and are happening all
around the world now, but they don't all  matter to how we ought to feel. Put another
way, it is virtuous to be aware of and moved by history, but there is no need for us to
chronicle and mourn every misfortune ever to affect anybody. Two hundred years ago,
somebody's love went unrequited, and they were devastated. But it doesn't make a
difference to how you ought to feel.
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Part Two: Why Feel Bad?
Chapter 5: Guilt
5.1 What is guilt?
5.1.1 The Straightforward Account
We might begin by assuming that feeling guilty is connected in some way with actually
being  guilty  –  of  having  actually  performed  some  wrong  action.  The  most
straightforward explanation is that to feel guilty involves taking oneself to have acted
wrongly. We can also immediately say a little about the affect that characterises guilt.
As Gilbert Harman puts it: 'To feel guilt is to feel bad'33. This gives us:
The Straightforward Account of Guilt: To feel guilty is to take oneself to have acted
wrongly and to feel bad about this. 
This allows for a broad range of cognitions to be involved in guilt, since it seems clear
that we can feel guilty without having exactly the belief that we have acted wrongly.
First, there are cases of what Patricia Greenspan calls 'anticipatory guilt',34 where we
feel guilty about a wrong action before we have done it, because we are imagining or
anticipating having done it.  Second, cases of what we might call  'provisional guilt',
where we feel guilty about an action that we have performed and which we feel was
wrong before we have firmly judged that it was wrong; this could be because it is a
difficult judgement to make or because we judged our conduct to be permissible but
somebody whose opinion we respect has accused us of acting wrongly. Third, cases of
what David Velleman35 calls 'self-disciplinary guilt' where we feel guilty for some small
personal failing such as abandoning our exercise regime. Here we may feel as if our
action was wrong even though we do not believe it was wrong. Finally, we may feel as
if we have done something wrong even though we know that really we have not, for
instance in a case of survivor's guilt, or in a case of harmless taboo violation.
33 Harman, Gilbert, 'Guilt-Free Morality', in Shafer-Landau, Russ, ed., Oxford Studies in 
Metaethics, Oxford: OUP, vol. 4, 2009, pp203-214, p204
34 Greenspan, Patricia, Practical Guilt, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. p109
35 Velleman, David, 'Don't Worry, Feel Guilty', in his Self to Self, Cambridge: CUP, 2006, 
pp156-169. p166
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We must be careful to describe an agent's feelings precisely in order to get the right
results from the straightforward account. Consider the case of Victor:
Victor, a vicious person, is caught and punished for vandalising a bus stop. He knows that vandalism is
wrong, but he doesn't care about acting virtuously; he vandalises things regardless, because he enjoys it. But
because Victor strongly disliked his punishment, after his punishment he comes to regret his action. “I should
never have vandalised that bus stop,” he thinks, “it was fun, but it wasn't worth getting punished for.” Victor
then resolves to only vandalise street signs in quiet country lanes, where he is much less likely to be caught.
It is clear that Victor doesn't feel guilty. Nonetheless, Victor does think that he acted
wrongly, and he does feel bad, so he does have both the cognition and the affect
required  by  the  straightforward  account  of  guilt.  However,  for  him  to  feel  guilt
according to the straightforward account Victor's cognition and affect must be related
in the right way. To feel guilty, Victor must feel bad about having acted wrongly.
To decide whether Victor  feels this  way, we must ask whether Victor's  bad feeling
characterises or is caused by his belief that he acted wrongly. Here, it is helpful to
consider whether it is most accurate to say that Victor feels regret that he vandalised a
bus stop, regret that he did something which got him punished, or regret that he acted
wrongly. Because of what we know about Victor – that his emotion was felt only after
his punishment, that he doesn't resolve to stop performing wrong actions but instead
only actions he is likely to be punished for, and that he would probably have felt just
the same even if  he didn't  believe vandalism was wrong – the second description
seems most appropriate. “Victor only regrets being caught,” we would naturally say.
The straightforward account therefore gives the correct result in this case: Victor is not
feeling guilty because he doesn't feel bad about having acted wrongly, but instead
about having been caught and punished.
However, there are reasons to doubt the straightforward account. Consider the case of
Ted:
When Ted was a young man just starting a family, he was a problem gambler. He lost a lot of money, and
came close to losing the family home before recovering. Ted is much older now, and hasn't gambled at all for
40 years.  These days he is  in excellent  financial  shape and proudly retired on an ample pension; he is
confident that he won't relapse. But his past recklessness is still painful for him to think about. Ted considers
his risking of the family home to be the worst thing he ever did, and is relieved that things didn't turn out
much worse. 
Ted does feel bad, as he feels pained, and he does take himself to have acted wrongly,
as he feels his gambling was the worst thing he has ever done. Does he feel bad about
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having acted wrongly? It seems that he must do. He certainly doesn't feel bad only
about the bad consequences for himself, because he is in fact relieved with how things
turned out. The other alternative is that he feels bad only about having been a reckless
person and not about the reckless things he did. But this is improbable, since Ted is
clearly thinking about  the  consequences of  his  actions  as  he  is  relieved that  they
weren't greater. So Ted is feeling guilty according to the straightforward account.
This is the wrong result. Ted would have felt guilty at the time he realised how badly he
was acting, but he now feels very differently to how he felt then. While he finds it
painful to think about his past mistake, he views it as just that, a past mistake: this is
why he is now proud of himself. Ted would be cross with us if we thought he was foolish
or a spendthrift (he is not), or if we openly blamed him for what he did (why are we
badgering  him  about  what  happened  so  long  ago?).  Similarly,  Ted  would  think  it
inappropriate for us to press him to do anything about what he did wrong, because he
already has done everything he ought to have done.  Ted is not worried about the
future, and is unlikely to be more than ordinarily concerned about what we think of
him. Ted admits that he acted wrongly and finds that thought painful, but he is also
calm, proud of himself, and inclined to reject blame and criticism. This doesn't seem
like a description of someone who feels guilt: it is better to say instead that Ted regrets
what he did. (I consider regret in chapter seven).
I shall now consider two further accounts of guilt proposed by Patricia Greenspan and
David Velleman. I consider both to improve upon the straightforward account, but each
to have problems of their own. I will then propose a new analysis, influenced by each
of the three accounts.
5.1.2 Greenspan's Identificatory Account
Greenspan's account holds constant the intentional object of guilt (our acting wrongly)
but specifies the negative affect as 'the agent's uncomfortable awareness that his first-
order empathetic emotion is self-directed and negative'.36 In the simplest case this
means that, after wrongly harming someone, we experience an empathetic awareness
of their anger, which is a negative attitude directed towards us. Our 'uncomfortable
awareness' of this comes when we adopt the victim's attitude or something like it as
our own, coming to feel angry with ourselves as well as simply aware of the victim's
anger. The uncomfortable awareness may consist of any self-punishing emotion, such
as self-anger, shame or remorse; which is felt will vary from case to case.
36 Greenspan, p129
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Greenspan notes that 'a wider notion of empathy seems to be needed'37 to account for
cases where there is no victim to empathise with. This wider notion would allow for
cases of imagined empathy. In the paradigm case where we feel guilty for wrongly
harming someone with their knowledge, we have an actual empathetic experience. In
a non-paradigm case,  we must  engage in an imaginative empathy to  produce the
uncomfortable negative affect of guilt. For example, if we harm someone without their
knowing that it was us who harmed them, we may still imagine their reaction if they
were to learn that it was us. In a case of self-disciplinary guilt, we might empathise
with an imagined ideal persona – the reaction of the person we could have been but
for our lack of resolve – or we might imagine the disappointed reaction of a loved one
who discovered our failure. In addition to this imaginative empathy, Greenspan could
also  give  an  account  of  learnt  guilt,  whereby  we  first  learn  to  feel  guilty  by
experiencing it in paradigm cases, but later come to feel the same way without literally
undergoing the intermediate empathetic emotion, thus experiencing an uncomfortable
feeling that “it would be right to be angry with me” in which the subject of the anger is
left vague and is not the focus of the experience.
Greenspan's account neatly explains why neither Victor nor Ted feel guilty. Victor only
regrets that his action has set himself up to be punished; he does not have any sort of
uncomfortable awareness that it would be appropriate for other agents to condemn
him. He is only concerned with the anger felt towards him in so far as it is a part of the
causal story explaining his punishment. Ted does feel bad about having acted wrongly,
but because his wrongdoing was so long ago and he has recovered since he is unlikely
still  to  feel  worried  that  others  are  or  should  be  angry  with  him.  Could  Ted  be
experiencing  learnt  guilt,  where  his  guilt  doesn't  arise  from  real  or  imaginative
empathy? This also seems unlikely, because his feeling is so different in tone from his
initial guilt feeling, and indeed empathetic guilt feelings generally, which involve much
more than simply feeling pained at the thought of one's wrongdoing. It isn’t reasonable
to consider Ted's feeling an instance of learnt guilt rather than a distinct emotion when
it is so different from paradigm cases of guilt.
Despite  its  advantages  in  dealing  with  the  previous  cases,  Greenspan's  account
incorrectly  rules  out  some  actual  cases  of  guilt.  I  have  in  mind  cases  where  our
attention does seem to be appropriately focused on our wrongdoing, and where the
negative affect felt does seem to be appropriate to guilt, but where the emotion is
neither focused on other people's  reactions nor brought about by real  or imagined
empathy. Consider the following example:
Lloyd secretly steals a library book – it was his favourite book and he almost always had it out on loan
37 Greenspan, p127
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anyway. At first, he feels satisfied with himself, but before long Lloyd comes to regret his decision and to feel
angry and uncomfortable with himself for stealing it. His attention is directed firmly at the theft: he feels
uncomfortably reminded of it by the book, so that he cannot enjoy reading it anymore. He therefore resolves
to secretly return the book to the library's shelves and not to act similarly again. Lloyd does not experience
any empathetic thoughts of the disappointment of library visitors or the frustration of the librarian that might
be caused by his theft – it was not a very popular book, and the library had more copies than people ever
wanted to borrow. Neither does he imagine how they might react if they found out it was him: since the
library is large and quiet, he is sure that he will be able to return it without being spotted. The idea that
people could rightly be angry at him or blame him doesn't cross his mind. Lloyd is simply struck by the
thought that he stole the book, and that stealing is wrong. He feels that he has betrayed his moral principles.
To decide if this is a good counterexample we must answer three questions. First, is
Lloyd feeling guilty? Second, is Lloyd's situation one that could obtain? Third,  must
Greenspan's account really deny that Lloyd feels guilty?
We should agree that Lloyd does feel guilty. His bad feeling is prompted by thinking of
the theft as wrong, and provides a spur to do something about this particular action;
both details are appropriate to guilt. This contrasts with the previous cases of Victor
and Ted. Victor does not really regret acting wrongly at all, and Ted only felt spurred to
act when he was younger. It does not seem better to say that Lloyd is feeling shame or
regret rather than guilt.
The second question is a little less clear.  Do we really believe that Lloyd could go
through this process of guilt and resolution without thinking of how people would be
right to blame him, or to be angry with him? We should agree that the case is possible.
Suppose Lloyd is something of a caricature Kantian: he sees morality as a matter of
obeying the moral law, concerned only with action and duty. He considers his emotions
as being of only secondary importance, others' emotions tertiary. So it is only natural
that they sometimes do not occur to him.
Considering the third question, it is clear that Greenspan cannot account for Lloyd's
case as involving actual or imagined empathy, but she may argue that Lloyd's case is
one of learnt guilt. Lloyd does feel uncomfortable at the thought of what he has done,
and he is feeling self-anger, an appropriately punishing affect and one that is the first-
person counterpart  of  the anger others could feel  towards him. So Lloyd could be
feeling  learnt  guilt.  However,  Greenspan's  account  cannot  acceptably  rely  on  this
response. Lloyd could have learnt to feel the way he does from experiencing paradigm
cases of  empathetic  guilt.  But there is  no reason to  think he must  have done so:
perhaps  all  of  Lloyd's  guilt  experiences  have  been  similar  to  his  current  one,  or
perhaps this is his very first guilt experience. It isn't reasonable to hold that Lloyd's
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feelings couldn't possibly have been brought about except as an indirect result of an
empathetic mechanism that operated on Lloyd in previous cases.
5.1.3 Velleman's Normative Vulnerability Account
Velleman proposes an account which changes the cognition involved in guilt feelings
as well as specifying the type of affect involved. Velleman's position is that guilt does
not  require  thought  about  our  acting  wrongly;  instead  'guilt  requires  a  sense  of
normative  vulnerability'.  Normative  vulnerability  involves  'the  sense  of  being  somehow
unjustified, of having nothing to say for oneself' but is only felt when that 'sense of
indefensibility  yields a sense of being defenceless  against negative responses of some
kind … One feels defenceless against these responses in the sense of having no claim
or entitlement to be spared from them, because they are warranted.'38 The kind of
negative response involved is later specified as either resentment or the withdrawal of
trust. To feel guilty therefore, we must take ourselves to have no claim against others'
resentment or mistrust.
Velleman's account also specifies the type of negative affect involved in guilt: 'guilt is a
feeling  of  both anxiety  and diminished self-worth.  The anxiety  comes from feeling
oneself exposed to something untoward. The sense of diminished self-worth comes
from  conceiving  of  that  exposure  as  a  matter  of  being  stripped  of  a  claim  or
entitlement.'39 Therefore, if a vicious person knows that they have made themselves
normatively  vulnerable,  but  the  affect  that  accompanies  this  is  one  of  thrill  and
excitement, then this person is not feeling guilty.
The  main  advantage  Velleman  claims  for  his  analysis  is  that  it  accounts  for  self-
disciplinary  guilt  and  survivor's  guilt.  Self-disciplinary  guilt  is  guilt  felt  over  small
personal failings like eating too much cake. Velleman offers two explanations of this
sort of guilt. First, we may take ourselves to have forfeited our own trust, in effect,
damaging our claim to be able to trust ourselves. We had resolved only to eat only a
single slice of cake, and yet we ended up having three slices. So we may naturally
worry that perhaps our resolutions are not good for much. This is indeed something
worth worrying about: 'a loss of self-trust can … undermine our ability to organise and
coordinate our activities over time'. Second, we may take ourselves to have damaged
our claim not to be mistrusted by others: 'Insofar as we are un-self-disciplined, we are
unreliable, and insofar as we are unreliable, we are untrustworthy.'40
In the case of survivor's guilt, we take ourselves to have warranted the resentment of
38 Velleman, p156-157. (Velleman's Emphasis)
39 Velleman, p157
40 Velleman, p166-167
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third parties feeling it  on behalf  of  the less fortunate deceased.  In contrast  to the
resentment we fear in the moral case, which develops from anger, this resentment is a
development of envy. The thought is that those close to someone who died might be
envious that others survived while the person they cared about did not. This envy may
develop into resentment if it is also felt that the person they cared about deserved to
survive  just  as  much  as  those  who  actually  did.  Survivor's  guilt  involves  anxiety
prompted by one's feeling of exposure to this resentment. Thus Velleman holds that
moral guilt and survivor's guilt should be treated as 'two distinct species of the same
emotion,  precisely  by  virtue  of  consisting  in  anxiety  about  having  warranted  two
distinct species of resentment.'41 
Velleman's conception of guilt is also able to account well for the cases of Ted and
Victor. Victor knows that he has acted wrongly, and so he would not see himself as
having  a  claim  against  resentment  or  mistrust.  Victor  therefore  feels  normatively
unjustified, but it is not clear that he feels normatively vulnerable, for he may not feel
defenceless against resentment or mistrust as a result. Victor might be a bit of a loner,
used to getting by while people tend to mistrust or resent him, or he may have fallen
in with a crowd of  similar people who will  not react badly to his vandalism. Either
circumstance provides Victor with a different sort of defence, an ability to shrug off or
endure the consequences of such negative reactions. We should also consider whether
Victor might feel defenceless against himself,  as Velleman proposes we may in his
treatment of self-disciplinary guilt. But Victor would not feel defenceless in this way
either, because he is not committed to any project of non-vandalism, nor is he prone to
become angry with himself for his vandalism.
Alternatively, Victor might indeed feel normatively vulnerable, seeing the link between
resentment and punishment, and between mistrust and his ability to get away with
further crimes. But this would still not be a case of guilt under Velleman's account,
because Victor's negative affect is not one of anxiety and diminished self-worth. Victor
never felt anxious: his regret sank in only after he was punished, and he knows he will
not be punished twice. He also has an effective plan to reduce his risk of punishment in
the  future,  by  vandalising  more  isolated  targets.  Nor  does  Victor  feel  a  sense  of
diminished self-worth: he has never drawn his self-worth from his moral standing.
Velleman's account also explains why Ted's case is not a case of guilt. Ted does take
himself to have once done something unjustified, but he does not feel normatively
vulnerable to complaints about this anymore, since it was both a very long time ago
and  its  adverse  consequences  have  now  been  recovered  from.  Even  were  Ted  to
consider his past behaviour to warrant some resentment today, he doesn't feel a sense
41 Velleman, p168
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of diminished self-worth. He is instead proud of his recovery and robust in his sense of
self-worth. He is also unlikely to feel anxious, for the same reasons. Ted is therefore
correctly understood as someone who still feels bad about having acted wrongly, but
has moved on from feeling guilty.
Velleman's account also coheres well with some of the common but inessential aspects
of  guilty  feeling.  It  explains  why  guilt  very  often  involves  empathy,  since  feeling
vulnerable to the reactions of others often triggers an empathetic awareness of those
reactions, and, conversely, an empathetic awareness of the those reactions in others
may cause us to feel vulnerable by helping us to realise that those reactions would be
warranted.  It  also  explains  why  guilt  very  often  motivates  us  to  either  hide  our
wrongdoing or  to  apologise  for  it  and seek  to  make  amends,  as  both  are  natural
responses to our anxiety that others will react negatively. By hiding we may prevent
the feared reaction from occurring, and by apologising we may temper it. 
However, Velleman's account cannot provide the right answer in the case of Lloyd.
Lloyd certainly feels normatively unjustified, and he feels normatively vulnerable as
well, because he feels defenceless against his own recriminations. In fact, his defences
are so compromised that he cannot bear to even read the book that he has stolen. But
Lloyd doesn't feel any anxiety about his normative vulnerability, since he is sure he will
not be caught. The negative affect that he feels is therefore not appropriate for guilt on
Velleman's account. Perhaps Lloyd might feel anxious about his moral character and
his ability to act rightly in future, and as a result  anxious about whether he really
deserves the trust  of  others or  whether he can really  trust  himself.  This  would be
similar to the anxiety in Velleman's account of self-disciplinary guilt. This would allow
Velleman to classify Lloyd as feeling guilty; however, it does not seem that Lloyd must
necessarily be feeling anxious in this way in order to feel guilty. The very strength of
Lloyd’s guilt might be a good reason for him to be confident that he won't make the
same mistake again, or he might simply view the case as an isolated incident.
5.1.4 Revising the Straightforward Account
Why is Lloyd a clear case of guilt while Ted is not? It seemed initially that Ted's feeling
isn't guilt because he is too comfortable with his position: he finds the thought of his
past mistakes painful, but isn't worried about them or what others will think of him,
and doesn't feel the need to do anything about them. On Greenspan's account the
deciding factor is that Ted doesn't feel as if others are or should be angry with him. On
Velleman's, it is that Ted doesn't have feelings of anxiety and diminished self-worth: his
mistakes are painful to him, but he is able to regard them calmly. However, Lloyd's
case reveals that these points cannot be what Ted's case turns on: Lloyd clearly feels
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guilty, even though his feeling is not empathetic or anxious either.
I therefore propose that the important difference between Ted and Lloyd is that Lloyd
feels, while Ted does not, that he has to do something about his wrongdoing, that it
demands a response from him – specifically,  that he must return the stolen book.
Lloyd's guilt  is motivating. We would not consider an agent who regretted a wrong
action but was not thereby motivated to respond in any way at all to be feeling guilty;
this is why Ted feels only regret. Of course, the motivation required by guilt need not
be a decisive motivation. We would still consider Lloyd to have felt guilty even if he
endured his painful feelings until they subsided, without actually returning the book.
Finally, we should allow that the motivation may not be to respond in any precise way.
A murderer might be wracked with guilt without knowing what to do, so long as they
felt a desperate motivation “to do something”.
The straightforward account can be revised to rule out an agent who is  not at  all
motivated  by  their  guilt:  we  may  simply  stipulate  that  the  emotion  is  one  that
motivates us to respond somehow. This gives us:
Slightly Revised Straightforward Account of Guilt: To feel guilty is to take oneself
to  have  acted  wrongly,  to  feel  bad  about  this,  and  to  be  motivated  to  respond
somehow to what one has done.
The account now gives the correct response to the cases. Victor doesn't feel guilty
because  he  doesn't  feel  bad  about  acting  wrongly,  only  about  being  caught.  Ted
doesn't feel guilty because his feeling is no longer motivating. Lloyd does feel guilt,
because he feels bad about stealing the book and is motivated to respond by returning
the book. However, the added clause must be clarified. First, what sort of motivations
satisfy it? Second, what sorts of response are intended by it? 
Regarding the sort of motivation required for guilt, we have already seen that it need
not be decisive motivation that leads to action. We can also see that the motivation
itself should feel bad, to fit the overall tenor of the guilt feeling. Guilt is a feeling that
feels bad and at least fairly urgent: it drives us to act, spurs us, and seems to demand
a response. I call such motivations negative ones, to distinguish them from motivations
that feel good. We sometimes feel bad about having acted wrongly and yet are happily
or excitedly motivated to respond appropriately (perhaps because we are glad that
things can be put right easily, or because we are eager to turn over a new leaf). But
this isn’t the same as feeling guilty.
The main question regarding the sort of response involved in guilt is whether it must
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be a response that the agent takes to be right, or whether any response will do. While
it is very sensible to want to do what is right in response to doing something wrong, as
Lloyd does, this isn't essential to guilt. This is because as well as motivating us to try to
make up for what we have done, guilt also frequently motivates us to hide or in some
other way act selfishly. Consider the case of Mary:
Mary, angry with a colleague, impulsively keys their car on her way out of the office. Having done this, Mary
immediately realises that it was wrong, and feels shocked and upset with herself. As well as this, Mary is very
worried about being caught. “Oh no, what if someone saw me!” she thinks. Looking around and noticing she
hasn't been spotted, she quickly leaves the scene.
Mary isn't motivated to respond in the way that she ought to, nor does she mistakenly
think that what one ought to do after acting wrongly is to hide. But she does feel
guilty, because she does feel bad about having acted wrongly, and her feeling is one
that acts as a spur and demands a response. It would be natural for us to describe her
as “guiltily slinking away”, or to explain that she ran away because she felt guilty. A
more brazen person might not have cared if anyone saw them. This type of guilt can
be called childish guilt, both because feeling guilty and responding in this sort of way is
familiar from most people's childhoods, and because it is less mature than responding
to one's wrongdoing by acting appropriately.
Another sort of response to guilt is an expressive one. Rosalind Hursthouse provides a
useful  account  of  what  it  is  to  express  emotion.42 Paradigm cases  of  actions  that
express our emotions include jumping for joy, smashing a glass in anger, or weeping
when upset by something. Hursthouse argues that on many occasions it is true '(i) that
the action was intentional; (ii) that the agent did not do it for a reason in the sense
that […] will “reveal the favourable light in which the agent saw what he did” […] and
(iii) that the agent would not have done the action if she had not been in the grip of
whatever  emotion  is  was'43.  When  these  conditions  are  met,  Hursthouse  calls  the
actions  in  question  arational,  to  indicate  that  they  are  not  governed  by  practical
reason, but not contrary to it either. An agent who acted in this way might explain it by
saying 'I Φ-ed because I was so frightened […] I just wanted to'44. When we express our
emotions in this way, arationally, we are responding expressively to our emotion. In
the case where we are joyful because a project of ours has been a great success, that
success is clearly a reason to be happy. It is not clearly a reason to jump up and down.
We jump up and down not because we ought to, but simply because, in the grip of
emotion, we want to. In doing so, we express our emotion, but we do not act for the
42 Hursthouse, Rosalind, 'Arational Action', The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 88, 1991, pp57-
68
43 Hursthouse, p59
44 Hursthouse, p58
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reason that in doing so we will express our emotion45.
Agents might express guilt by pacing, shouting, or hurting themselves, and often will
at the same time as being motivated in other ways. However, simply feeling bad about
what one has done wrong and expressing that feeling is not necessarily guilt, because
one can intentionally express one's emotion without feeling driven to express it. If Ted
thinks about his gambling, frowns, and shakes his head a little, we would say that he is
expressing his regret, not his guilt. This is because we think it is unlikely that he feels
compelled to frown. If instead Ted wakes in the middle of the night, climbs onto his
roof, and screams wildly into the sky, we would then say that he felt guilty: his pain at
the thought of his wrongdoing now seems to be driving him to express it, because
climbing onto the roof is not something usually done lightly. 
The best way to revise the straightforward account of guilt is therefore to require that
guilt  involve  a  negative  motivation  to  respond  somehow  to  the  wrongdoing.  This
requires a feeling that spurs us, drives us, or seems to demand a response, but where
the response could be of any type, including appropriate responses like apologising or
making amends, childish responses like covering up what one has done, or expressive
responses like shouting a confession into the night or writing it in a diary. This gives us:
Revised Straightforward Account of Guilt: To feel guilty is to take oneself to have
acted wrongly,  to  feel  bad about  this,  and to  be  negatively  motivated to  respond
somehow to what one has done. 
5.1.5 Defending the Revised Straightforward Account
I will now summarise the argument in favour of the revised straightforward account of
guilt and respond to possible objections. The main recommendation for the revised
straightforward  account  is  that  it  classifies  the  cases  I  have  considered  correctly,
where the alternatives do not. As well as this, it shares some of the advantages of the
other  accounts  and explains  what  makes them appealing.  Like  the  straightforward
account,  it  is  a  simple  analysis  of  guilt,  and  while  it  is  more  restrictive  than  the
straightforward account it still allows for a broad range of feelings to be recognised as
guilt. In particular, it is a strength of the account that it follows our usage in allowing
for a range of different types of felt affect to be involved in guilt.
Greenspan's  account  of  guilt  as  an  uncomfortable  empathetic  recognition  of  the
warranted  anger  or  resentment  of  others  provided  an  appealing  explanation  of
paradigm cases of guilt while misclassifying other cases. The features it relies on –
45 Hursthouse, pp60-61
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discomfort, empathy and our relationship to others – are clearly important to guilt. This
is still the case on the revised straightforward account. Feeling uncomfortable or ill at
ease is clearly one way of feeling bad, but it is also an affect that can be negatively
motivating: one way for guilt to motivate us to respond is to make us uncomfortable
with leaving things as they are. The revised straightforward account can also explain
why paradigm cases of guilt involve empathy and our relationship with others:  our
awareness of how others have been made to feel by our wrongdoing can easily lead us
to  feel  that  we  ought  to  do  something  in  response,  and  our  responding  seems
especially important in cases that are other-regarding.
The  only  sort  of  case  that  Greenspan  would  consider  guilt  that  the  revised
straightforward account does not is the case where we are uncomfortable with the
warranted  ill-feeling  others  have  towards  us,  but  where  this  discomfort  doesn't
motivate us to respond at all, not even by motivating us to do something about their
ill-feeling, but without knowing what we could do. Here the revised straightforward
account is correct. The agent who doesn't feel any motivation, even in the general
sense, seems either to care so little about the other person as to not really feel guilty,
or  to  be  relaxed  about  the  situation  because  they  have  already  responded
appropriately, and so to be in Ted's situation of feeling only regret.
Velleman's account makes a sense of normative vulnerability and an anxious affect
essential to guilt. Once again it is clear on the revised straightforward account how
these feelings can be involved in guilt: if we feel anxious and normatively vulnerable, it
is natural for this to motivate us to respond in a way that might return us to a normal
position.  An  advantage  of  Velleman's  account  was  its  ability  to  cope  with  self-
disciplinary  or  survivor's  guilt,  and  this  is  an  advantage  that  the  revised
straightforward account shares: as long as we take ourselves to have acted wrongly
and are driven to do something about it, we can feel guilty – even if we are completely
wrong to take things this way, as is the case in survivor's guilt. The advantage of the
revised straightforward account over Velleman's is that it does not restrict guilt only to
cases where the agent feels anxious or vulnerable. That restriction is too severe to
allow for cases of guilt at minor wrongdoing (where we are unlikely to feel anxious or
vulnerable  to  other's  reactions),  or  guilt  which  involves  instead  anger,  sadness,
embarrassment or other ways of feeling bad that can be motivating.
The most likely objection to my account is that we can feel guilt even in cases where
our feeling is not at all motivating. My response must rely on our intuitions about guilt.
The core intuition here is that a person who is really feeling guilty must be motivated
to respond somehow, even if they are not decisively motivated and even if they are not
motivated to respond in a particular way. To drive this home we can imagine the case
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of someone who claims to feel guilty, but who admits that they are not even a little bit
motivated to respond to what they have done in any way. This person strikes me as
insincere or confused.
The  most  likely  case  of  a  person  who  may  genuinely  feel  guilty  without  being
motivated to act is a person who thinks that they have acted wrongly but is depressed
and overwhelmed by  this  thought  rather  than driven to  do  anything  about  it.  For
example, consider the case of Polly:
Polly cares a lot about being a good person, but she also has something of a temper. On one occasion,
during a heated argument with her father, Polly snaps and spitefully says something that she knows will be
very hurtful to him. Afterwards, Polly realises that it was wrong to say what she did. This leaves her feeling
intensely disappointed with herself and painfully aware that how she has treated her father reflects very
badly on her. These feelings preoccupy Polly entirely, and she falls into a deep funk. She is distracted from
and unconcerned about thoughts of whether or how she should respond to what she has done. She doesn't
feel driven to apologise, to avoid her father, or to express herself. She just feels upset and disappointed about
what she said. 
Greenspan briefly raises the possibility of this sort of guilt, though she also maintains
that  guilt  is  motivating  in  paradigm cases:  'though  guilt  may  be  incapacitating  in
excessive doses, the agent in a state of feeling guilty is typically motivated  by  that
state to escape it.'46 I would suggest that when guilt appears so overwhelming as to be
incapacitating,  it  is  in  fact  often  motivating  an  expressive  response:  we  are  so
overwhelmed that we feel driven to hug ourselves, pull our hair out, or hide in our
beds. As well as this, or instead, we might be painfully motivated to respond properly
to  what  we  have  done,  but  overwhelmingly  discouraged  by  the  difficulty  of  that
response. This explains why Polly's case strikes us as unusual: is she really not anxious
about her next meeting with her father in a way that motivates her to put the meeting
off? Is she really not painfully aware that she ought to apologise, and spurred to do so?
Doesn't she desperately want to do something, even if she can't say what, or if it's just to
scream or punch the wall? If there truly is no motivating element to Polly's feeling, no
spur to respond at all, then she is not feeling guilty: she is feeling some other emotion,
such as shame or remorse.
5.2 Why feel guilty?
I shall begin arguing for the conclusion that it is sometimes appropriate to feel guilty
by  considering  Harman's  arguments  to  the  opposite  conclusion  that  guilt  is  never
appropriate.
46 Greenspan, p132
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5.2.1 Harman's analysis of guilt
Harman argues that guilt cannot merely be feeling that one is in fact guilty of some
offence. Such a conception of guilt would make the claim that we ought to feel guilty
when we have acted wrongly trivial: even a psychopath could feel that way, since they
may know that they have acted wrongly and simply not care. Instead, Harman holds
that guilt requires feeling bad: 'guilt feelings have to be real feelings … To feel guilt is
to feel bad.'47 Harman is thus working with something similar to the straightforward
account of guilt. However, not all kinds of negative affect felt about our having acted
wrongly count as guilt for Harman. In particular, he claims that 'it is not enough for
nontrivial  guilt  that one regrets having done something morally wrong',  contending
that 'one regrets many things one has done without feeling guilty about them,'48 and
again that a psychopath could have such feelings. Finally, Harman lists some of the
types of negative feeling that have been suggested as characteristic of guilt: 'remorse,
involving  deep  regret,  painful  humiliation,  distress,  self-punishment,  and/or  self-
flagellation',  'anxiety  and … the thought  that  one deserves punishment.'49 Though
Harman does not specify that guilt must be motivating, his analysis of guilt is similar to
my own, because a negatively motivating feeling will typically be a stronger or more
intense feeling than simple regret. I will argue against Harman's position that guilt is
not required of a moral person using his account of guilt. Later, I will use the details of
my account of guilt to identify exactly when guilt is appropriate.
5.2.2 Harman's arguments against guilt
Harman argues for  the position that guilt  is not 'central  to morality'50.  He has two
targets in mind. The first is the normative view that guilt can be appropriate: that if an
agent knows they have acted wrongly then 'the agent has a strong reason to feel guilt',
'the agent ought to have guilt feelings', 'the agent is justified in having guilt feelings,' or
'only an agent with  bad character  would not have such feelings'51.  The second is the
conceptual  view  that  guilt  plays  a  definitional  role  in  concepts  such  as  moral
standards, moral principles, moral agency, or moral motivation.52 I am only concerned
here  to  reject  Harman's  normative  arguments.  Accepting  the  view  that  we  ought
sometimes  to  feel  guilt  is  consistent  with  rejecting  the  view  that  guilt  plays  a
definitional role in moral concepts.
Harman's normative conclusion is that guilt is not required of the morally excellent
47 Harman, p204
48 Harman, p204
49 Harman, p205
50 Harman, p208
51 Harman, p203
52 Harman, p203-204
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person. His position is that 'there are morally excellent people who are not subject to
guilt', that although 'many moral people are susceptible to guilt … that is a defect in
them', that 'it would be a good thing for those moral people who feel guilt to try to
eliminate it', and that 'it is possible and better not to need that motivation' sometimes
provided by guilt.53 If  we have in  mind a completely  virtuous  person this  may be
plausible54: there is no need to feel guilt or even be susceptible to it if one always acts
completely  virtuously.  However,  Harman applies  his  conclusions more  broadly  than
this:  he  also  denies that  'the moral  quality  of  the  people I  know varies with their
susceptibility  to  non-trivial  guilt'  and claims  that  'there  seem actually  to  be  many
moral people with moral principles but no susceptibility to guilt feelings', implying that
guilt is not required for ordinary virtue either.55 (Though 'moral people' is ambiguous
between the normative issue of virtue and the conceptual issue of moral agency, it is
clear from Harman's talk of 'moral quality' and what is 'very moral' in the same section
that he does wish to make a normative claim about virtue as well  as a conceptual
claim about moral agency). Taken in this broader sense, Harman's conclusions imply
that even a bad person who has done something wrong is not required to feel guilty:
Harman can only hold that a bad person is morally required to develop and act on
guilt-free motivations to act  morally.  Their feeling guilty could only be commended
with qualification: it would be commendable only if it did motivate them to act better,
and only in comparison to their not being motivated at all.
The structure of the Harman's normative argument is to claim that guilt stands in need
of  a  justification and then to  suggest  that  no such justification  can be offered by
criticising a series of possible justifications. To reject this argument, I will show that
there are justifications available that are capable of withstanding Harman's objections.
I will also argue that Harman's claim that guilt stands in need of a justification is to
some degree misleading.
Harman first considers the following justification for guilt:
'When somebody violates the moral  code, others may get angry at them and that
anger is sometimes warranted or reasonable. So, isn't one reasonable and warranted
in getting angry with oneself for violating the moral code? And isn't that to have the
relevant sort of guilt?'56
Harman then objects that a disposition to feel anger at wrongdoers is useful, because
it can provide a deterrent to immoral behaviour, but that this does not imply that a
53 Harman, p213
54 Harman, Footnote 3, p208
55 Harman, p208. 
56 Harman, p210
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disposition  to  feel  guilt  is  also  useful.  As  a  result,  'if  there  are  people  who  have
adequate  motivation  to  act  morally  without  being  susceptible  to  nontrivial  guilt
feelings … guilt does not have to be reasonable for them even if having a disposition
to outrage and anger at others for their wrongful acts is reasonable.'57 The argument is
that the disposition to anger is  warranted because of its  usefulness,  and so to be
warranted a guilty disposition must also be useful. However, guilt is not useful in an
agent  already  motivated  to  act  well,  so  it  is  not  warranted  for  such  an  agent.
Therefore,  this  sort  of  good  agent  is  not  required  to  feel  guilty,  and  guilt  is  not
essential to moral excellence, nor normatively required.
We may be suspicious of Harman's consideration only of 'people who have adequate
motivation to act morally' in his response to a claim about what is appropriate of those
agents who have violated the moral code. Surely adequately morally motivated agents
would have obeyed the moral code? But we may read Harman here as considering
people whose moral motivation is adequate to cause them to seek seriously to become
agents who never violate the moral code. If it were true that these people had no
reason to feel guilty for their misdeeds, that would be a result that would undermine
the appropriateness of guilt.
The  problem  with  Harman's  argument  is  that  anger  is  not  only  warranted  by  its
usefulness. Suppose that somebody violates the moral code in a way that harms us or
otherwise  encroaches  on  our  moral  entitlements.  Don't  we  already  know that  our
anger is warranted, just because we have been treated shoddily and not accorded the
respect  and  consideration  we  deserve?  A  person  who  does  not  get  angry  in  this
situation lacks proper self-respect. They seem to be dispirited or a pushover, in a way
that is bad for them. We would tell them that they ought to be angry and that they
don't deserve to be treated that way. In thinking this we think that they have a reason
to feel angry that is independent of its deterrent effect, and that this is a reason for
them to be more angry than a mere onlooker. This all  stands independently of the
instrumental usefulness of their getting angry.
It may be objected that self-respect does not require anger in this way. An agent who is
aware that they are being wronged and is prepared to stand up for themselves, but
who feels forgiving rather than angry, is gracious rather than a pushover. This may be
the attitude of those who employ non-violent direct action against their oppressors.
Such an agent clearly has a great deal of self-respect, but we should question whether
it is true that they feel no anger, or instead that they feel angry but keep their anger
under control and choose not to express it through hostility. It is also worth noting that
the argument under consideration does not require anger in particular to be warranted
57 Harman, p210
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in response to wrongdoing against us: it only requires that some bad feeling beyond
mere regret is appropriate. Blame or disapproval may provide a clearer example: it is
hard  to  imagine  a  self-respecting  civil  rights  campaigner  who  doesn't  strongly
disapprove of at least those of their oppressors who know fully what they are doing.
Since we have some reason to blame or disapprove of those who wrong us, whether or
not this will achieve anything, so we may have some reason to blame or disapprove of
our own actions when we wrong others, even if that will not achieve anything either.
Now,  just  as  self-respect  warrants  anger  (or  blame,  or  disapproval)  in  the  victim,
proper respect for the victim warrants self-anger (or self-blame, or self-disapproval),
and therefore guilt, in the offender. Though the point does not rely on it, Greenspan's
account of guilt is able to capture this particularly well.  Greenspan holds that guilt
originates in an empathetic identification with the warranted anger we attribute to
others.  She  therefore  considers  feeling  guilty  for  wrongly  harming  someone  (and
thereby warranting their anger) to be the paradigm case of guilty feeling. Guilt here is
'the agent's uncomfortable awareness that his first-order empathetic emotion' – that
is, his empathetic awareness of the victim's anger – 'is self-directed and negative.'58 To
wrong someone and accept their anger as warranted without feeling guilty would be
disrespectful.  It  would either display a callous lack of empathy for the victim, or a
troubling lack of concern for being the subject of such warranted anger. If we were to
express our attitude to the victim, we would have to say “Of course I agree that you
ought to feel angry with me, but that doesn't make me feel angry with myself, and I
don't believe that it should.”
Harman  may  respond  by  claiming  that  there  are  other  ways  to  show appropriate
respect for the victim apart from feeling guilty,  just as there are other ways to be
morally motivated. Might these be sufficient? Harman notes that:
'The admirable people I have in mind feel regret about moral mistakes, but not guilt …
they can apologize, say that they are sorry for what they have done, try to make
amends, and sincerely promise not to do it again.'59
These do seem at first sight to be attitudes that might show proper respect for the
victim. There are two problems with this response. The first is that Harman's account
of guilt forces him to use a thin conception of regret, and that this thin conception does
58 Greenspan, p129. This objection can also be stated while accepting Harman's 
analysis of guilt. The added insight I take from Greenspan is that guilt ought to 
involve empathy as well as just self-anger. This allows us to additionally explain 
why we would disapprove of a self-anger was not caused by empathy. But our 
reasons to be troubled by the empathetic agent who simply lacks self-anger stand 
independently of this consideration. 
59 Harman, p211
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not express respect for the victim. The second is that apology, making amends, and
promising to do better cannot be sufficient for treating the victim respectfully in cases
where guilt is not also felt.
Harman does not provide an explicit account of the way in which he uses the term
'regret'. However, he is clear that regret does not imply guilt, and he contrasts regret
with guilt feelings of 'remorse … painful humiliation, distress, self-punishment, and/or
self-flagellation … anxiety and … the thought that one deserves punishment'. He also
gives  one  example  of  regret:  'one  may  regret  having  moved  one's  queen  to  a
particular square in a game of chess'. While regret does not imply guilt, Harman allows
that it may be a part of it,  as feelings of guilt 'may involve agent regret'.60 This is
important. The guilt-free agents Harman considers to show proper respect can only be
feeling the sort of regret that is not a constituent of guilt. Harman says that these
agents feel regret 'about moral mistakes', and claimed earlier that this sort of regret
was not enough for non-trivial guilt because a psychopath could feel such regret. Now,
presumably, a psychopath would regret having acted wrongly for some self-interested
reason:  they  might  regret  having  acted  wrongly  because  it  caused  them  to  be
punished for instance. That sort of regret does not strike us as a respectful attitude,
because it does not have an appropriate cause.
What causes of regret would be consistent with the agent having a fully respectful
attitude towards the person they have wronged? The causes must at least include the
agent’s empathy for the victim and their knowledge that they had wrongfully harmed
the victim. It would hardly be respectful for the agent to feel regret about their action,
but for reasons that did not include the harm they caused the victim and the anger
they  know  they  have  warranted  in  the  victim.  The  harm  caused  and  the  anger
warranted are among the most important aspects of the situation to the victim, so we
expect any person treating the victim with respect to appreciate their weight. We want
them to be part of what is really regretted by the agent. Now, this sort of regret must
be a constituent of guilt. For it is a negative feeling accompanying  and caused by  the
thought that we have acted wrongly. It fits Harman's analysis of guilt, and is a sort of
regret  that  a  psychopath  could  not  feel.  As  long  as  it  motivates  us  to  respond
appropriately, it is guilt on my preferred analysis too. The respectful agent feels guilty,
and the guilt-free agents Harman imagines are disrespectful, because they feel regret
of the wrong kind.
If Harman's agents' regrets do not express respect for the victim, could their efforts to
apologise, make amends, and not to act wrongly again do so instead? I do not believe
that they could. Beginning with apology, it seems that these agents are incapable of
60 Harman, p205
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making a sincere and respectful apology. For we have seen that any empathy they do
have  for  their  (rightly)  angry  victim  is  insufficient  to  make  them  angry  with
themselves, and that any regret they feel about their action is not caused by the fact
that  they  wrongly  harmed their  victim.  These  attitudes  are  very  incongruent  with
genuine contrition.
The argument here is not that apologies are required, apologies require guilt, and so
guilt is required as a constituent or precondition of an apology. This would risk begging
the question: if  one is not inclined to care about feelings of guilt  one may not be
inclined to care about apologies either. The point is that apologies are no better than
simple admissions of wrongdoing unless the wrongdoer also feels guilty. The reason to
feel guilty (and the reason to apologise) is that it is respectful to the victim.
Perhaps it could be argued that an apology is sincere just because the agent's belief
that they acted wrongly is sincere. There is a sense in which we speak of apologising
for which this is true: this is that of a simple admission of wrongdoing. However, what
this  expresses  depends  very  much on  the  context  and on  what  else  the  agent  is
feeling.  Perhaps  if  the  agent's  wrongdoing  is  small,  ordinary  and  mostly
inconsequential – for example, if they are twenty minutes later to dinner – then such a
response would be respectful. However, as a response to something more serious an
admission of wrongdoing accompanied only by regret would be disrespectful.
Similar points tell against the respectfulness of a guilt-free promise to act better in
future. If the promise made by Harman's guilt-free agent is sincere it must originate
from something other than guilt, and so from something other than concern for the
effect on the victim or the anger they know they have warranted. For example, they
might sincerely report being driven to act correctly in future by a strong desire for self-
improvement. But that sort of motivation does nothing to show respect for the victim.
When  it  comes  to  making  amends,  there  is  not  a  problem of  sincerity.  Harman's
agents' efforts to make amends could be motivated by genuine empathy or sympathy
for the victim, and they could also reasonably feel themselves more obliged to help the
victim than anyone else because they were causally involved and at fault. The agents
could not therefore be reasonably accused of lacking a respectful motivation. However,
there are still problems here. First, making amends alone is insufficient to demonstrate
respect for the victim. Second, there are cases where making amends is impossible or
inappropriate, and in these cases Harman's agents will be seen to entirely lack respect
for their victims.
To understand the first problem, consider the attitude demonstrated by an agent who
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offers to make amends to their victim in what we have agreed is a respectful way, but
who still does not feel guilt, and so does not feel any regret that stems from a proper
concern for the victim and cannot make a respectful apology. I think it is clear that
such an agent is, all things considered, only partly respectful. They are doing the right
things – making amends, trying their best to reform – but their overall attitude seems
detached or callous. Perhaps in a less serious case where we are capable of fully and
acceptably making amends this objection might not seem significant. For example, if
we forget our promise to act as a child-minder for our friend, who then has to waste
some expensive theatre tickets, we may make amends by buying them new tickets
and acting as child-minder on another occasion, and perhaps treating them to dinner
to make up for the inconvenience we have caused them. This might be an acceptable
response, even if no guilt was felt. 
However, this leads us to the second problem: there are many cases of more serious
wrongdoing where it is impossible or inappropriate to fully make up for what one has
done, or perhaps to even begin to make amends. Imagine we are child-minding and we
are  inexcusably  inattentive,  resulting  in  the  child  suffering  a  serious  accident  and
breaking their leg. Our friend has to rush from the theatre to the hospital, and their
child suffers a lot of pain and cannot enjoy the summer in the way they would have
liked. Now, of course we can and perhaps should offer to pay for the child's medical
treatment.  But  in  this  case,  doing  so  does  not  fully  repair  the  damage.  This  is
something that cannot be done; the child's leg will remain broken until it heals. In fact,
we ought not even to try to completely make up for everything that has happened: to
offer to buy new theatre tickets in this case would be hurtful and wrong. Perhaps later
we might make some additional  gesture:  we could offer  to  pay for,  and if  we are
forgiven to join in on, some fantastic holiday that will make the child's next summer
better. But this would not show adequate respect towards our friend and their child if
we did not also feel guilty and sincerely contrite. If our friend knew that we did not feel
these ways, they would most likely reject our offer in order to express their blame or
resentment. To stress the point further, suppose that the child had instead died as a
result of the accident, and therefore of our negligence. In this case, it would not be
appropriate to offer anything in amends; to do so would be insensitive, hurtful and not
respectful at all. In such a case, the only way to show appropriate respect to our friend
is to feel deeply sorry, remorseful, and guilty. 
Harman considers two further normative arguments in favour of guilt: that guilt serves
a useful social function in mitigating anger, and that guilt can ensure more wrongdoers
are punished by serving as a form of self-punishment. His responses rest on the same
contentions  that  I  have  already  examined:  Harman  believes  regret,  apology  and
making amends are also sufficient to mitigate others' anger at the wrongdoer, and that
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making amends is a satisfactory alternative to feeling self-punishing guilt. These same
responses fail for the same reasons. Since regret, apology and making amends alone
are  disrespectful,  they  are  unlikely  to  mitigate  the  anger  people  feel  towards  the
wrongdoer if it is known that they do not feel guilty. Since seeking to make amends is
not always possible or appropriate it cannot always provide an alternative to guilt.
Harman's belief that guilt stands in need of a justification is based on the idea that
guilt  is  'a  negative  experience  that  can  make  people  miserable'.61 Here,  Harman
assumes  that  emotions  which  feel  bad  are  to  be  avoided,  in  the  absence  of  a
countervailing reason to feel them. Furthermore, Harman clearly expects such a reason
to be instrumental: 'It might be worth paying this price if susceptibility to guilt  made
people act better'.62 We have seen that we are in a position to provide such a justification
of guilt:  guilt  is often the respectful attitude to have, and we know that respectful
attitudes tend to have better consequences than disrespectful ones. Nonetheless, we
ought  to  challenge  Harman's  expectation  of  an  instrumental  justification  for  bad
feelings.
We can do so by employing arguments from valuing, which I introduced in section 3.5.
Consider sadness: just like guilt, it feels bad and is capable of making us miserable. If
we accept  that  sadness  must  be  justified instrumentally,  we must  argue that  it  is
warranted by its ability to motivate us to act in ways that will  ultimately make us
happier. But it is not clear that we need sadness in order to be sufficiently motivated –
just as Harman argues is the case with guilt. Indeed, when things are going badly for
us, sadness might seem only to make things even worse. Is this a good reason to try to
eliminate  our  disposition  to  feel  sad?  No:  when  we  feel  sad  it  is  often  because
something we value or care about is doing poorly. To eliminate sadness from our lives
we would have to stop valuing things, value only things that are sure to do well, or
value things in such a way as to be emotionally vulnerable only to pleasant feelings.
None of these approaches are attractive or plausible. This is the case for guilt as well:
to morally value some course of action is to have a positive experience in following it,
and a negative experience in  betraying it.  Something like this  thought  lies  behind
Greenspan's  assertion  that  an  agent  reflecting  on  a  bad  action  of  theirs  must
'appreciate its seriousness, in a sense not unlike aesthetic appreciation to the extent
that it rules out being left cold'. And it is not motivation that the 'cold' agent lacks: 'it
will not be enough for the agent to make up for the lapse with good deeds'.63
I have argued that Harman is wrong to conclude that guilt is never appropriate. We
ought to feel guilty at least when we have seriously wronged another person. This guilt
61 Harman, p211
62 Harman, p211-212. My Emphasis.
63 Greenspan, p113
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is necessary to show proper respect for them; if we do not feel any guilt then we lack
the  concern  that  we  ought  to  have  for  our  victim.  Harman  does  not  provide  a
compelling reason to think the common view that we ought to feel guilty when we
have acted wrongly is mistaken.
5.3 When is it appropriate to feel guilty?
So far, I have shown that shown that guilt is sometimes appropriate because it shows
respect and concern to the victims of wrongdoing. I will now consider what can be said
in general about when it is appropriate to feel it. First, I will argue that appropriate guilt
is always guilt  that motivates a response that is owed to those we have wronged.
Second, I will argue that guilt is only appropriate in fairly serious cases. Finally, I will
consider exceptional cases in which unfitting guilt can be appropriate. 
5.3.1 The appropriateness of different types of guilt
In this  section I  argue that appropriate guilt  motivates a response that is  owed to
somebody. I do so by showing other types of guilt not to be appropriate.
In cases of childish guilt we are aware that we have acted wrongly and feel bad about
it, but instead of feeling motivated to respond virtuously we feel driven to hide our
guilt, blame others, run away or respond in other ways that are vicious. Childish guilt is
inappropriate  simply  because the  responses it  motivates are  inappropriate:  it  is  of
course better to be motivated to act virtuously than viciously. Cases of childish guilt
will fall into two kinds. In some cases, such as Mary's, the agent ought to feel guilty but
should be motivated to respond differently: Mary ought to apologise to her colleague,
pay for their car to be fixed, and find a better way to deal with her frustrations. In other
cases, all kinds of guilt would be inappropriate, and so the agent should either accept
what they have done or, like Ted, feel bad about it but without being driven to respond
somehow.
Expressive guilt  spurs us towards arational actions such as pacing or clutching our
head in our hands. This sort of guilt is not appropriate because it is not required for the
wrongdoer to treat those they have wronged respectfully. While it is common to pace
anxiously or in other ways arationally express our guilt  while  apologising,  it  is not
essential to a respectful apology that we do so, or feel as if we should. It is enough that
our apology is sincere; this requires that we feel guilty, but not that we feel expressive
guilt in particular. However, there is usually no strong reason not to pace anxiously or
otherwise  express  our  guilt,  so  feeling driven to  do so alongside  feeling driven to
apologise would not usually be inappropriate either. What would make expressive guilt
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inappropriate would be if it were inappropriate to feel guilty at all, or if the expressive
guilt felt was excessively strong.
Another possible response is that of supererogatory guilt.  By this I mean guilt that
negatively  motivates  us  to  perform  supererogatory  responses  to  our  wrongdoing:
responses that are good responses, but which are not owed to anybody as a matter of
duty. Consider the following case:
Some nights ago James became very drunk and made a considerable nuisance of himself. No one was badly
hurt  but  his  actions wasted the  resources  of  police  officers,  nurses,  and sanitation workers.  James  has
already apologised to the particular people whose time he wasted, and paid any fines or other legal penalties
required of him. In fact, he has done everything that he owed to those affected by his wrongdoing. However,
James resolves  to  do more than this:  he will  also try to  reduce the burdens drunkenness  places  on his
community generally, by speaking in an alcohol awareness class in a local school and volunteering as a
special constable with the local police service. 
If James still feels guilty while volunteering, then his guilt is supererogatory guilt: he
feels bad about his wrongdoing, and he feels negatively motivated to volunteer. Would
such supererogatory guilt be appropriate? I don't think that it would, because it is no
longer required by respectfulness. Consider what we would think of James if he didn't
feel guilty, but still went through with his plans to volunteer as a special constable.
Imagine James regrets his previous behaviour and wants to do more to make up for it,
but doesn't feel guilty because his motivation to volunteer isn't a negative feeling but
a positive one. Suppose James sees it as a strong first step towards being a better
person, so his attitude is eager and ambitious. He is even a little proud of himself for
responding to his wrongdoing so much better than most people do, though of course
not completely proud of himself, since he knows that it would have been better to
volunteer without doing anything wrong first.  This  is clearly an acceptable way for
James  to  feel.  Precisely  because  he  doesn't  owe  it  to  anybody  to  respond  to  his
wrongdoing by  volunteering,  the  way he  feels  is  not  disrespectful  or  insincere  for
lacking in guilt.
A  case  of  self-disciplinary  guilt  is  one  in  which  we  have  only  wronged  ourselves.
Consider Keira:
Keira has resolved to start running once a week on Saturday mornings. Keeping to that resolution would be
good for her, so she ought to keep to it, but her failing to keep to the resolution would not be wronging
anybody else – she wouldn't be breaking plans with another runner or anything like that. However, come
Saturday morning it's raining and Keira puts off starting running. The next Saturday, she is exhausted from a
hard week and puts it off again. Soon, the resolution is abandoned.
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It might well be that Keira feels guilty for abandoning her resolution. We often say that
we feel guilty for giving up on our resolutions, or indulging in pleasant but unhealthy
things. This guilt can be perfectly fitting: Keira's action is at least a little vicious, and it
is clear enough what sort of thing she ought to do as a result (which is to go for a run!).
But would Keira's guilt be appropriate?
Keira's  guilt  does  not  show respect  for  anyone  else  in  this  case,  so  my  previous
argument in favour of guilt does not directly apply. It might apply if guilt was required
as the self-respecting attitude, but it is much less clear in the case of self-respect that
simply regretting what  one did,  or  feeling ashamed,  would not be sufficiently self-
respectful. As with James' case, imagine Keira does judge herself to have let herself
down a bit, but then simply resolves once again, more strongly, and in a positive way
to take up running. It doesn't seem right to accuse Keira of lacking self-respect in this
case.
Another argument for the appropriateness of guilt here is that it is beneficial for Keira
to feel it, because it will most effectively motivate her to do what she ought to do. This
would be a reason for her to feel guilty, and especially if it made a great difference to
her motivation or if she only needed to feel a mild guilt to be so motivated it might be
a  strong  enough  reason  to  outweigh  the  reason  against  guilt  provided  by  its
unpleasantness.  However,  as  I  explained  in  section  3.4,  this  is  a  weak  form  of
argument  for  the  appropriateness  of  an emotion.  As  Harman points  out,  for  many
people in many cases, non-guilt motivations are effective.64 Something more than a
motivational benefit is required to make guilt appropriate. I therefore conclude that
guilt is generally not an appropriate response to wrongdoing that only affects oneself.
Since  childish,  expressive,  supererogatory  and  self-disciplinary  guilt  are  not
appropriate, appropriate guilt will always motivate us to respond to our wrongdoing in
a way that we owe to those we have wronged. This is explained by the justification for
guilt provided in section 5.2: guilt is appropriate because it is required to be respectful
to one’s victims.
5.3.2 Seriousness and appropriateness
To  show  that  guilt  is  sometimes  required  by  respectfulness,  I  argued  that  the
alternatives to guilt are sometimes disrespectful on their own. The cases I relied on
were cases that were serious, such as negligently injuring a friend's child. This is a
necessary feature of such cases: if  what we have done wrong is not serious,  then
admitting what we have done and (if necessary) making amends will be sufficient to
64 Harman, p213
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show that we respect the wronged party. In a clearly unimportant case this is plain to
see. Imagine that I promised to return your book yesterday but failed to do so. Today, I
admit that I was at fault and post it to you special delivery, but don't feel bad about
what has happened because I know that you didn't have any urgent need for the book
yesterday. It would be overblown to say that my attitude was disrespectful to you.
For cases that are somewhat but not very serious, it will be difficult to say whether
guilt is appropriate. If I repeatedly fail to return your book, breaking several promises
to do so, and never feel the least bit guilty, then sooner or later it becomes clear that
my attitude is disrespectful, as well as my behaviour. However, the point at which this
becomes true is not something I can settle in this thesis. For guilt, what matters is
whether a guilt-free reaction is respectful, which we know depends in some way on the
seriousness  of  the  wrongdoing.  Settling  the  matter  will  depend on  our  account  of
respect and our wider normative views.
When guilt is appropriate, the strength of our guilt feeling ought to be proportional to
the  seriousness  of  what  we have  done  wrong.  To  see this,  consider  a  wrongdoer,
Darren, who goes to a party to make trouble, for no good reason. First, Darren throws a
drink over Alex, ruining his suit. Later, Darren starts a fight with Brendan, who ends up
in the hospital with a broken rib and a concussion. The next day, Darren feels fairly
guilty about hurting Brendan, but terribly guilty about ruining Alex's suit. It is clear that
Darren has things the wrong way around; he ought to be more concerned about what
he did to Brendan than he is about what he did to Alex, and because he is not, his
attitude  seems  disrespectful  to  Brendan.  This  isn't  merely  a  comparative  point.
Suppose Darren has only wronged Brendan, but feels about as guilty as we would
expect someone to feel over ruining a suit. We would still criticise Darren for not taking
what he has done to Brendan seriously enough.
5.3.3 Unfitting guilt can be appropriate
For guilt to be fitting, one must have acted wrongly. In some cases, this is sufficient,
because  the  motivating  part  of  the  emotion  does  not  have  a  further  cognitive
component. For example, in expressive guilt, we take it that we have acted wrongly,
feel bad about this, and are simply driven, arationally, to scream our confession from
the rooftop. In other cases, the motivating part of our guilt involves a further thought
about the world which must also be accurate for the emotion as a whole to be fitting.
For example, when our guilt  drives us to apologise we take it  that we have acted
wrongly, feel bad about this, take it that we ought to apologise, and are negatively
motivated to do so. In this case, the fact that we oughtn't really to apologise would be
enough to make our guilt unfitting. This means that for appropriate guilt to be fitting
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we must not only have done something wrong, but there must also be something that
we ought to do about it.
It is natural to think that all appropriate guilt must be fitting guilt. Surely if we haven't
done anything wrong then it isn't appropriate to feel guilty? However, consider the
following case:
Anthony likes to make cutting jokes about his friends. He's aware that this could be taken too far and become
cruel rather than witty, but he is confident of his ability to avoid that. After a party at which he made what he
judged to be a very good joke at Charlie's expense, and which seemed to go down well with Charlie, he is
confronted by Bethany. “I can't believe what you said to Charlie last night,” she says, “you went way too far,
you need to call him and apologise.”  
Suppose that Anthony's judgement, not Bethany's, is the correct one: Anthony's joke
wasn't cruel, Charlie wasn't offended, and there is no need to apologise. Nonetheless,
Anthony might well feel guilty after being criticised by Bethany, because her criticism
might prompt him to take it that he went too far and ought to apologise – perhaps by
believing it  or thinking of it  as a real  possibility,  or perhaps just  by considering or
imagining it  – and this might make Anthony feel bad, and negatively motivated to
apologise. Could it be appropriate for Anthony to feel this way? It is clear that in the
right  circumstances,  it  could  be.  Bethany's  opinion,  especially  if  she  is  usually  a
reliable judge of such matters, can give Anthony a good reason to doubt his initial
judgement. If so, it is appropriate for Anthony to be modest about his judgement, and
once Anthony suspects he might have to apologise, it is appropriate and respectful
towards Charlie for this to concern him. It may be that the appropriate sort of guilt
here is a milder, less certain sort of guilt, because Anthony may not himself judge that
he has acted wrongly, but it is still  guilt: it is a negatively motivating feeling about
perhaps  having  acted  wrongly  and  so  being  required  to  apologise  to  Charlie.  We
commonly  experience  this  sort  of  anxious  feeling  of  perhaps  owing  someone  an
apology, and it feels similar to paradigm cases of guilt. This form of guilt is similar to
Greenspan's  anticipatory  guilt,  that  form of  guilt  felt  'in  advance of  action,  as  the
emotional strut of the motivational force of moral 'ought''.65 Its similarity to guilt can be
made clearer by contrasting it to the way we would feel if our behaviour were criticised
unreasonably: this would usually make us feel angry or upset, rather than guilty.
That we must assume Bethany's criticism to be reasonable and plausible to generate
the  counterexample  is  revealing.  It  suggests  that  what  is  needed  for  appropriate
feelings of guilt is not that the guilt is fitting, but that we have good reasons to think
that it is fitting. This line of thought is supported by our thoughts about the resolution
65 Greenspan, p109
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of Anthony's case: once Anthony either apologises to Charlie or asks him how he felt
about the joke, and so learns for sure that he didn't act wrongly in telling it, it would be
inappropriate for him to continue to feel guilty. If we know that guilt would be unfitting
–  for  example,  because  we  have  already  responded  appropriately  –  then  it  is
inappropriate. 
This suggestion has much to recommend it. First, it provides a natural stopping point
for guilt feelings: when we have responded properly to whatever we were feeling guilty
about in the first place. Second, it coheres with a simple account of the point of guilt
feelings: it is appropriate to feel guilt  because it  is appropriate to be motivated to
respond appropriately to our wrongdoing, and because it would be inappropriate for
this motivation to be experienced as positive or as indifferent. Third, to feel as if you
ought to be doing something in response to what you did wrong when there is not in
fact  anything  you  ought  to  be  doing  is  to  be  mistaken  about  something  quite
important. At best, you would be feeling needlessly distressed, and at worst, you would
be distracted from your other obligations or motivated to do something you ought not
to, such as apologising to someone when it would be better to leave them in peace, or
offering gifts that are not suitable tokens of contrition but simply offensive and crass.
Finally, once one has responded appropriately, the justification of guilt in terms of its
connection to respectfulness is greatly weakened. Either feeling guilty and responding
appropriately are sufficient to show respect and nothing more is required afterwards,
or, in the case is of very serious wrongs,  something else is required, but not simply
more guilt.
It  might  be  objected  that  feeling  guilt  that  one  knows  to  be  unfitting  can  be  an
appropriate response to a case of very serious wrongdoing. After all, one could be well
aware that even responding in the best way possible falls far short of making up for
what one has done. It would admittedly be distressing and in a way futile, but perhaps
in this situation the agent deserves to feel distressed simply because of what they
have done?
I  agree  that  feeling  distressed,  in  some  way,  is  often  appropriate  after  you  have
responded as best  you can.  But  guilt  is  not  the right sort  of  distress to feel.  One
important thing emotions do is to direct our attention. If you have already responded
as best you can to what you have done wrong, then it is appropriate to direct your
attention elsewhere: on the effects of your action on yourself and on the victim, and on
how what you have done reflects on your character. The emotions I  discuss in the
following chapters focus on these things.
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5.3.4 Summary
To feel guilt is to feel bad about having acted wrongly, and negatively motivated to
respond somehow. Guilt is appropriate when we have good reasons to believe that we
have committed fairly serious wrongdoing, and that a response is owed to those we
have wronged. Guilt is appropriate in this sort of case because a failure to feel guilty
would be disrespectful.
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Chapter 6: Shame
6.1 What is Shame?
My aim in this section will be to provide an account of shame that is clear, reasonably
close to common usage, and which coheres well with my account of guilt. I will first
consider  competing  philosophical  accounts  of  shame,  then  develop  an  account  of
shame which draws on their strengths while avoiding their weaknesses.
6.1.1 Taylor and Williams: Shame and self-evaluation
Gabrielle Taylor and Bernard Williams provide similar accounts of shame, and make
two  important  claims  about  it.  The  first  is  that  feeling  shame  involves  feeling
distressed or uneasy at the way one is seen, or might be seen:
'at the core, to feel shame is to feel distress at being seen at all'66
'The basic experience connected with shame is that of being seen, inappropriately, by
the wrong people, in the wrong condition''67
This is predominantly a claim about what shame feels like. The second claim is about
the cognitive  content  of  shame:  that  feeling  shame involves  an unfavourable  self-
evaluation. For Taylor:
'the  person feeling  shame […]  feels  herself  degraded,  not  the  sort  of  person she
believed, assumed, or hoped she was or anyway should be'68
Taylor holds that the adverse evaluation of the self involved in shame is sufficient to
make it a moral emotion, taken in a broad sense:
'There is no reason to deny that shame in all its occurrences is a moral emotion […]
The final self-directed adverse judgement in shame is always the same: that he is a
lesser person than he should be, for an in some way better person would not find
himself in a position where he can be seen as he is'69
66 Taylor, Gabrielle, Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1985. p60
67 Williams, Bernard, Shame and Necessity, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, 
p78
68 Taylor, p64
69 Taylor, pp76-77
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Taylor also links shame to one's sense of self-respect and the view that one has fallen
short  of  one's  standards.  Taylor  views  self-respect  as  a  matter  of  making  certain
normative judgements about one's behaviour and the way one is treated: 'The self-
respecting person has certain views of what is due to him and from him'. Thus, 'Certain
kinds of behaviour and … treatment will seem intolerable to the person of self-respect'.
Shame comes into the picture because 'the frustration of [the self-respecting person's]
expectations in this area is precisely the occasion for feeling shame'. As a result, Taylor
claims that 'we can characterise self-respect by reference to shame: if someone has
self-respect then under certain specific circumstances he will be feeling shame.'70
Taylor's view then is that to feel shame is to take an adverse ethical view of oneself: to
take oneself to have fallen short of where one ought to be – either because one has
acted improperly or because one has been treated badly. The felt affect of shame is
one of feeling distressed at the thought of being seen in one's condition.
For Williams, the cognitive content of shame is to be understood in relation to that of
nemesis:  the  shock,  contempt,  or  rage  that  is  felt  in  reaction  to  the  shameful
behaviour  of  others.  Because  standards  for  shame  and  nemesis  are  shared  and
internalised, they must have meaningful normative content:
'there has to be something for these interrelated attitudes to be about. It is not merely
a structure by which I know that you will be annoyed with me because you know that I
would be annoyed with you. These reciprocal attitudes have a content: some kinds of
behaviour  are  admired  […]  others  despised,  and  it  is  those  attitudes  that  are
internalised, not simply the prospect of hostile reactions'71
 
Williams argues that understanding shame to involve this sort of normative cognition
allows us to avoid the mistaken view that shame concerns only appearances:
'the silly mistake is to suppose that the reactions of shame depend simply on being
found out, that the feeling behind every decision or thought that is governed by shame
is literally and immediately the fear of being seen.'72
Finally,  Williams also  holds  that  the  normative  evaluation  involved in  shame is  an
evaluation  of  the  self  that  is  closely  connected  to  one's  sense  of  self-respect.  It
therefore  falls  within  the  scope  of  the  ethical  in  a  similarly  broad  sense  to  that
employed by Taylor:
70 Taylor pp78-80
71 Williams, pp83-84
72 Williams, p81
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'What arouses shame [...] is something that typically elicits from others contempt or
derision or avoidance. This may equally be an act or omission, but it need not be: it
may be some failing or defect. It will lower the agent's self-respect and diminish him in
his own eyes.'73
It is correct to understand shame as involving an ethical self-evaluation, so long as
ethical  is  understood in  the  right  way.  If  what  it  is  to  be  an  ethical  evaluation  is
construed very narrowly, for example as concerning only our appraisals of how we
treat others, or of how closely we keep to a set of explicit duties, this would rule out
many clear cases of shame. For example, one may be ashamed of feeling pleased
about someone else's misfortune, and one may be ashamed of merely dreaming one
acted wrongly. We need not take ourselves, improbably, to be treating people badly or
acting wrongly in order to feel ashamed in those ways. A narrower alternative is to
consider an evaluation to be ethical just in case it is a self-evaluation, placing every
evaluative judgement we could make about ourselves in the ethical domain. However,
this makes shame too broad. Consider the case of Henry seeing an unflattering photo
of  himself;  just  for  a  moment,  he  thinks  'gosh,  I  look  terrible'  and  feels  a  little
uncomfortable at the idea of it being displayed for everyone to see. This is a case of an
adverse self-evaluation involving distress at the idea of being seen, but Henry is not
feeling ashamed, he is just feeling displeased or embarrassed.
Implicitly, Williams and Taylor treat an ethical self-evaluation as one that reaches a
certain degree of importance. For Williams, shame must concern something deemed
serious enough by one's shared norms that others' nemesis is an appropriate reaction
to one's shameful state. For Taylor, shame involves taking something seriously in the
sense of taking it to violate a demand of self-respect or to be a way of falling short of
where one ought to be. A more explicit account of shame as involving a self-evaluation
that meets a threshold level of seriousness can be provided by employing the concept
of  eudaimonia.  An ethical  self-evaluation is  one that  carries an implication for  the
agent's eudaimonia: it bears on whether or not, or to what degree, the agent is living
and doing well. This is the significance threshold used in the Eudaimonia Principle of
Chapter Four: it  means that an agent who takes shame views that which they are
ashamed of to be important enough to make a negative difference to how their life is
going. If Henry doesn't like his appearance in the photo, but doesn't take it seriously in
this way, then he isn't ashamed of it.
It  may be objected here that surely a person may feel  ashamed without  explicitly
thinking to themselves that their life is a worse one for its inclusion of whatever they
are ashamed of, let alone conceptualising this as an ethical difference. This is to be
73 Williams, pp89-90
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accepted: we ought not to assert that shame requires this thought. The point is only
that shame requires a significant self-evaluation: whatever the agent is ashamed of,
we know that they take it to be significant, that they “take it seriously”, as we might
say. How significant is that? Significant enough to affect how a human life goes. A
person can take something that seriously without thinking of it in that way.
I am not persuaded that shame must always involve a feeling of exposure, or distress
at how one is or could be seen. While feeling shame often involves feeling this way,
there are also clear instances of shame where this feeling is lacking, even when we
allow that one can perfectly well feel exposed without actually being exposed. Imagine
someone  who  is  ashamed  that  they  are  too  often  afraid  to  stand  up  for  others.
Sometimes, their shame will involve feeling discomfort at how they will look to a real
onlooker; other times it will involve a general anxiety about what others might think of
them. Both of these possibilities are consistent with Taylor's and Williams' accounts.
However, there are many other ways their shame might feel. Their shame might take
on a downcast, disheartening quality, as when a person feels that they are “letting
themselves down”. Their shame might involve feelings of distress at their cowardice,
and  anxious  or  angry  reflection  on  their  difficulty  in  improving  themselves.  Their
shame might even have an anguished or horrified quality, especially if it is prompted
by a dramatic incident, as when someone is struck by the thought “what have I done?”
or “what have I become?”. These alternatives could equally well accompany or come
apart from feelings of exposure or distress at how one is or could be seen.
The most convincing cases of shame without feelings of exposure are those of agents
who  feel  ashamed for  things  that  their  peers  tend not  to  judge  as  shameful.  For
example,  the shame of  a person who believes that  they are  not  doing enough to
prevent climate change or alleviate global poverty, but who still does far more than
their peers, will probably lack the sort of felt quality that Williams and Taylor describe,
since their peers are likely to be impressed, rather than critical of them. Of course, we
can still imagine that person as feeling exposed: to an idealised other, to those who
are suffering, or to the gaze of future generations. The point is that imagining the case
this way is not necessary to imagining that the agent is ashamed.
6.1.2 Velleman: Shame and self-presentation
The accounts of  Taylor and Williams are close to what Velleman calls the standard
conception of shame, where 'the subject thinks less of himself at the thought of how
he is seen by others'.74 Velleman seeks an alternative account of shame because he
74 Velleman, David, 'The Genesis of Shame', in his Self to Self, Cambridge University 
Press, 2006, pp45-69. p46
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believes  there  are  clear  cases  of  shame  where  the  subject  neither  thinks  less  of
himself nor has any reason to, such as the case of Adam and Eve's shame in their
nakedness.
Velleman's account links shame to failures of self-presentation, paradigmatically seen
in failures of privacy. We feel shame when we fail in some attempt of ours to present
the public image that we had intended to. Shame involves anxiety, because being able
to control your public image is essential to being able to communicate and cooperate
with other agents, and therefore to living a good life:
'Threats  to  your  standing as  a  self-presenting  creature  are  thus  a  source  of  deep
anxiety, and anxiety about the threatened loss of that standing is what constitutes the
emotion of shame.'75
For Velleman, then, feelings of shame do not have to involve any ethical self-evaluation
at all, only a failure to present oneself as intended. However, Velleman accepts that
many cases of shame appear ethical in nature, and suggests an explanation for this:
'[ethical]  judgements  are  associated  with  shame because  they  often  serve  as  the
grounds for relegating aspects of ourselves to the private realm […] shame would not
be associated with that assessment in absence of  any sense of  compromised self-
presentation – for example, if we acted on the same impulses with abject resignation
or brazen defiance.'76
However, this explanation is not satisfactory: we do sometimes feel shame after acting
brazenly, which provides a counterexample to Velleman's position. Consider the case
of Liam, who deliberately humiliates somebody out of spite. Liam has a cool head, and
spends considerable time contemplating how to cause the most distress to his target.
He carefully orchestrates his actions so that as many people as possible will see him
humiliating his  victim. This  cannot possibly be a failure of  self-presentation –  Liam
presented himself exactly as intended – but it certainly is plausible for him to feel
ashamed of himself for acting this way.
A possible reply is that to feel shame after acting this way, Liam must change his mind
about wanting to be seen to be spiteful, or belatedly realise that he never wanted this
at all. This may be so, but this is not the most important realisation Liam must come to
if he is to feel ashamed. The most important realisation is that he does not in fact want
to be spiteful, because spitefulness is to be evaluated as bad, vicious or wrong. If Liam
75 Velleman 2006, p55
76 Velleman 2006, p59
Page 77 of 140
were  really  committed  to  and  approving  of  his  spitefulness,  if  he  evaluated  it
positively, and was merely anxious about his ability to present himself differently, we
wouldn't say that he was feeling shame.
As with analysing shame to be necessarily characterised by a feeling of exposure, it
also seems incorrect to analyse shame as necessarily characterised by a feeling of
anxiety. Once again, while anxiety is a common feature of many cases of shame, we
can recognise other cases which do not involve an anxious affect. Shame may have a
straightforwardly downcast, disheartening affect, or a feeling of being angry at oneself
rather than anxious at one's position. Shame may not have an anxious quality to it in
cases where it is felt at its strongest and most immediate. If the ashamed person feels
that they have hit rock bottom, anxious feeling would be out of place: what is there to
be anxious about when things cannot get any worse? These possible affects could
characterise shame in conjunction with anxiety, but also apart from it. For the clearest
case of shame without anxiety, consider the shame that may be felt for conforming to
a widely endorsed norm that one nonetheless rejects.  Having conformed,  one may
have secured the self-presentation expected of one and feel, as a result, less anxious
about one's social standing. Nonetheless, one might feel ashamed at the very same
time  that  one's  anxiety  recedes,  lamenting  that  one  is  the  sort  of  person  who
abandons their principles for a chance at an easier life.
6.1.3 My account of shame
So far  I  have endorsed the cognitive aspect  of  Taylor's  and Williams'  view:  to  feel
shame is to take an adverse ethical view of oneself. Such a view is ethical if it is taken
by the agent to be significant enough to affect how their life goes. However, I have
found the accounts of Taylor, Williams and Velleman too narrow in their treatment of
the felt affect of shame: for each way of specifying the felt affect of shame there have
been counterexamples.
Therefore, as a starting point for my analysis of shame, I take the cognitive element
used in Taylor's and Williams' accounts, but broaden the range of felt affect that can be
involved in  shame.  While  distress  at  the  way one is  seen or  anxiety  about  being
exposed are paradigm cases of what it feels like to be ashamed, shame does not have
to feel  that way. I  have suggested feelings of  distress or  disappointment simply at
one's vice as another set of  paradigm shame feelings,  and  I  do not see a general
reason to rule out other possibilities, so long as they involve feeling bad. This gives us:
Starting Analysis of  Shame:  To feel  shame is to take an adverse ethical  view of
oneself, and to feel bad about it.
Page 78 of 140
However, this pared-down analysis leaves shame too similar to other emotions that
can take an adverse self-evaluation as their object, particularly regret. If  we regret
being vicious, then we feel bad about our adverse ethical self-evaluation. Is shame
really nothing more than regretting a certain sort of thing?
One difference is made clear by the starting analysis: if we are ashamed, we must take
our self-evaluation to be significant. This is not the case if we only feel regret: we can
regret something without taking it to be significant. For example, after Henry sees the
horrible photo of himself, he may regret not having styled his hair that morning. But
we wouldn't infer from this that Henry felt ashamed, because we are inclined to doubt
that he takes his failure to style his hair to be important.
However, there is a second difference which requires a change in the analysis: shame
is  always a  strong or  fairly  strong feeling.  In contrast,  regret  can be a very weak
feeling.  Imagine Olivia, a person who knows that she is thoroughly greedy, but who
never  normally  feels  bad about  this.  One day,  she feels  a  slight,  fleeting pang of
discomfort at the thought of her greed after watching a charity appeal. The instant the
appeal  is  over,  the  feeling  passes,  never  to  recur,  never  giving  rise  to  any
uncomfortable feelings about other matters, and never inhibiting or dampening any
good feelings. Was Olivia, briefly, ashamed of herself? I am reluctant to say so: in an
experience of shame, the way the agent feels is concordant with the serious, adverse
view they take of themselves. Just as it would be discordant (and not really shame) if
they were to feel good instead of bad, it is discordant (and not really shame) if they
feel weakly bad instead of strongly bad.
It  may be objected that  we are happy to  describe  some people as  feeling a  little
ashamed of themselves. However,  this is consistent with the view that shame is a
strong feeling. When we describe someone as a little ashamed we mean that they feel
neither very strongly nor very weakly about their adverse self-evaluation, so that their
feeling is weak for shame, or on the borderline between shame and something else. We
should also remember that a feeling can be strong enough to be a case of shame
without needing to be very intense – this is because it could be strong by having a long
duration,  or  by  displacing  good  feelings  that  we  might  have  had  otherwise,  or
prompting more bad feelings77. It might be this sort of strong but not intense feeling of
shame that we have in mind when we say someone is a little ashamed.
By  considering  these  two  differences  we  can  better  understand  the  relationship
between shame and regret. Regret and shame do overlap: it may be true that we are
feeling ashamed because we regret something of the right kind. However, shame is
77 As I described in section 3.2.2
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not just regretting a certain sort of thing: it is regretting a certain sort of thing in a
certain sort of way. Shame is always felt about an adverse self-evaluation, while regret
can be felt about anything taken to be bad somehow. Shame always takes its cognition
to be significant,  but  regret  only  sometimes does.  Finally,  shame is  never  a  weak
feeling, while regret can be weak or strong.
It is easier to distinguish shame from guilt. To feel guilt is to take oneself to have acted
wrongly, to feel bad about this, and to be negatively motivated to respond to what one
has done. This motivation is the distinguishing feature of guilt, as it is not essential to
shame. However, the boundaries between guilt and shame can be blurred by our use
of the term 'ashamed', which in some contexts seems to mean almost the same as
saying one feels guilty. For instance “I'm ashamed of what I did” or “I'm so ashamed I
didn't say anything” seem to mean almost the same as “I feel guilty about what I did”
or “I feel so guilty for not saying anything”. There are two ways to interpret this. First,
we may accept that guilt and shame can have overlapping intentional objects: that we
sometimes do literally feel shame for our actions, because 'I acted wrongly' is a form of
ethical self-evaluation, understood broadly. Second, we may hold that the sense of self-
evaluation involved in shame is to be understood narrowly as an evaluation of one's
character, so that we never literally feel shame for our actions.
If we take the first interpretation and accept that we can feel shame simply for our
actions, shame and guilt must be distinguished by how they feel and by the rest of the
cognition  involved.  The  clearest  difference  is  that  guilt  necessarily  involves  a
motivation  to  make  an  appropriate  normative  response  to  what  one  did  wrong,
whereas the shameful person may not be motivated, for example if their shame simply
leaves them miserable and dejected. 
If we take the second interpretation, shame and guilt are clearly distinct because they
involve a different sort  of  evaluative cognition:  guilt  an evaluation of  an action as
wrong,  and  shame  an  evaluation  of  oneself  as  vicious.  This  is  less  hospitable  to
common usage in which we do to talk of feeling ashamed of our actions; however, this
talk can be made sense of as referring to shame that is felt as a result of reflecting on
our actions, or to feeling shame for being the sort of person who could act that way.
I will adopt the first interpretation here: we do sometimes feel shame literally for our
actions,  but  this  is  not  the  same  as  feeling  guilty  because  of  the  differences  in
cognition and felt affect between shame and guilt. As well as the fact that the guilty
person is distinctively motivated, the person who is ashamed must take the significant
evaluative view of themselves that I discussed previously. Thus, it is not enough for us
to be ashamed of our action to feel that the action was wrong and requires a response:
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we must also take it seriously – seriously enough to affect how a life goes. The person
who is  ashamed of  an action of  theirs  might feel  that the action reveals them as
vicious.  Alternatively,  they  might  view  the  simple  fact  that  they  committed  the
shameful act to be sufficient to mark them out as a certain sort of bad person: a thief,
an adulterer, a killer, or suchlike. Either sort of self-evaluation is sufficient for shame.
This leaves us with the following analysis of shame:
Shame:  To  feel  shame is  to  take  an  adverse  ethical  view of  oneself,  and  to  feel
strongly bad about it.
An adverse ethical view is understood as any adverse view of oneself that one takes to
be  significant.  The  level  of  significance  required  is  enough  to  affect  the  agent's
eudaimonia, in the sense discussed in chapter four. 
It is worth considering cases of vicarious shame, which may seem to challenge my
analysis. It is not uncommon to feel ashamed of the behaviour of family members,
friends, or one's compatriots. Do these feelings really always involve taking an adverse
ethical view of oneself, not just of the other party?
My account does not require that feeling shame at the actions of another involves
judging oneself to be bad in some way; it only requires that feeling shame involves
taking oneself to be bad in some way in the very broad sense that it is a part of the
cognition involved in the feeling. Thus, imagining being in the other person's position,
considering what you would think of yourself in their position, or worrying about what
people might think of you based on your relationship to the other person, would all be
sufficient for shame under my account. 
Furthermore, actually making a negative judgement regarding oneself on the basis of
the actions of others is not necessarily unreasonable. When one realises that a friend
habitually makes cruel jokes at the expense of others, it is natural to consider what it
says about oneself that one enjoys this person's company, or whether one may be
doing  the  same  thing  without  realising  it.  If  I  think  that  my  government's  policy
towards homelessness is shameful, it is worth asking to what extent am I complicit in
it, and whether I am really doing as much as I should to try to change the policy or
mitigate its effects. So it would not be surprising if vicarious shame involved explicit or
implicit judgements about oneself in some cases.
My account of shame also explains the clear contrast between vicarious shame and
other  emotions  that  take  a  poor  view of  others'  behaviour.  If  I  simply  resent  the
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government's policy on homelessness, the ill feeling involved in that emotion might be
a similar felt affect to that of shame, but the emotions will be clearly distinct because
in resentment my negative appraisal is solely and firmly directed at the government.
Finally,  holding  vicarious  shame  to  involve  some  sort  of  self-evaluative  cognition
explains why we usually experience it when we have some sort of personal connection
to the other party: the personal connection is often the reason it makes sense to ask
how  their  action  reflects  on  oneself.  If  I  think  a  foreign  government's  policy  on
homelessness is shameful, there is much less pressure on me to explain why I'm not
doing much of anything about it.
6.2 Why feel Shame?
I will begin my normative discussion of shame by arguing that we ought sometimes to
feel ashamed, because feeling ashamed is sometimes a part of valuing one's ethical
standing or of the virtue of self-respect. I will then draw on that defence of shame to
provide an account of when shame is the appropriate emotion to feel.
6.2.1 Shame and Valuing
The first argument I make for feeling shame is an argument from valuing78. We ought
to feel something when our self-evaluation is negative because doing so is a part of
valuing those things for which we are ethically appraised: our good character, our good
actions, and our living well. Call these things together our ethical standing. In some
circumstances,  shame  is  the  only  emotional  reaction  consistent  with  valuing  our
ethical standing in the appropriate way.
That we ought to value our ethical standing is very clear. It is certainly important that
we live our lives well, and having a good character and acting well are important parts
of a life well lived. They are also valuable for their own sakes. It is also very clear that
valuing one's ethical standing involves one's emotional life as well as just one's desires
or beliefs. Not only is our ethical standing very important, it is also substantially under
our control: no-one is better placed to influence our actions and character than we are
ourselves.  It  would be very strange indeed to value one's ethical  standing,  and to
understand  its  importance  and  one's  ability  to  influence  it,  and  yet  still  not  to
experience emotional reactions to it – not to regret foolishly acting to put it at risk, nor
ever being proud of it or happy with it, or worried or anxious about it.
To argue that shame in particular is part of properly valuing one's ethical standing, I
78 I introduced this form of argument in section 3.5 
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will consider in turn a variety of alternative emotional responses, and argue that for
each alternative response there are some situations in which shame would be more
appropriate.
6.2.2 Shame and Self-respect
A similar argument for shame can be provided by drawing  upon Taylor's linking of
shame with self-respect. As we saw previously, Taylor views self-respect as a matter of
making  certain  normative  judgements  about  one's  behaviour  and  the  way  one  is
treated; thus, 'Certain kinds of behaviour and … treatment will seem intolerable to the
person of self-respect'. As with Scheffler's approach to valuing, emotional vulnerability
is  involved in self-respect –  the self  respecting person does not  merely judge that
certain behaviour or treatment is intolerable, but also feels something about this. For
Taylor, what is felt is shame: 'the frustration of expectations in this area is precisely the
occasion for feeling shame […] if someone has self-respect then under certain specific
circumstances he will be feeling shame.'79 Taylor's view invites the argument that since
self-respect is a virtue, and since part of self-respect is a disposition to feel shame in
certain  circumstances,  it  is  virtuous  and  appropriate  to  feel  shame  in  those
circumstances.
Taylor's analysis is broadly correct. A person who lacked any strong convictions about
either what treatment they deserved or what behaviour was demanded from them
would be lacking in self-respect. The person who accepts any treatment is too passive
to be called self-respecting, and the person who considers any behaviour of  theirs
permissible is too lacking in standards, too unwilling or unable to hold themselves to
anything.  We also  have  a  strong  intuition  that  the  self-respecting  person  will  feel
shame if they fall short of the behavioural expectation they have of themselves. The
expression 'have you no shame?' draws these considerations to mind. It asks us if we
have any standards, if there is anything we consider beneath us, anything that we
would not do. It  is therefore very close to simply asking 'don't  you have any self-
respect?'
However, I am not convinced by Taylor's approach in the case of treatments. One sort
of treatment that may provoke shame is to expose or report something shameful a
person has done. This would be unlikely to work on someone who lacked any kind of
self-respect; however, this sort of shaming isn't the sort of treatment that the person of
self-respect is likely to consider intolerable. Someone who holds themselves and others
to a high standard is likely to welcome scrutiny. Shame can alternatively be provoked
by victimising, abusing, or humiliating a person. In this case, the treatment is clearly
79 Taylor pp78-80
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the sort of thing that the self-respecting person would find intolerable. However, not
feeling ashamed after this sort of treatment doesn't indicate a lack of self-respect: we
wouldn't doubt the self-respect of someone who reacted instead with resentment or
disgust. Nonetheless, the relation of shame for behaviour to self-respect is sufficient to
argue that shame is sometimes appropriate.
To make this argument robust, it must be shown that it is shame in particular that is
involved in self-respect, and that there are not other emotions that can appropriately
fill  the  same  role.  As  we  consider  the  possible  alternatives  to  shame,  we  should
therefore ask of them both whether they provide an appropriate way of valuing one's
ethical  standing  and  whether  they  would  be  a  sufficient  reaction  on  the  part  of
someone with genuine respect for themselves. This may be a similar task, because
when self-respect is analysed as as a matter of holding strongly to certain views about
what is demanded of one it is revealed to be closely related to valuing one's ethical
standing.  Nonetheless,  considering  the  issue both  in  terms of  valuing  and of  self-
respect may provide some additional insight.
6.2  .3 Ambition and acceptance
The first alternatives I wish to consider are those which do not feel bad, as shame
does.  First,  I  have in  mind ambition,  understood as  a  confident,  positive,  forward-
looking feeling that motivates us to improve. The second alternative is harder to name,
but  I  shall  call  it  acceptance:  I  have  in  mind  a  humble,  relaxed  and  untroubled
awareness of one's limitations. The person who feels this way accepts their flaws and
accepts that they are flaws, but is content to live with them. Acceptance is an emotion
because it is something that is felt; although the feeling is a peaceful one there is more
to  accepting  a  failure  than  merely  believing  it.  Acceptance  is  untroubled  not  just
because troubled feelings are absent, but because a calm, tranquil feeling is present.
For a case where ambition is an appropriate alternative to shame, consider Thomas, a
person who has recently allowed himself to become overweight, and who knows that
he risks damaging his health. It seems that the appropriate thing for Thomas to focus
on is the considerable improvement to his health that can be attained by exercise and
healthier eating, and ambition is focused in this way. Ambition is appropriate because
his vice is slight and improvement is a fairly straightforward matter; we would not
doubt Thomas valued his health or that he was a self-respecting person if he felt this
way. Indeed, ambition – a positive, honest, confident desire to do better – does seem to
be a quality of the person of self-respect. For while Taylor is right not to equate self-
respect  to  a  simple  positive  self-image  or self-appraisal,  such  attitudes  can  be
appropriate for the self-respecting person, as they are not the sort of person to lose
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sight of their potential and their goodness.
Acceptance can be appropriate in cases of less serious flaws. For example, suppose
Laura is a mediocre pianist,  because she doesn't  practice very hard and loses her
composure easily. Laura might plausibly consider her playing to be held back by these
small vices, but be content to play casually without striving to be a better pianist. As
long as Laura is not lazy or excessively anxious with regards to everything she does, it
seems better for her to accept that her playing is held back in this way than it does for
her to feel ashamed.
Acceptance  can  also  be  an  appropriate  reaction  in  cases  where  improvement  is
extremely difficult or impossible. If Laura remains only a modest pianist even after
practising diligently for a long time, it may be that she simply lacks the potential to be
an excellent player. It wouldn't be appropriate for Laura to feel ashamed about her
inability to become a great pianist; that is something it would be better for her to
accept.
Finally, both acceptance and ambition can be appropriate alternatives to shame as a
response to failures of our projects, especially competitive ones. If Laura is passed over
at a piano audition, she might feel ashamed of this, taking herself to be “a failure as a
pianist”.  But it  would be more appropriate for  her to either feel  ambitious and try
again, or to simply accept her failure.
Ambition and acceptance may appear to be generally more appropriate than shame
because  they  are  not  unpleasant  and  distressing  in  the  way  that  shame  is.  Why
consider a distressing reaction more appropriate without a good reason? The answer is
to  be  found  by  attending  to  cases  where  acceptance  and  ambition  appear
inappropriate  in  comparison  to  shame.  These  will  have  to  be  cases  where  it  is
appropriate both to focus on our failings and faults, rather than on our capacity to
improve, and to be troubled by them, rather than content with them. Such cases come
about where the reasons shame struck us as inappropriate no longer apply: cases of
long unrealised potential, significant shortfalls from our potential, and serious ethical
failures.
Ambition becomes inappropriate when our failing is serious or enduring. Returning to
the  case  of  Thomas,  suppose  that  he  consistently  fails  to  follow  through  on  his
ambition and improve his fitness.  After some time, though it  persists,  his ambition
begins to seem somewhat hollow; it is not enough to motivate a sufficient response, so
it appears either insincere or feeble. At the same time, let us suppose he is at fault:
there is no question of genetics or illness or anything else putting the required efforts
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out of reach. There comes a point where either Thomas will begin to feel ashamed that
he lacks the resolve to align his actions with his goals, or else cease to really value his
health. This is the way we talk of such cases: when a person persistently fails to act in
a way that accords with what he says or what he thinks he values, we say that he
“doesn't really care”.
It may be objected that it is equally possible for Thomas to feel ashamed of himself for
a long time without doing anything to improve his health, for shame may equally well
fail to motivate a sufficient response. Wouldn't we still say of Thomas in this case that
he didn't really care about his health? I agree that, sooner or later, we would: shame
alone is not enough to dissuade us from this judgement. However, this is consistent
with the view that Thomas' shame can still be a way for him to value his health to
some extent. If Thomas is indeed distraught at his recognition of his vice, it seems too
strong to say that he doesn't value his health at all; it is better to say that he doesn't
value it fully or that he doesn't value it in the best way. That would require both an
emotional response and that he act. Understood this way, shame can be seen to be
more appropriate than continued ambition in the face of inaction; the problem with
such ambition is that it soon becomes idle fantasy, so that it would be more accurate
to describe the agent merely as desiring or wishing to be healthier, rather than as
valuing their health.
For  a  case  where  the  agent's  vice  is  too  serious  for  ambition  to  be  appropriate,
consider someone who feels  jealous of  his  position in his  social  circle  and so acts
spitefully to deter a newcomer from returning, but reacts with unashamed ambition –
“Gosh!  I  could  quite  easily  be  a  much better  person  by  being  friendly  instead of
spiteful, I ought to get on that right away”. This person fails to grasp the seriousness of
their vice, or fails to value their virtue properly.
Acceptance is also inappropriate in these cases, because both agents are, and know
they are, well able to take effective action to improve their position, and ought to do
so. To feel acceptance here is to view friendliness or healthiness as something to be
respected  in  others,  and  to  be  unfortunately  lacking  from oneself,  but  not  to  be
troubled  about  lacking  it.  This  is  inappropriate  because  it  does  not  take  the  self-
evaluation sufficiently seriously.
Similar considerations apply when shame focuses on a particular action, or on being
person with a certain sort of action on their record. If Laura fails at her audition, or is a
failed pianist, this is not the sort of thing it is appropriate to be ashamed of; ambition
to  try  again  or  acceptance  of  the  failure  is  more  appropriate.  However,  if  Laura
destroys an irreplaceable antique piano in a fit of rage after failing her audition, then
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responses of ambition or acceptance to that would be flippant and inappropriate.
Agents who feel acceptance or ambition in serious cases also lack self-respect of the
sort Taylor describes. Taylor's account of self-respect focuses on tight standards that
are tied to our sense of self; this is why it is natural to speak of what the person of self-
respect finds intolerable. The agent who responds with ambition or acceptance to a
serious failure on their part to meet their own standards does not react to that failure
as if they find it intolerable.
6.2.4: Guilt
The next alternative to consider is guilt. Guilt, as an overtly moral emotion and one
which is distressing, certainly appears to take moral failure seriously. The question at
hand  is  whether  guilt  might  be  more  appropriate  than  shame  in  the  sort  of
circumstances that at first sight seem to warrant shame. The primary reason we might
think this to be the case is that guilt may seem to be a more appropriately focused
emotion.
As noted by Williams80, shame is sometimes considered to be too focused on distress
at the way others see one, on the way one's image has gone awry. This doesn't seem
to  get  at  the  crux  of  the  matter  in  the  way  that  guilt  does,  by  focusing  on  the
wrongdoing itself,  the victim, or the harm caused. Kantians in particular, but by no
means Kantians alone, may be concerned that shame is too much about losing face,
heteronomous rather than autonomous, and secondary to the actual moral situation.
However, Taylor and Williams both argue that shame is not simply about being seen
badly, but rather about being seen in a way one considers inappropriate:
'Shame need not be just a matter of being seen, but of being seen by an observer with
a certain  view.  Indeed,  the  view taken by the  observer  need not  itself  be critical:
people can be ashamed of being admired by the wrong audience in the wrong way.
Equally, they need not be ashamed of being poorly viewed, if the view is that of an
observer for whom they feel contempt'.81
This allows us to say that when shame is a response to being seen badly, it is a matter
of being seen badly by someone whom they respect, or at least whose judgement they
respect. I  have also argued that a concern for how one is seen is not essential to
shame. Shame is therefore not problematically heteronomous. Furthermore, if we have
a healthy respect for others and value their opinion of us, a distressed reaction will be
80 Williams pp77-78
81 Williams p82. See also Taylor, pp64-67
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warranted when that opinion is rightfully adverse in a way that is significant. As for the
need to focus on particular actions and their consequences we may note that shame
may  of  course  be  felt  in  addition  to  guilt,  or  remorse,  or  anything  else  that  is
appropriate in the situation. Shame need not be the only emotion felt.
Moreover, the inward focus of shame on our character and flaws can just as easily be
seen as an asset. We have already shown that sometimes it is appropriate to feel bad
about our viciousness, because feeling that way is a part of what it is to care about our
character, and is required by self-respect. Now, it does not seem to me that guilt is
properly directed at these things: we feel guilt for our actions or omissions, not for
being a bad person or possessing a vicious character trait.
This  distinction can be seen in our practice of  forgiveness.  Guilt  is often eased by
another's forgiveness, while shame is usually not. This is because guilt is focused on
wrong actions and what must be done in response to them, while shame focuses on an
ethical self-evaluation, often by focusing on our vices. Firstly, it is actions that we ask
forgiveness for: it is not appropriate to ask someone to forgive us for our character
flaws.  Asking forgiveness for  an action of  ours is asking forgiveness for  something
which occurred in the past, and which we and the forgiving party may want to move on
from. To ask forgiveness for our flawed character is not like this, because our vice is a
present  concern;  we cannot  move on from it  until  we reform. Forgiveness for  bad
character seems inappropriate in the same way that forgiveness in advance for future
wrongdoing seems inappropriate. 
Secondly, we seek forgiveness from other people whom we judge to have had a stake
in  our  actions  –  usually  those  who  have  been  badly  affected  by  them,  but  also
sometimes from those who simply expected better of us. In cases that are purely or
primarily self-regarding we tend not to seek forgiveness, even if we still feel guilty. If
we feel guilty for eating too much cake, but see it as our own business, it doesn't seem
appropriate  to  ask  for  anyone's  forgiveness.  So  our  guilt  is  only  absolved  by
forgiveness when we see what we did as primarily somebody else's business. But we
always take what we are ashamed of to be our own business: even in a case where we
are ashamed of mistreating somebody, we wouldn't be feeling shame if we didn't take
our wrongdoing to be an important personal failing.
Forgiveness frequently eases guilt because it is relevant to the motivation to respond
that characterises guilt. As the response motivated by guilt is often owed to somebody,
their forgiving the guilty agent is often intended to release them from that obligation.
For example, when we forgive someone who is unable to repay their debt to us, in
doing so we usually release them from the obligation to repay us when they are able.
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Since continued guilt is inappropriate if one has already responded appropriately to
one's wrongdoing, forgiveness of this sort makes continued guilt inappropriate. In the
case of shame, however, we take ourselves to have fallen short of our own standards.
Whether or not someone else is willing to forgive us is not directly relevant to whether
or not we have let ourselves down, and so forgiveness is not enough to make one's
shame inappropriate.
Since guilt focuses on our wrong actions and what must be done about them, it is
sometimes appropriate to feel  shame as well.  This is because wrongdoing and the
obligations  it  places  on  us  are  not  the  only  things  that  are  relevant  to  our  self-
evaluation. If we value our ethical standing and have a healthy sense of self-respect,
we must also attend to what our actions say about us and whether our character is
vicious or virtuous. It is just as important that we are emotionally vulnerable to these
considerations as those that concern guilt. If the only negative feelings we have about
our ethical failings focus on particular wrong actions and our responses to them then
we are either inattentive to the significance of our vices themselves, or else we are
feeling only acceptance of our vices or ambition to rid ourselves of them, which we
have already seen cannot always be the appropriate reactions.
6.2.5: Regret
Perhaps the strongest alternative candidate to shame in the situations where shame
seems appropriate is regret. However, regret and shame are not mutually exclusive. I
will argue in chapter seven that to feel regret is to take it that something has gone or
is going in some way wrong or badly, and to feel bad about this.  To feel shame is to
take an adverse ethical view of oneself, and to feel at least fairly strongly bad about it.
Therefore if we take it that we are a cruel person and that in this way things are going
badly, and feel at least fairly strongly distressed about this, we will be feeling both
shame and regret. In considering whether regret is appropriate instead of shame, we
must consider only instances of regret which are not also instances of shame. In these
instances we either regret something without taking it to be an ethical matter or regret
it only weakly.
To regret something without taking it to be an ethical matter will not seem appropriate
in cases that are serious ethical matters, for similar reasons to why acceptance seemed
inappropriate in those cases. In fact, not taking one's self-evaluation to be an ethical
matter at all is to take it even less seriously than if one took it to be an ethical failing,
but one which can be accepted. I shall therefore focus on whether feeling only a little
bad about one's adverse ethical self-evaluation can be an appropriate alternative to
shame.
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Regret  of  this  sort  occupies  a  middle  ground  between  shame (a  strong,  negative
reaction to failure) on the one hand and acceptance or ambition (neutral or positive
reactions to failure) on the other. For this reason, regret may appear more likely to
keep our flaws in perspective than shame. Because of the strength of feeling involved,
shame often prompts further bad feelings or displaces good feelings about ourselves.
This is something we might worry about, and one of the reasons ambition seemed
attractive: it isn't good for us to languish in a funk, only attending to the worst aspects
of  ourselves.  Regret  can  provide  a  way of  taking  our  failings  more  seriously  than
ambition,  but  without  risking  the  downward  spiral  of  bad  feeling  associated  with
shame.
There will  be cases of moderate flaws which warrant regret rather than shame. In
these cases a similarly modest emotional reaction is the best way of valuing one's
ethical standing and showing one's self-respect. Just as the self-respecting person finds
some behaviour on their part intolerable, surely there are also behaviours which they
find disagreeable,  but not intolerable. To feel  ashamed of every failing, even those
which  are  modest,  is  not  the  attitude  we  expect  of  the  self-respecting  person;
sometimes, they will merely regret what they did. This is because they retain a healthy
sense of their virtues as well as their vices.
Still,  in  some cases  shame must  be  appropriate  rather  than regret.  This  is  simply
because it is not appropriate to react as if all of one's failings are modest, even those
which  are  very  serious.  When  our  failings  are  serious,  the  tendency  of  shame  to
prompt further shame can be appropriate. For example, suppose we become ashamed
of  our  jealousy,  after  experiencing  strong  possessive  feelings  we  wouldn't  have
expected ourselves to feel. Because our character is far from transparent to us, and
because of what we know about other jealous people, this experience really should
prompt us to become more generally worried about our character and ethical standing.
Perhaps we are also not as kind, friendly or faithful as we thought we were?
6.3: When is it appropriate to feel shame?
To summarise the position so far, to feel shame is to take an adverse ethical view of
oneself, and to feel strongly bad about it. The idea of self-evaluation in play is broadly
construed, so as to allow shame to be felt for actions, so long as they are taken to be
significant.  I  have  argued  that  shame  is  sometimes  the  appropriate  emotional
response to such a self-evaluation, because it is sometimes the proper way to value
one's ethical standing or to maintain an attitude of self-respect. This was achieved by
assuming, with Scheffler and Taylor, that some emotional reaction must be involved in
valuing and in self-respect, and then showing the alternatives to shame to be in some
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cases insufficient if shame is not felt as well.
Having established that shame is sometimes appropriate, the next step is to develop a
more general account of when shame is appropriate. I will argue that shame is only
appropriate if one has good reason to think it is fitting, that shame should be restricted
to serious ethical failings, and that shame is usually not appropriate for vices that are,
or actions that were, beyond our control.
6.3.1 Fittingness and appropriateness
For  shame to  be  fitting,  the  adverse  ethical  self-evaluation  involved in  it  must  be
accurate. Shame can fail to be fitting in two ways: either it is descriptively mistaken, or
normatively mistaken. Suppose that Michael is ashamed of his unreliability. If Michael
is actually reliable, then his shame is unfitting because it is descriptively mistaken. If
unreliability  is  not  actually  vicious,  then Michael's  shame is  unfitting because it  is
normatively mistaken.
Unfitting  shame  seems  unlikely  to  be  appropriate.  Probably  the  most  common
circumstance in which we would tell somebody that they oughtn't to feel ashamed is
that in which they have nothing to be ashamed of, either because they are not the sort
of person they take themselves to be or because they are ashamed of something that
it isn't correct to evaluate adversely, as when we say “that's nothing to be ashamed
of”. However, we should ask whether shame follows the same pattern as guilt, where
unfitting guilt can be appropriate so long as the agent has good reason to think that it
is fitting.
Consider the following case:
Nora's friends and family all spend much more time working and studying than Nora, and criticise her for
being lazy. Nora ignores them for a long time, because she doesn't agree: she thinks they are working too
hard and need to learn to relax. At the end of the year, Nora performs very badly in her exams. She is very
upset, and, thinking that her family and friends were right all along, she begins to feel ashamed of herself for
being lazy, stubborn, and a failure. However, Nora isn't really lazy: her friends are indeed too hard-working,
and her exam results were mixed up with another candidate's.
Supposing that laziness, stubbornness and failing exams are serious enough, Nora's
shame is  appropriate.  She should be  willing to  re-evaluate her position when new
evidence comes to light, and she should take others' opinions seriously. So appropriate
shame, like appropriate guilt, requires that the agent has good reason to think that it is
fitting, but not that it actually is fitting. That said, appropriate shame demands strong
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evidence to think that it is fitting, because it is a strong feeling and involves making a
significant adverse self-evaluation. Because of this, and because it is plausible that we
are often in a better epistemic position to appraise our own character than others are,
unfitting shame will be less commonly appropriate than unfitting guilt.
6.3.2 Seriousness and appropriateness
An ethical failing must be serious for shame to be an appropriate response. In part, this
is a matter of fittingness: some things are so insignificant that it would be mistaken to
consider  them ethical  failings  at  all.  Henry's  appearance  in  the  photograph  is  an
example of  this.  I've argued that  something is  significant enough to  be an ethical
matter if it affects the agent's eudaimonia (see section 5.1.1). However, we have also
seen that some failings that reach this level of significance still aren't serious enough
to make shame appropriate. Thomas's poor fitness provided an example of this: it isn't
serious enough to make shame appropriate unless we also suppose that Thomas has
repeatedly failed in his attempts to improve.
So, how serious does our failing have to be for shame to be appropriate, rather than
just fitting? It must be a failing that doesn't just make a difference to our eudaimonia,
but rather makes a large or important difference. As well as considering this, we can
also  make  a  judgement  in  a  particular  case  by  considering  whether  or  not  an
alternative to shame such as regret, acceptance, or ambition would be consistent with
the agent properly valuing their ethical standing and maintaining an attitude of self-
respect. In the case of shame for actions, this will depend on how wrongful the action
was and how significant it is to the agent's life. In the case of shame for vices, it will
depend on how serious the vice is, and for how long the agent has possessed it.
Against my view that shame is appropriate only in the case of serious ethical failings it
may be objected that we do not typically think weaker feelings of shame about small
failings  are  inappropriate:  we  would  not  be  quick  to  censure  them.  However,  this
thought can be accepted together with my view. We should only criticise someone for
feeling  shame  that  is  inappropriate,  and  shame  at  less  serious  but  still  ethically
significant  failings  is  plausibly  neither  appropriate  nor  inappropriate:  an
understandable way to  feel  in the circumstances,  but  not required either,  because
experiencing another emotion, such as ambition, would also be acceptable.
6.3.3 Control and appropriateness
Finally, we saw that in some cases shame can be inappropriate because the agent
lacks  sufficient  control  over  the  failing  they  are  ashamed of.  For  instance,  feeling
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shame for failing to reach an ambitious goal that might be beyond one's ability seems
inappropriate. Similarly, feeling ashamed of a blamelessly acquired and untreatable
illness is clearly inappropriate, even if we agree that the illness warrants an adverse
ethical self-evaluation, for example if its symptoms make it very difficult to live a good
life.
There are good reasons to think that shame for actions which were beyond our control
tend not to  be appropriate.  First,  for  shame to be appropriate our failing must  be
serious. However, not being able to control something, or having only an attenuated
control over it, often makes it less important to our self-evaluation. If I accidentally
destroy your favourite vase, I will feel bad and wish that I hadn't done it, but it is best if
I accept that accidents happen to everyone and don't take it too hard. If Laura is really
not suited to the piano, it is best if she recognises that it may not be her fault, and is
something  she  ought  to  learn  to  accept.  Second,  when  we  lack  control  over  our
actions,  that often makes it  inappropriate to draw inferences from them about our
virtue or vice. If somebody is deliberately coughing during your speech then they are
rude, and this may be something they ought to be ashamed of. But if they are ill and
can't help but cough, it isn't correct to infer that they are rude, and so they shouldn't
feel ashamed of themselves.
However, there are cases where these reasons do not apply, and where it may be
appropriate to feel shame for things one did, but could not control. Some vices are
revealed by actions that are not completely within our control. A person who cannot
help but laugh at other people's misfortune is cruel, even if they never deliberately do
cruel things. If the cruelty of their laughter is significant enough, they ought to be
ashamed  of  themselves  for  it.  It  is  also  worth  noting  that  a  lack  of  control  over
something may not always be very important. As I considered in section 2.3.4, we may
not have very much control over our beliefs or emotions. It may still be appropriate to
feel ashamed if our beliefs or feelings are vicious. These considerations also explain
why shame for things that are done to us may sometimes be appropriate: the way we
are treated is sometimes revealing of how other people evaluate us, and the fact that
one cannot control others' treatment of us isn't a good reason to discard an inference
drawn  this  way.  If  we  have  good  reasons  to  think  that  others  are  evaluating  us
correctly, then shame may be an appropriate response to their behaviour towards us.
The appropriateness of this sort of shame may explain why some victims of abuse feel
ashamed: they may wrongly infer, or simply feel as if, their abuse is inflicted on them
because they are bad people in some way.
In the case of shame for vices, it is the degree of control one can exercise looking
forwards that is important, rather than how much control we had over developing the
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vice. This provides the best explanation of our intuitions regarding the cases. It is often
appropriate to accept flaws when they are beyond one's control in the sense that there
is nothing one can do about them. In these cases, since there is nothing we can do,
acceptance  does  not  usually  call  into  doubt  whether  or  not  we  value  our  ethical
standing, or whether we are self-respecting people. Indeed, to feel ashamed in these
cases is often to be too harsh on oneself, to view oneself too poorly, and perhaps in
this way to show a lack of self-respect. This account of the relevance of our control to
the appropriateness of shame can also explain why acceptance can be an appropriate
response to a vice that is only difficult, not impossible, to correct, such as in the case
where Laura accepts that she is a sloppy pianist as a result of her lack of composure or
diligence. The reason shame is not appropriate here is not that there is nothing Laura
can do about her lack of composure, but rather that there is nothing Laura ought to do
about it,  since what can be done is sufficiently hard and a lack of composure is a
sufficiently  minor  failing.  That  she  has  given  up  on  improving  herself  in  this  way
doesn't mean that Laura lacks self-respect or doesn’t value living a good life properly –
she is just sensibly prioritising. However, we would not so readily accept this reasoning
when a more important  virtue is  involved.  Some people find it  very difficult  to be
brave, because they cannot seem to bring themselves to stand up to their fears. Other
people struggle to be kind, because they find it very difficult to empathise with others.
But  since  bravery  and  kindness  are  more  important  to  living  a  good  life  than
composure, accepting that one lacks these virtues is too drastic to be appropriate.
The degree to which one can exercise control  over what one is  ashamed of  going
forwards is also the important factor in cases of vicarious shame. Returning to the case
in which I feel ashamed of the UK government's policies regarding homelessness, it
seems that the reason it may be appropriate for me to take the government's failure to
reflect badly on me is that I  do have ways to influence the policy which I  am not
exercising. What seems important here is not whether I have sufficient influence to
have the policy changed (this is rather unlikely), but whether my influence is great
enough that how I use it  is relevant to my ethical self-evaluation. As a contrast,  it
would  be  inappropriate  for  me  to  be  ashamed  of  the  US  government's  policies
regarding homelessness: as I am neither a US citizen nor resident my influence there is
not relevant in the same way.
These considerations together show that the appropriateness of shame is related to
how much control we have over something: the more it is true that our failings were or
are under our control, the more likely shame is to be an appropriate response to them.
However, we cannot simply infer that it is inappropriate to be ashamed of something
from the fact that we lack control  over it,  because there are exceptions to such a
principle.
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6.3.4 Summary
I have argued that shame is appropriate because feeling it is sometimes a part of what
it is to properly value one's ethical standing and because it is required by the virtue of
self-respect.  These grounds make shame appropriate in cases where one has good
reason to take oneself to have the ethical failing one is ashamed of, and where that
failing is serious enough that regret, ambition or acceptance would be inappropriate.
Shame that  involves appraising oneself  as  vicious is  more likely to  be appropriate
when there is something that one can do about the vice. Shame for past actions is
more likely to be appropriate when the action was under our control at the time.
Page 95 of 140
Chapter 7: Regret
7.1 What is Regret?
7.1.1 Regret as a broad emotion
I intend to use 'regret' broadly. We regret something when we take it that something
has gone or is going in some way wrong or badly, and feel bad about it. This approach
is  similar  to  Bernard  Williams'  in  Moral  Luck: 'The  constitutive  thought  of  regret  in
general is something like 'how much better if it had been otherwise', and the feeling
can in principle apply to anything'82 the main difference being that Williams' phrasing
suggests  that  regret  involves  an  all-things  considered  judgement  and  a  wish  that
things really had been otherwise.  I  prefer to use the 'in some way' construction to
allow for ambivalent cases where we regret something even though we also feel that
what has happened is for the best, all things considered. For example, if our child has
been accepted into a university which is excellent and their first choice, we might feel
glad for them but also regret that they will not be going to the same one as we did.
Similarly, while in many cases of regret we wish that things were different, this is not
essential. The university case shows this, as does a case in which we regret something
but feel so despondently resigned to it that we do not actively wish it to be otherwise.
Under this broad definition, it is analytically true that anyone who feels guilt or shame
feels regret too, since both emotions involve taking something to have gone badly, and
both are distressing. When we feel guilt, what has gone badly is our acting wrongly;
with shame, it could be our acting wrongly, being vicious, or our life going badly in
some other way.
We can regret pretty much anything, including things that are entirely beyond our
ability to influence. I could regret that the sky is blue, if I detest the colour blue, and I
could regret living in the 21st Century, if I consider it dull compared to the others.
However, we do consider such regrets a little odd; since regret must be painful or
unpleasant, it seems strange to take such things so hard. It is more common to simply
day-dream about being an American pioneer than to really regret not being one. Since
we can regret something entirely beyond our realm of control, to regret something
within one's realm of influence does not commit oneself to taking any sort of
responsibility for it. If I think that you are overly sensitive, I can regret hurting your
feelings without believing that I was at fault. I can regret that an oil spill is harming
wildlife, without thinking that it is my responsibility to go and clean it up: I might think
82 Williams, Bernard, 'Moral Luck', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 
Vol. 50 (1976), pp115-135.p123
Page 96 of 140
that it is the oil company's responsibility.
I am stipulating here that regret is always an emotion, but it is worth noting that regret
can also be  used to  refer  only  to  the  judgement  that  something has  gone  badly,
without implying any feeling of sadness or distress. For example, it may be the case
that when we say we regret our youthful indiscretions, we only mean that we think we
acted badly, not that we are distressed by this thought. This may be what politicians
intend when they say that they believe they did the right thing but also regret any
harm  caused:  they  simply  want  to  acknowledge  that  their  policy  had  some  bad
consequences, not to additionally express their distress. I will not draw any conclusions
about this sort of regret; all of my arguments and conclusions will be about feelings of
regret,  not  mere  judgements.  However,  since my arguments  will  rely  in  places on
intuitions about regret, we must remain vigilant that the intuitions we rely on are truly
intuitions about feelings of regret, and not about mere judgements.
7.1.2 Agent-regret
What I have said so far does not account for all of the ways we use regret, even when
not referring to mere judgements. This is because there are occasions where we would
naturally say we regret something, but where it seems that what we are feeling is
partly constituted by our feeling responsible in some way.  For  some, this is their
primary use for the word. I believe that this feeling is the one Williams refers to as
agent-regret:
'there is a particularly important species of regret, which I shall call 'agent-regret',
which a person can feel only towards his own past actions (or, at most, actions in
which he regards himself as a participant). In this case, the supposed possible
difference is that one might have acted otherwise'.83
Williams is clear that agent-regret is not simply regret for something we have done:
'There can be cases directed towards one's own past actions which are not cases of
agent-regret, because the past action is regarded purely externally, as one might
regard anyone else's action'.84
What exactly is the difference between regret for what we have done and agent-
regret? It cannot be that the person who feels agent-regret judges that they were at
fault because Williams attributes feelings of agent-regret to agents who know they are
83 Williams, Moral Luck, p123
84 Williams, Moral Luck, p123
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not at fault:
‘the lorry driver who, through no fault of his, runs over a child, will feel differently from
any spectator [...] there is something special in his relation to this happening,
something which cannot merely be eliminated by the consideration that it was not his
fault’.85
Joseph Raz suggests the difference is that 'agent-regret relates to one's sense of who
one is. When I agent-regret an action of mine I feel bad or sorry about being or having
become a person who acted in that way.' Therefore, agent-regret 'is poignant in being
not regret that there is such a person, but that I am such a person.'86 
It is worth noting that Raz's suggestion does not imply that the agent-regretful person
feels they have become in some way bad or vicious. They need only to feel bad about
the way they have become. For example, suppose that a student is unsure whether
they should study English or medicine. After choosing medicine, they come to regret
their decision. They find studying medicine very stressful, and wish that they had
chosen to study English. They do not feel like they will be happy as a doctor, and they
find that they cannot write poetry anymore, because they suffer from stress-induced
writer's block. This is a case of regret for the student's past action, it is not regarded
purely externally, and it does seem to relate importantly to the student's sense of self.
The student feels bad about having become someone who is often stressed and
agitated, and who no longer writes poetry. But they need not blame themselves for
their decision: it is not wrong to study medicine, and they had no way of knowing they
would react that way to studying it.
The conditions Raz describes – regret for what we have done, because of its affect on
our sense of self – are sufficient to mark a case out as agent-regret. However, I do not
believe they mark the necessary conditions of agent-regret. This is because it seems
to me that agent-regret is also felt in the following sort of case: 
Sandra accidentally knocks over Rick's vase, breaking it. Sandra is not at fault, and everybody knows she
was not at fault. Fred, who saw this happen, regrets that the vase was knocked over because he knows Rick
liked the vase. Sandra regrets breaking the vase. Though Sandra doesn't feel guilty, since she knows she was
not at fault, she does feel responsible for breaking the vase, and so she offers to pay for Rick to replace it.
Fred doesn't feel this way at all; it doesn't occur to him to offer to replace it for Rick.
85 Williams, Moral Luck, p124
86 Raz, Jospeh, From Normativity to Responsibility, Oxford University Press, 2011, p233-234 
(Raz's Emphasis)
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Sandra is feeling a special sort of regret, different to Fred's and directed towards her
own past action: she is feeling agent-regret. But we do not feel compelled to say that
Sandra, given what we have said so far, must feel bad about having become the sort
of person who has (accidentally) broken a vase. It seems more likely that she will pay
Rick, recover her composure, and forget all about the incident without contemplating
her sense of self at all. (If Sandra often broke things, that might be a different matter,
but this was an isolated incident).
Cases of this sort are familiar from the literature on moral luck. When Sandra feels
responsible in this way, she is thinking in terms of what Judith Andre calls the prosaic
sense of responsibility, where 'to be responsible is to have an obligation to rectify bad
consequences. If I break your vase, I must replace it. I can be responsible in [this]
sense without being in the least blameworthy, although often the two coincide.’87 In
Sandra's case, it seems that she is exercising what Susan Wolf calls the nameless
virtue. Similar to generosity, this is the virtue 'that would lead one to offer to pay for
the vase that one broke even if one's fault in the incident was uncertain’.88
My belief is that when one regrets something and takes oneself to be responsible for it,
one feels agent-regret. This includes, but is not limited to, prosaic responsibility, and
can therefore  account for Sandra's case. Raz's analysis provides sufficient conditions
for agent-regret because his idea of our sense of ourselves is tied to the things we are
responsible for, at least prosaically: 'When I agent-regret an action of mine I feel bad or
sorry about being or having become a person who acted in that way'89. To think of ourselves
as a person who acted is to think of ourselves as a person responsible in some way for
that action.
7.2 Why feel Regret?
7.2.1 A fortiori arguments for regret
Since regret is a broad emotion and those who feel guilt and shame feel regret too, my
arguments  that  we  ought  sometimes  to  feel  guilty  or  ashamed  are,  a  fortiori,
arguments that we ought sometimes to feel regret. We should feel guilty if we owe
somebody a response for our wrongdoing, so we should regret what we have done
wrong in cases where guilt is appropriate. Similarly, we ought to feel ashamed of our
serious ethical failings, so we ought to regret them. In each case, it is agent-regret that
is  shown to  be  appropriate,  since  we ought  to  see ourselves  as  either  morally  or
87 Andre, Judith, 'Nagel, Williams and Moral Luck', Analysis, 1983, pp202-207. p205
88 Wolf, Susan, 'The Moral of Moral Luck', Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 31, Issue 1, 2001, 
pp1-16. p10
89 Raz, p233 (My emphasis) 
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prosaically responsible for wrongdoing and failures of the sort that warrant guilt  or
shame.
This  much is  already established.  I  am interested now in  whether  there  are  other
occasions in which regret is appropriate, for example in the way I considered in my
discussion  of  alternatives  to  shame  (section  6.2.5).  I  will  proceed  by  considering
Rüdiger  Bittner's  argument  against  feeling regret,  and John Gardner's  argument  in
favour of feeling regret. 
7.2.2 Bittner's argument against regret
Bittner argues that it is never reasonable to feel regret for something bad that one has
done. Bittner takes regret to be 'a painful feeling about  something we did  which we
think was bad',90 and notes that other feelings such as remorse, repentance and guilt
can be considered as different kinds of regret. This view of regret is compatible with
my broad account, but Bittner's claim that it must be some act of ours which we regret
suggests  he is  thinking of  agent-regret  in particular.  As well  as this,  Bittner  is  not
explicit about whether we must feel as if our act was bad, all things considered, or just
in some way bad. It is reasonable for Bittner to focus on cases of agent-regret and all
things considered badness because such cases seem to be the most likely to be cases
of reasonable regret. By rejecting them, he can claim that we ought to eliminate all
forms of regret without needing to be exhaustive or to defend any comprehensive
position about what regret is.
Bittner's argument against regret runs as follows: 'It is not reasonable, because one did
something bad, to go and make things worse. But that is what regret is, double misery,
the second for the sake of the first. So, regret is not reasonable.'91 This is motivated by
the fact that regret is a painful feeling. Its being painful means that being in a state of
regret is always in that way bad; this is why to feel regret is to make things worse. That
regret is in this way bad is taken to provide a standing reason against feeling it. Thus,
for it to be reasonable to feel regret, we would need to identify something good about
regret, something that outweighs its painfulness. The burden of proof is therefore on
the person arguing for regret, and Bittner uses the rest of his paper to reject different
attempts to discharge the burden.
This strategy is sensible, as it mirrors the way we consider other painful experiences.
Suppose going for a one mile jog is pleasant, but going for a five mile jog would be
painful. If that's the end of the story, we should only go for a one mile jog. To show that
90 Rüdiger Bittner, 'Is it reasonable to regret things one did?', The Journal of Philosophy, 
Vol 89, No. 5, May 1992, pp262-273. p262
91 Bittner, p265
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it is reasonable to go on the five mile jog, we need to be able to identify some other
benefit  we can only get from the longer jog. It  needs to further our wish to run a
marathon, or be better for our health than the shorter jog. This search for a benefit to
regret expresses a  frequent  practical  worry  about  negative  feelings.  When we say
“there's no use crying over spilt milk”, we suggest that we oughtn't to cry, because
there's no practical benefit to doing so.
The best way to respond to Bittner's argument is to accept and discharge the burden
of proof he places on us. I have already shown that this can be done in those cases of
regret which overlap with guilt  or  shame. A more general  response of  this  kind is
offered by John Gardner's argument that regret is often required for its own sake.
7.2.3 Gardner: The Continuity Thesis as an argument for regret
Gardner does not analyse regret directly,  but he states that 'Regret is the rational
response to any measure of non-conformity with any reason'92 and also in a note that
all  regret  'reflects  (what  the  regretter  takes  to  be)  incomplete  conformity  with
reason'.93 Since incomplete conformity with reason will  plausibly always involve our
doing something that is in some way bad (even if only because an opportunity for
something good was missed) it seems that Gardner is identifying the same intentional
object for regret as Bittner and I. Gardner goes on to explain that feeling regret 'may
damage, and in extreme cases destroy'94 a life, which makes clear that he takes regret
to be a bad feeling, rather than a mere judgement. So Bittner, Gardner and I are not
talking past each other.
I introduced Gardner's continuity thesis in Chapter Four as the idea that reasons await
full conformity, so that a reason not conformed to now counts as a reason to do the
next  best  thing95.  When full  conformity  to  a  reason is  impossible,  the  reason now
counts  as  a  reason  to  regret  not  having  fully  conformed.  This  will  be  the  case
whenever doing the next best thing is not as good as having done what we had reason
to do in the first place: 'the reason for the regret is the very same reason that was
incompletely conformed to (coupled, of course, with the fact of incomplete conformity
to  it)'.  The further we are from fully  conforming to the reason,  the more regret is
appropriate, until 'the point of maximal regret at which my non-conformity with the
original reason is total'96.
92 Gardner p58
93 Gardner, p58 note 19, 
94 Gardner, p60
95 Section 3.4.3; Gardner, pp57-58
96 Gardner, p58
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This suggests a response to Bittner: when regret is appropriate, this is because we
have failed to fully conform to some reason, and that very reason is the reason to feel
regret. Thus, in every case where we have acted badly, and so failed to fully conform
to some reason, we necessarily have a reason to feel  regret that can be balanced
against  the pain the  regret  would cause us.  As  a  result,  regret will  sometimes be
reasonable, and sometimes not, depending on various factors such as how bad a thing
we did. This position is contrary to Bittner's and plausible at first sight.
Gardner positions his view against the opposite view 'that at every moment we start
again from  tabula  rasa,  rationally speaking […] Regret,  apology,  reparation, remorse,
atonement, punishment: all this retrospectivity is irrational unless it now commends
itself afresh, as a way of (say) reducing future suffering, or expressing renewed respect
for others.'97 And indeed,  Gardner's argument is not anticipated by Bittner because
Bittner does disregard past considerations in that way. Bittner argues against several
possible  justifications  of  regret,  all  of  which  depend  on  present  or  future
considerations: that regret has good consequences for future behaviour98, that regret is
valuable now as a form of atonement or self-punishment99, and various interpretations
of Williams' arguments in favour of agent-regret.100 He does not consider responses
such as Gardner’s which rely on past considerations.
However, in Chapter Four I argued against Gardner's Continuity Thesis. On Gardner's
view, so long as a reason is categorical (that is, so long as it doesn't depend on our
particular goals and interests), it will always provide a reason for regret if we fail to
conform to it, even if the reason was a small one, and even if we failed to conform to it
long ago.  I  argued that this  resulted in an implausible  over-abundance of  reasons.
Against  this  objection  Gardner  notes  that  such  reasons  will  often  be  outweighed.
However, if we rely on this response, Gardner's challenge is much less troubling for
Bittner, who could argue that the reason to feel regret provided by the degree of non-
conformity to a past reason will always be outweighed by the rather strong reason we
have to avoid useless pain.
7.2.4 The Eudaimonia Principle and regret
To show that we have reasons to feel regret strong enough to outweigh our reason to
avoid useless pain, we can employ the Eudaimonia Principle101 in place of Gardner’s
97 Gardner, p58
98 Bittner, pp266-267
99 Bittner, pp267-268
100Bittner, pp268-272
101The Eudaimonia Principle holds that a fact about the past matters to how we ought
to feel if and only if it affects our eudaimonia. I defended this principle in chapter 
four. 
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Continuity Thesis. If our lack of conformity to a reason is serious enough to affect our
eudaimonia,  then  in  that  case  it  will  become  a  significant  reason  to  feel  regret.
Because only significant mistakes affect our eudaimonia, and because whether we live
well  is  a  matter of  great  importance,  it  isn't  plausible  for  Bittner  to  hold that  our
reasons to feel regret are always outweighed by painfulness in these cases. However,
we  should  consider  whether  he  could  accept  that  the  effect  on  our  eudaimonia
matters, while denying that it provides a reason to feel regret in particular. What about
regret could make it such a widely appropriate response?
The broadness of regret is its first main advantage. I can regret anything I take to be in
some way bad. Saying that I feel regret does not commit me to feeling guilt or shame
or anything more specific, nor to believing myself to be at fault or to blame. I can also
feel  regret  to  more or  less any degree;  it  makes sense to  say either that I  feel  a
tremendous regret or that I feel a slight regret. This broadness is important because it
means that regret can always be a fitting response to our non-comformity to a reason,
since in feeling regret, we take something to be bad in some way, and non-comformity
to a reason is always in some way bad. Even if our non-conformity was accidental or
justified, it must still be bad in some way: if it were not, there would have been no
reason to begin with.  This means that regret can be coherently and relevantly felt
about reason-violation of any sort. As well as this, because we can feel regret to any
degree, and in many different ways, so long as we ought to feel something about our
reason-violation regret will never be an obvious under- or over-reaction.
The second advantage of regret is the very painfulness that Bittner criticises it for.
Regret feels bad. In one sense, as Bittner notes, this is a reason not to feel it. But,
when it is called for, that regret feels bad can be a reason in favour of feeling it too. We
are considering cases in which something has gone bad in some way: it  would be
perverse to feel good about that.
Next, we should consider whether action is preferable as an alternative to regret as a
response to what has gone wrong in the cases I am considering. Responding through
action seems preferable at first sight if we are sympathetic to Bittner's assumption
that our response should have some clear, practical benefit looking forward.
Whatever  sort  of  action  is  recommended,  it  will  need  to  be  a  coherent,  relevant
response in all the sorts of cases we are considering. The most direct sort of responses,
like compensation, will not do, because there are some things that cannot be, or ought
not  to  be,  compensated for102.  The best candidate  would be  the  view that,  to  the
degree that we have not conformed to them fully, important past reasons become
102 See section 5.2.1
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reasons to perform supererogatory acts. We could view this as a way of balancing out
the cosmic score: the fact that I failed to give a stranger directions yesterday is a
reason today for me to go beyond the call of duty to make the world better in some
way, though not in any particular way. I could satisfy this reason by making a larger
than required donation to a worthy charity. This seems like a strange practice, but,
especially in the light of Bittner's point about the painfulness of regret, it can seem in
some ways a better practice than that of going around regretting things. After all, if
this really were our practice, there would be far fewer painful feelings and many more
good deeds in the world.
The problem with this sort of alternative to regret is that it makes our reasons take
apparently arbitrary objects. Yesterday, the fact that you were lost was a reason to
help you find your way. It is easy to see why helping you find your way would have
been an appropriate response to the reason: it would have stopped you from being
lost. Similarly, if today I apologise for not helping, we can still see the link between the
reason and its object. I am apologising to you, because it is you who was lost, and you
who I should have helped. It would not usually make sense to apologise to someone
else! In the case of regret, there is still  a non-arbitrary connection to the reason: I
regret not helping you, because I should have helped you, because you were lost. Here
we see the importance of regret's broadness: we can always feel regret about failing to
fully conform to a reason, so regret will always in that way be relevant. However, if the
reason instead became a reason to do a supererogatory good deed, there might be no
specific connection left. The fact that you were lost and I didn't help you is supposed to
become a reason to to a good deed, but it is hard to see what your needing directions
has to do with my general do-gooding, or my donation to Deworm The World.
Perhaps we can respond to this objection by adding a clause to our supererogation
principle: to the degree that we have not conformed to it fully, an old reason becomes
a reason to perform a supererogatory act which is as related as possible to the original
reason. Thus, the fact that I failed to give you directions yesterday is now a reason for
me to  go  beyond the  call  of  duty  in  helping  prevent  people  from getting  lost,  or
benefiting you,  or  something else  as  related  as  possible.  This  is  an improvement;
however, it is clear that this is still a long way off from the guarantee of relevance
regret is able to provide. As well as this, the radical nature of this scheme makes it less
persuasive than the Eudaimonia Principle it attempts to unseat.
7.2.5 Summary
I  have argued that Gardner's  view that reasons we can no longer conform to fully
always become reasons for regret does not provide a response to Bittner on its own,
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for,  on  its  own,  the  view  does  not  show  that  the  reasons  to  feel  regret  will  be
significant enough to matter to how we ought to feel.  However,  by employing the
Eudaimonia Principle, we can see that if our non-conformity to a reason affects our
eudaimonia, the reason it provides us will matter. We ought to take these reasons to be
reasons for regret in particular, because regret is the only response to non-comformity
to a reason that will always be both available to the agent and relevant to the original
reason.
7.3 When is it appropriate to feel regret?
I  have  now  shown  that  when  our  non-comformity  to  our  reasons  affects  our
eudaimonia, this matters to how we ought to feel and calls for regret in particular. I've
also argued that it is implausible to hold that this consideration is always outweighed
by the painfulness of  regret.  Regret is  therefore sometimes appropriate.  I  will  now
consider when it is appropriate.
I  will  argue  that  an  adverse  effect  on  our  eudaimonia  is  a  necessary,  but  not  a
sufficient  condition for  appropriate regret.  It  is  necessary,  because regret for  what
affects  someone  else's  eudaimonia  but  not  our  own  is  not  appropriate.  It  is  not
sufficient,  because  it  may  be  better  for  us  to  focus  on  other  matters.  Finally,  I
emphasise that regret being appropriate for an agent is not the same as the view that
they ought to be feeling regret right now, or all the time, which helps us to answer the
worry that the virtuous agent will live their life hounded by regret.
7.3.1 An effect on our eudaimonia is necessary for appropriate regret
The view that we should regret something only if it affects how well our life is going is
the intuitive position that we shouldn't regret failures of ours if they don't matter to us:
we shouldn't cry over spilt milk. This is true even if we had a good reason not to spill
the milk. Regret about such insignificant failures is vulnerable to Bittner's objection: it
is pointless pain, pain in the absence of any good reason to feel it.
However,  what  about  the  case  in  which  our  non-conformity  to  a  reason  affects
somebody else's eudaimonia, but not our own? Surely the virtuous person is not only
concerned about themselves?
Several points can be made in response to this objection. The first is a point that I
made in section 4.5.2: that the virtues are not egoistic. When we affect other people's
eudaimonia, that usually affects our own eudaimonia as well, even if not by as much. A
good life has many positive effects on the lives of others, and a life with predominantly
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negative effects on the lives of others is a bad one. Cases of wrongdoing with harmful
effects  will  normally  affect  our  own  eudaimonia.  The  second  is  that  while  it  is  a
necessary condition of appropriate regret that what we regret affects our eudaimonia,
this  does not imply that what we should regret is the fact  that our eudaimonia is
affected. When it is appropriate to regret hurting a friend's feelings, part of the reason
why we should feel regret is that it matters to us how our friends feel and whether we
are kind and tactful rather than cruel and callous. But what we regret is that we hurt
our friend, not that our life is now worse for having done so, or that eudaimonia is so
dependent on being a good friend. Finally, just because regret is not appropriate does
not mean that it is inappropriate. An appropriate emotion is virtuous in that situation
and feeling it is evidence of a virtuous character. This can fail to be the case without
implying that the emotion is instead vicious.
For a clear example of the sort of case we are interested in, consider Diane:
Diane is an excellent teacher. Nonetheless, one of her students has done very poorly. Diane knows he will be
devastated if he fails, and considers passing him, just barely. In her best judgement, he doesn't deserve to
pass, but there's not a lot in it. Other markers might pass him, and it might get by moderation. Diane thinks
about it carefully, then fails him. The student is devastated.
Now,  perhaps  the  main  thing  reducing  the  student's  eudaimonia  is  his  poor
performance, not failing the exam. Still, Diane might have let him pass anyway, and
had the student just barely passed, this might have secured him a better job, spared
his feelings, or in some other way meaningfully lessened the blow. Because of this,
Diane had some reason, though outweighed, to pass him, which she did not conform
to. Diane's eudaimonia is not affected: even the best teachers occasionally have some
of their pupils fail.
Will Diane regret failing her student, or not, bearing in mind that we know she is an
excellent  teacher?  I  wouldn't  be  surprised either  way.  This  suggests  that  regret  is
neither  appropriate  nor  inappropriate  in  this  sort  of  case,  which is  consistent  with
taking an effect on the agent's own eudaimonia to be a necessary condition for regret
to be the appropriate response to their failing to fully conform to a reason.
The same sort of consideration applies to failures that have only small effects on our
lives. If I am late for the bus and so miss the first act of a play I wanted to see, this is
quite  frustrating,  but  supposing  it  is  an  isolated  incident  it  doesn't  affect  my
eudaimonia. The play is not so spectacular that missing the beginning of it worsens my
life! In such a situation, I expect I would feel regret: “Bother! If only I had left five
minutes earlier,” I would think. Bittner would probably not feel this way: “Well, it's a
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pity, but the best thing now is to enjoy the second half,” he might think. Now, my
regret is not appropriate: it is not a sign of my virtue that I am so cut up about missing
the play. Nor is Bittner's lack of regret inappropriate: it is not vicious of him to take
things so calmly. Whether or not my regret is inappropriate is a harder question. Quite
possibly  it  is:  Bittner's  argument  that  it  is  pointless  pain  seems to  apply.  But  the
important point is that my regret cannot be appropriate because it doesn't affect my
eudaimonia.
One small qualification is needed here, because I have been considering only cases of
fitting regret so far. Unfitting regret may be appropriate, as was the case with guilt and
shame, if the agent has good reason to think that they have failed to fully conform to a
reason in a way that affects their eudaimonia, even if in fact the agent did conform to
the reason, or the reason was never that important.
7.3.2 An affect on eudaimonia is not sufficient for appropriate regret
Gardner notes that there are frequently 'new reasons that militate powerfully in favour
of getting on with our lives'103, rather than feeling regret. Even when a past mistake of
ours still matters to us, many of our present concerns will be more important and more
urgent than dwelling on the past. For example, suppose that a few weeks ago, you
badly let down a friend of yours: you didn't offer to help them when you clearly should
have, because you were tired and irritable. Today the two of you are sharing a delicious
meal together. Should you feel happy, regretful, or both? It seems clear to me that you
should feel happy, unless your friend is still in need of help today – which would be
regret brought  on by a  present consideration rather than regret about  not helping
weeks ago. It is perhaps less clear, but I think we would still get the same result if you
are today dining with a different friend: it seems there doesn't need to be very much
going on now for it to be more appropriate to focus on that.
However, this sort of consideration is usually a reason not to feel regret right now,
occurrently, rather than a reason not to feel regret at all. As I discussed in section 3.3,
to feel  constant regret is unlikely to be appropriate.  Imagine if  you were to regret
letting down your friend constantly, night and day, for several weeks. This would be an
extraordinary amount of regret! It would be more appropriate for you to feel regret on
a few occasions, for example in quiet moments when little else is going on, or when
someone asks how your friend is doing, or at other times when it is called to your
attention.
When we say that regret is not appropriate, we mean that we no longer think you
103Gardner, p59
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ought to feel regret at all. This requires not some particular, more urgent, concern to
displace regret at a particular moment, but some general reason to think that regret is
no longer required, not even when nothing else is there to displace it.  I've already
argued that the object of your regret no longer mattering would be such a reason.
What  considerations  might  serve  this  role  while  the  mistake  you  regret  does  still
matter to you?
It is difficult to answer this question in the abstract, but we can point to the benefits
that are often to be had in moving on from the past – what we would call “making a
clean break” or “putting it behind us”. As well as freeing us from the pain of regret as
Bittner notes, moving on can also be encouraging, leading us to act and feel better in
future. It needn't mean a change in our judgement about the past, only our feelings
about it. As long as moving on in this way isn't inappropriate, then regret will not be
appropriate.
This attitude of moving on from a reason not fully conformed to is one of accepting
one's failure to conform to it,  or  reacting to that failure with ambition rather than
regret. I have considered such reactions before, in the previous chapter on shame104.
There, I argued that such reactions become inappropriate if the failure they respond to
is too serious or too enduring. In that case, regret and possibly shame is warranted:
shame being in effect a strong regret when it comes to serious personal failings. If
what one has done was very bad – if it is a very serious reason that one has not
conformed to – then moving on either looks like running away or simply not caring,
neither  of  which  are  attractive  ways  of  responding.  Ultimately,  this  leaves  the
appropriateness  of  regret  depending on the  severity  of  what  you have done.  This
makes the appropriateness of regret a vague matter: there will be many borderline
cases. This is a little unsatisfying,  but as I  argued in chapter two105,  we should be
prepared to accept somewhat vague conclusions in ethics; it is the agent involved who
judges borderline cases.
7.3.3 Summary
When it is appropriate to regret what we have done, the reason to feel regret is simply
the same reason that we had to act otherwise in the first place. It is therefore mistaken
to look for a justification based on present considerations as Bittner does. Gardner is
correct that we do not begin each moment from a blank slate.
Nonetheless, we should not regret every mistake we make, nor do we always have pro
104Section 6.2.3
105Section 2.3.3
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tanto reasons to regret our  mistakes.  Some mistakes are unimportant,  and do not
matter to us. Other mistakes are important, but are appropriately responded to with
acceptance or ambition. The clearest cases where regret is appropriate are those in
which guilt,  shame or remorse (which I  shall  consider next) are appropriate; this is
because those who feel these emotions necessarily feel regret too. Sometimes, regret
will  seem  appropriate  as  a  middle  ground  between  these  reactions  and  simple
acceptance – when we regret something that is too important to simply accept, but not
important enough to warrant shame. The borderlines here are vague, but this is not
too much vagueness, not least because the difference between a strong regret for
what we have done and a weak shame is not a large difference.
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Chapter 8: Remorse
I've  argued  that  appropriate  regret  is  regulated  by  the  Eudaimonia  Principle.  You
should only regret your past wrongdoing if it affects your eudaimonia: how your life is
going, considered as a whole. I considered the objection that we should often regret
our wrongdoing because of its impact on other people, rather than on our own lives. I
argued that in cases of this sort, one's own life is affected too; wrongfully harming
other people makes for a bad life. This showed that cases of harming others are not
counterexamples to the necessary condition I impose on the appropriateness of regret.
However,  there  is  an important  difference between regretting  what  we have done
because of the harm we have caused to someone else and regretting what we have
done because it  has  affected our  own life,  or  simply  because it  was wrong.  I  will
address that difference in this chapter, arguing that we ought to feel bad about the
wrongful harm we have caused, specifically. The name I give to this sort of feeling is
remorse.
8.1 What is remorse?
8.1.1 My  stipulative   approach to remorse
My analyses of guilt,  shame and regret have all  been partly stipulative, in order to
achieve  clarity  and  precision  despite  the  nuances  and  ambiguities  of  ordinary
language. However, my analysis of remorse will be particularly stipulative, because it
is arrived at differently. Rather than beginning from interpretations of our uses of the
term and moving towards a philosophical analysis, I begin with a clear analysis and
argue that it fits well into the framework I have been constructing, and is close enough
to common usage not to be misleading.
8.1.2 My analysis of remorse
To capture the difference between regretting our wrongdoing because of its effect on
others rather than its effect on ourselves, remorse must take this effect as its object.
As a sort of regret, remorse will of course feel bad. This gives us the following starting
point:
First analysis: To feel remorse is to take it that someone has been harmed by one's
wrongdoing, and to feel bad about this.
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Next, we should specify that remorse involves agent-regret. This is because remorse,
like agent-regret, is an emotion that a bystander – or someone who regards their own
actions in the same way they would regard a bystander's ('purely externally'106,  as
Williams puts it) – cannot feel. The key feature of agent-regret is that the agent feels
responsible in some way, so this is what needs to be added to the analysis.
By  making  it  explicit  that  the  agent  takes  themselves  to  be  responsible,  we  can
remove the reference to the agent's own wrongdoing. Usually we feel responsible for
wrongdoing because it was our own, but since we can also feel responsible for the
wrongdoing of others, remorse for the harms caused by such wrongdoing is intelligible.
They aren’t paradigm cases of remorse but they are perfectly sensible: if a parent's
child destroys another family's treasured heirloom the parent will feel terrible about
the  distress  caused,  and  will  feel  differently  from  the  other  family's  friends  and
neighbours, because unlike them the parent will feel responsible. Similarly, politicians
and citizens can express remorse for atrocities committed by their country in the past,
even  though  they  were  not  personally  involved.  They  are  unlikely  to  feel  morally
responsible, but may still feel prosaically responsible in a way that would be strange
for citizens of other countries to feel.
It is also important that the agent feels responsible for the harm itself, not just the
wrongdoing that led to the harm. This is because sometimes harms are caused by
wrongdoings while clearly not being the responsibility of the wrongdoer. For instance, if
I wager my life savings on whether Andy keeps his promise to Betty I will be harmed if
Andy breaks his  promise. Andy is responsible for his promise, but he wouldn't feel
remorse for what happened to me (unless he takes a strangely broad view of what he
is responsible for) because it's not his fault that I made such a foolish bet. I will capture
this by saying that remorse involves taking the harm to be wrongful harm, rather than
just the result of wrongdoing.
We can also be more specific about the felt affect involved in remorse. The point of
remorse is that it is focused on the victim rather than on oneself; however, there are
ways of feeling bad about what has happened to someone else that show very little
regard for them at all. For example, we can be distressed at the thought of someone's
suffering in a way that repels us,  and pushes our attention away – as if  we were
reacting to a taboo violation, or an ugly road-kill.  To rule out this sort  of  feeling,  I
propose that remorse involves a sympathetic or empathetic feeling. The sympathetic
person feels bad for the other person, rather than bad about them. This shows concern
for the other person. It may not show very much, since their sympathy might be pity
and  they  might  view  themselves  as  quite  superior,  but  it  certainly  shows  some
106Williams, Moral Luck, p123
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concern: the sympathetic person cannot be feeling contemptuous, or indifferent, or
repelled by the other person's suffering. The empathetic person feels bad in a way that
mirrors how the other person feels. They must therefore pay them some attention or
otherwise  understand  their  reaction,  so  they  are  not  indifferent  or  repelled,  and
because of their shared reaction they are not contemptuous either.
These changes give us:
Remorse:  To feel remorse is to take it that someone has been wrongly harmed in a
way one is responsible for, and to feel bad about this in a sympathetic or empathetic
way.
Something should also be said about what harm is taken to be. As with the concept of
an ethical self-evaluation involved in shame, the concept of harm involved in remorse
has a significance threshold: there is no remorse for a harm taken to be unimportant.
The concept of eudaimonia is to be used again to understand how significant the harm
must  be  taken  to  be.  When  remorse  is  felt  for  a  harm,  the  harm is  taken  to  be
significant enough to affect how the victim's life is going. However, as with shame, the
agent needn't make such an analysis herself. She only needs to take the harm to be
significant  to  that  degree,  she doesn't  have to  literally  take the victim's life  to  be
worsened.
That  there  is  some  significance  threshold  on  remorse  is  very  clear.  No-one  feels
remorse after their inattentiveness causes them to short-change a customer by ten
pence – not unless they are dramatically mistaken about how important ten pence is.
That the significance threshold is that of affecting eudaimonia is not so clear, but is
supported by the eudaimonia principle defended in Chapter Four: using eudaimonia as
the significance threshold for remorse as well has the plausible implication that the
consequences of our wrongdoing are significant enough to make remorse fitting if they
also matter to how the wronged party should feel.
There is no immediate violence being done to our common usage of the word remorse
on  my  analysis.  I  have  analysed  remorse  as  being  felt  for  the  harm an  agent  is
responsible  for,  and we are  happy to  speak in  that  way.  For  instance,  when I  am
offended by someone who is too cavalier about their behaviour,  I  can protest that
“they show no remorse for the harm they caused!”. And although we are also happy to
complain that “they show no remorse for  their  actions,”  this  way of  talking is still
sensible  on  my  account:  wrongful  actions  are  well  known  to  cause  harm,  and
emphasising  “their  actions”  emphasises  that  they  are  responsible,  which  is  also
important to remorse.
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Having  presented  my  account  of  remorse,  I  will  now  explain  how  it  fits  into  the
framework provided by the other emotions I have considered, taking them in turn. At
the same time, I will argue that distinguishing these emotions from remorse is also not
too far from ordinary usage.
8.1.3 Remorse and guilt
I have been positioning remorse as an emotion which shows concern for victims. Guilt
is also an emotion which shows concern for victims, when it is felt appropriately. In
these cases, guilt shows our concern to provide victims what we owe them. Often this
will mean the guilty person wanting to compensate the victim, erasing as much of the
harm  as  they  can;  other  times  it  will  involve  wanting  to  apologise  or  ask  for
forgiveness. Because of this, it is unsurprising that those who feel guilty usually also
feel bad about the harm that they have caused.
This raises the possibility of seeing remorse as a type of guilt. This would be faithful to
common usage: we often take remorse to simply refer to strong guilt, or to feelings of
guilt about something serious. So, while we can feel guilty about stealing a stick of
gum or about stealing a person's retirement savings, we prefer to say that we feel
remorse only about stealing the life savings, not about the stick of gum. My account of
remorse also fits well with this aspect of common usage: remorse is a more obviously
sensible reaction in the more serious case because it is serious cases that inflict harm,
and remorse is felt about harms.
The reason I prefer to analyse remorse as a separate emotion from guilt is that the two
emotions can each be felt separately, and can each be appropriate separately. It is
therefore simplest to analyse them as two separate emotions.
Guilt is felt without remorse in several cases. First, the agent may feel that they have
acted wrongly and ought to apologise without feeling that they have harmed anybody,
such as when they have behaved rudely. Second, the agent may feel guilty when they
have only harmed themselves, such as when they feel guilty about abandoning their
New Year's resolutions. Third, an agent may feel that they have acted wrongly and
ought to make amends, but nonetheless might not care much about the harm caused
or what it means to the victim. For example, the agent might care about bad karma or
divine retribution, rather than the effect on their victim.
Remorse is  felt  without  guilt  when the agent  feels  bad about  the harm they have
caused but isn't motivated by that feeling to respond somehow. The agent may not
feel motivated because they realise there is nothing that can be done. Alternatively,
Page 113 of 140
the remorse they feel could have a paralysing or overwhelming affect on them: if the
victim  feels  overwhelmed  and  as  if  nothing  could  help  them,  the  wrongdoer's
empathetic response may leave them overwhelmed too. A very bad person may feel
remorse without guilt if they are occasionally able to sympathise with their victims, but
fail  to  realise  that  their  suffering  demands  a  response  from  them,  or  fail  to  be
motivated to respond in that way.
As well as both guilt and remorse being sensibly felt on their own, they can each be
appropriate on their own too. Appropriate guilt requires wrongdoing serious enough
that the victim is owed a response, while remorse requires wrongdoing serious enough
to harm the victim. It is clear that there are cases which are serious enough to warrant
guilt but not remorse: if you treat somebody very rudely then you will owe them an
apology and ought to feel guilty. But even very rude behaviour is not always harmful,
especially to someone with a thick skin who is able to shrug it off. Remorse but not
guilt is appropriate in a case in which the agent has already responded properly to
what they have done, or in which there simply is no appropriate response.
8.1.4 Remorse and regret
When we regret something in the broad sense we take it something has gone or is
going in some way wrong or badly, and feel bad about this. We agent-regret something
if we also take ourselves to be in some way responsible for it. Remorse is therefore a
type of agent-regret. Why not leave the analysis of remorse there? To feel remorse
would just be to agent-regret a harm.
A similar case could be made for guilt and shame. Why not analyse guilt as agent-
regretting wrongdoing that demands an appropriate response, and shame as agent-
regretting one's adverse ethical self-evaluation? These analyses would be misleading
because agent-regret admits of too broad a range of felt affect. Agent-regret simply
feels bad. But guilt feels negatively motivating: guilt is a spur to action, and we aren’t
really  feeling  guilty  unless  our  feeling  is  motivating.  Similarly,  shame  is  a  strong
feeling: there is no such thing as feeble, fleeting shame. Remorse also requires a more
specific felt affect: agent-regret simply feels bad, but remorse is always a sympathetic
or empathetic feeling.
8.1.5 Remorse and shame
I  have argued that  we can feel  ashamed of  our  actions  so long as  we take them
seriously enough to affect our ethical self-evaluation – typically by taking them to be a
stain on our record, or a sign of our vice. It seems just as reasonable to feel ashamed
Page 114 of 140
of the consequences of our actions. Taking someone else's suffering to be seriously
bad  and  one's  own  responsibility  affects  our  self-evaluation  too:  it  can  just  as
reasonably be seen as a blot on our record, or a sign of our vice. Why consider remorse
a distinct emotion from shame of this sort?
I distinguish them because their felt affect can be different. As we have just seen,
shame  is  simply  a  strongly  bad  feeling,  but  remorse  must  be  sympathetic  or
empathetic. Now, shame is often empathetic, because feeling exposed to the harsh
judgements of others is a paradigm shameful feeling, and will often come about as an
empathetic awareness of the actual harsh judgements of others. But shame does not
have  to  be  empathetic,  and  a  feeling  of  sympathy  would  be  an  unusual  way  of
experiencing shame.
Not only are the felt  affects of  shame and remorse different,  but this difference is
importantly relevant to the justification of remorse, and to my project. For as I have
explained already,  it  is  important  that  remorse  shows concern for  others,  whereas
shame shows concern for one's own ethical standing.
8.2 Why feel remorse?
8.2.1 Remorse shows respect and concern for victims
I will make an argument from valuing107 to justify remorse: remorse is a part of what it
is to be concerned for those we have wrongly harmed, we ought to be so concerned,
and therefore remorse is appropriate.
We  ought  to  be  concerned  for  those  we  have  wrongly  harmed  because  it  is
disrespectful not to be. Concern is appropriate rather than valuing, because concern
does not imply a favourable judgement about them. The victim might be a thoroughly
vicious  person;  we  should  still  be  concerned  for  them and  the  suffering  we  have
caused them, but we needn't start admiring them.
That  we  ought  to  be  concerned  about  those  who  are  suffering  because  of  our
wrongdoing is  very  clear.  Perhaps we should simply care about  everyone,  and our
wrongdoing  is  an  occasion  on  which  we  ought  to  show the  concern  we  have  for
everyone to the victim in particular. Or if that is too demanding, we should become
concerned about  a  person when,  and because,  we  have  wrongfully  harmed them.
Either way, to wrongfully harm a person and then simply not to be concerned for them
at all is clearly disrespectful.
107I introduced this form of argument in section 3.5
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Because remorse is a way of feeling bad about another person's suffering, it is a way
of being emotionally vulnerable to it, and caring about it. It is then a short step from
being  concerned  about  a  person's  suffering  to  being  concerned  for  the  person
themselves: normally, one cares about a person's suffering because one cares about
them. It would be a peculiar sort of concern if it didn't spread from the suffering to the
person suffering. It would be, for example, the concern of someone who just finds the
suffering unpleasant and wants it gone for the sake of their own comfort. It is to rule
out such peculiar sorts of concern that remorse is limited to sympathetic or empathetic
felt affect.
8.2.2 Unemotional reactions are disrespectful to victims
It  may  be  objected  that  genuine  concern  does  not  always  involve  emotional
vulnerability. Instead, concern should be understood as involving accurate judgement
and right action. For example, consider a teacher who always takes a lot of time over
their marking, grades papers accurately, and offers extra help to pupils who need it.
Isn't this a description of a caring teacher, who is concerned about her pupils? Now
imagine a wrongdoer who takes a lot of time to think about what he has done, and so
is able to form an accurate judgement about the harm he has caused. He then does
everything he ought to in response, such as offering compensation. Doesn't he seem
to be concerned about his victim? After all, he is paying attention and acting rightly in
the same way as the teacher.
The problem with this line of objection is that the cases are under-described. Suppose
that I tell you some more about the teacher: she is never pleased, excited, or proud
when her students do well.  She is never upset, alarmed, or disappointed when her
students do badly. She used to experience these reactions when she was new to the
profession,  but  she  doesn't  any  more.  Her  colleagues  all  agree  that  she  is  highly
competent and hard-working, but they also think that she is jaded, that she doesn't
care anymore. We are surprised when we add this description to the case, because we
learn something new, something that we did not expect from the description of her
actions. We learn that she doesn't really care about her students, she only acts like she
does. The case of the wrongdoer is under-described in this same way. If we learn that
he doesn't feel  the least bit  of remorse, nor any other sort  of  bad feeling,  we are
surprised. He acts like a person who cares, but he doesn't really.
However, I do not need to prove that a person who lacks emotional vulnerability lacks
concern entirely. It is enough for my argument that emotional vulnerability makes an
important difference to concern. We might put this by allowing that the teacher and
wrongdoer  are  concerned,  but  less  concerned  than  they  should  be.  We  should
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acknowledge that the teacher and the wrongdoer are getting something right: they are
doing the right things, and this is very important. But they are also missing something
important.  This  is particularly clear in the case of  the wrongdoer:  someone else is
suffering, it  is their fault,  and they know it;  but still  they don't  feel  bad. They are
especially vulnerable to the charge that they don't care. While the teacher can reply
that they always act correctly, and this shows that they care, this reply sounds hollow
coming from the wrongdoer. They may now be acting correctly, but really they ought
not to have harmed their victim in the first place.
8.2.3 Alternatives to remorse can be disrespectful to victims
The  main  reason  that  remorse  is  preferable  to  other  ways  of  feeling  bad  is  that
remorse clearly shows concern for the victim as well as just the harm caused to them,
because of its sympathetic or empathetic affect. As I explained in section 8.1.2, this
sort of affect rules out the unusual cases in which a person may feel bad about the
harm they have caused in a way that doesn't show concern for the victim. Since agent-
regret and shame do not necessarily involve a sympathetic or empathetic feeling, they
may fail  to  show proper  respect  and concern  for  the  victim if  remorse  is  not  felt
alongside them.
However, it is also worth considering whether a more neutral or positive feeling could
show the wrongdoer's concern for their victim. Consider a case like this:
Richard is a vicious gossip. He betrays people's confidences and spreads lies and half-truths, stirring up
trouble just because it amuses him. In one recent incident, he has gone much too far and a rumour he started
has destroyed his friend Megan's marriage. Richard feels guilty, and comes clean, but this is not enough to
save the marriage. Richard knows he has done Megan a great harm; but he also thinks that she is a good
person and will surely be able to find someone else, and will one day be happy again. So, rather than feeling
sorry for her, he confidently and hopefully looks forward to her future happiness.
Could Richard's response be appropriate? It is not fanciful: he is aware of the harm he
has done, and we can suppose that his prediction that Megan will recover is correct. He
doesn't seem to disregard Megan either, so long as we imagine he wants Megan to be
happy for her own sake. Indeed, in so far as the basis for his hopefulness is that he
admires Megan's good character, his attitude may appear respectful.
Our opinion of Richard should be determined by a further feature of the case: how
does Megan feel about all this? If Megan also manages to feel a hopeful and confident
anticipation of her future happiness, and if Richard knows this and is empathising with
her, then Richard's reaction is acceptable. In these circumstances, the way he feels is
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respectful  because he is  sensitive to Megan's feelings,  and because his  attitude is
supportive of hers. If Megan felt confident and hopeful, and Richard knew this, but still
felt unhopeful and terribly sorry for her, this would be a condescending attitude and in
that way disrespectful and inappropriate (since, in the case we are imagining, Megan is
right to be confident).
On the other hand, if Megan feels devastated, then it is inappropriate and cavalier for
Richard to disregard that and feel ambitious and hopeful for her future happiness. Even
though Richard's confidence is fitting, it is disrespectful for him to disregard the way
Megan  actually  feels.  After  all,  it  is  also  fitting  for  Megan  to  be  devastated:  her
marriage is over and this  is  very bad for  her,  despite what she may have to look
forward to. If Richard is insensitive to this, his reaction is disrespectful because it does
not show the right sort  of  concern for  her.  He ought to be feeling remorse, either
instead of or as well as feeling hopeful.
If Megan's reaction is ambivalent – if she is very upset but also feels some hope, for
instance – then it is appropriate for Richard to feel an ambivalent remorse. It would be
disrespectful for him not to feel remorse, because Megan still feels, quite sensibly, bad
about the harm Richard has caused her. But since Megan is also feeling hopeful, it
would still be condescending if Richard felt completely hopeless about the harm he's
caused her, since Megan's hopefulness is fitting.
The  same  considerations  apply  for  more  muted  or  neutral  reactions,  such  as
acceptance. Megan might come to regard the breakup of her marriage as something
bad, but still  make peace with it.  If she does, then it  is appropriate for Richard to
regard things the same way: this is what would be most respectful to Megan. What
would be disrespectful is for Richard to accept what has happened even though Megan
is still devastated, and reasonably so.
In all these cases it seems important that Richard is sensitive to the way Megan feels.
It may also be important that the way Megan feels is not inappropriate – if it were,
perhaps  Richard  oughtn't  to  be  sensitive  to  it.  Are  these  the  deciding  factors  in
general?
Consider a variant in which Megan still feels devastated, even though it is clear to us
and to Richard that feeling so bad is inappropriate, and feeling acceptance would be
appropriate. For example, imagine that many years have passed, she has remarried,
and most things are now going well for her. If things are going so well that it would be
wrong to say that Richard had harmed her, remorse would no longer be appropriate. If
things were that way, Megan would seem deluded, and Richard oughtn't to feel bad
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about causing harm that he hasn't in fact caused. However, this is extremely unlikely
to be an accurate description of the case. If Megan is devastated about the break up of
her first marriage, her life seems to be going badly for the very reason that she is
devastated; the fact that her feeling so bad is an inappropriate over-reaction doesn't
change this. If this is how things are, there is still a strong case that Richard ought to
feel remorse: Megan is still suffering because of his wrongdoing, she still feels bad, and
he ought to be concerned by this. His feeling acceptance or hope without feeling any
remorse is still to disrespectfully disregard how Megan is feeling. It may be objected
here  that  it  is  unfair  to  Richard  to  describe  Megan  as  suffering  because  of  his
wrongdoing. If she is only suffering because of her inappropriate reaction, maybe it is
fairer to say that she is suffering only because of her feeling, which may no longer be
Richard's fault.  This is what the case turns on: if Megan is doing badly because of
Richard's  wrongdoing,  so that Richard is  responsible  for  it,  and if  Megan feels bad
about it,  then Richard should feel  remorse.  If  Megan is  doing badly for a different
reason, remorse is not appropriate for Richard. So long as Megan is really wrongfully
harmed by what Richard did,  Richard ought to be sensitive to Megan's feeling bad
about what has happened, even if Megan's reaction is inappropriate.
What of a case in which Megan feels hopeful or accepting, but where it is clear that
this is an inappropriate reaction? For example, suppose she is hopeful not of finding
happiness  in  a  new  marriage,  but  instead  hopeful  that  she  will  remarry  her  first
partner,  even  though  it  is  clear  that  this  is  never  going  to  happen.  Her  hope  is
grounded in utter delusion; her friends would be less worried about her if she were
sad. In this case, remorse is still called for. It is no longer condescending for Richard to
feel  sorry  for  Megan,  because  her  hopefulness  is  no  longer  a  sensible  response.
Perhaps Richard might reasonably feel hopeful in a different way to Megan, but until
Megan  is  in  that  position  as  well,  feeling  no  remorse  alongside  such  hopefulness
disregards the bad position Richard has put Megan in, and is disrespectful. If Megan
were upset because of what Richard did,  it would be one of the ways in which his
action affected her badly.  Megan's  inappropriate  hope is  also  an adverse  effect  of
Richard's wrongdoing, so he should respond to it in the same way.
8.3 When is remorse appropriate?
8.3.1 Remorse and suffering
Remorse  is  appropriate  if  the  victim  is  suffering,  if  this  is  the  wrongdoer's
responsibility, and if the victim either actually feels bad, ought to feel bad, or would
reasonably be believed to feel bad. If the victim is not suffering because of the wrong,
then remorse is not appropriate because to feel remorse would be a mistaken over-
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reaction. If the victim is suffering, but feels acceptance or hopefulness in a way that is
not  inappropriate,  and the  wrongdoer  knows this,  then remorse  is  not  appropriate
because it would be a condescending reaction. A wrongdoer shows the most respect
and concern for the victim if their reaction is sensitive to the victim's reaction.  
For my purposes here, whether a victim has been harmed or is suffering because of a
wrong depends on whether the wrong has adversely affected their eudaimonia. This
comes down to whether their life, seen as a whole, is made worse by the occurrence of
the wrong. Often this will depend on the context: An isolated insult, even if very rude,
does not usually worsen a person's life. Remorse would not be appropriate; though
guilt would, as they would be owed an apology. But if the same insult is a part of a
pattern of bullying or harassment, it may worsen the person's life; remorse would then
be appropriate.
For this reason of context, remorse will often be appropriate soon after an offence, but
will later cease to be appropriate. If a person is assaulted in public, it is likely to shake
their faith in other people and make them anxious. But their faith and confidence will,
probably, be recovered, assuming they are not assaulted again. Once enough time has
passed that they, and we, can be confident it was an isolated incident with no lasting
ill-effect, and not significant when viewing their life as a whole, they are no longer
suffering. At this point, remorse is no longer appropriate.
However, some serious wrongs are enough to worsen one's life as a whole on their
own, no matter the context;  they will  never be fully recovered from. If a person is
murdered, their life is a worse one simply because it ended that way. If a painter's
greatest creations are destroyed by a vandal, the painter's life goes worse for this.
Hopefully they will produce excellent paintings again one day, but even if they do, it
will always be true that their life would have been better but for the destruction of
their previous works.
For wrongdoing this serious, remorse may be appropriate for the wrongdoer's whole
life. If the victim is never able to accept what has happened, it will be. But if the victim
can accept what has happened, and if that acceptance is not inappropriate, then the
wrongdoer should accept it too. This is because the reason remorse is appropriate is
the respect and concern it shows for the victim. To accept a harm that the victim does
not shows a lack of concern because of its insensitivity to the victim's feeling. But this
is no objection to accepting a harm together with the victim. That remorse might be
appropriate for an agent's whole life is demanding, but not too demanding, because it
would not be the case that the agent ought to feel constant remorse, every second of
every day. They ought to feel remorse on the right sort of occasions and often enough
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that it would always be true to say of them dispositionally that they feel remorse, but
not so often that they never feel anything else. 
It might be objected that making the appropriateness of remorse contingent on how
the victim happens to react in this way makes it a matter of luck. Of two wrongdoers
who no longer feel remorse, and who did the same thing wrong with the same effect
on two different victims, only one might be blameworthy for their lack of remorse, if
only one of the victims was able to accept what happened. My view does have this
implication, but I  am not troubled by it.  How demanding it  is to act rightly clearly
depends on the context: you and I might go for the same walk by the same lake, but if
there is only a child drowning on the day I go for the walk, only I am required to ruin
my suit while attempting a rescue. This is bad luck for me, but it shouldn't undermine
the intuition that I ought to attempt the rescue. The remorse case is analogous. If a lot
of remorse is required of a wrongdoer because their victim was particularly frail, that is
bad luck – for them, and for the victim – but that it is bad luck shouldn't undermine our
belief that they ought to feel remorse.
Doesn't  this  response  undermine  the  sense  in  which  remorse  is  the  appropriate
response for wrongful harms that are one's responsibility? Just as Andy shouldn't feel
remorse when I lose my life savings because of his broken promise, since it wasn't his
fault, other wrongdoers shouldn't feel remorse when bad luck means that harms befall
the victim for which they are not responsible. This much is correct, but the purpose of
this condition was to rule out bizarre cases like Andy's, not to explain just how much
remorse should be felt in an ordinary case. What we are interested in, ordinarily, is
whether  the  wrongdoer  is  right  to  see  the  harm suffered  as  wrongful  harm,  and
whether they are responsible for it, either morally or just prosaically. In most cases,
this is true of the unlucky portion of a harm caused by wrongdoing. When Megan's
marriage  is  ruined  after  Richard's  gossip,  this  may  be  one  of  the  worst  possible
outcomes, but it is still wrongful harm, and he is still responsible for it, so remorse is
still appropriate.
Another objection is that actually being sensitive to the feelings of one's victim is often
creepy or intrusive. If you are my friend and I have wronged you, it is reasonable for
me to keep track of how you are feeling. But if you are a stranger to me, it would
usually  be  better  for  me  to  butt  out!  This  point  can  be  accommodated:  if  the
wrongdoer doesn't know how the victim is doing, and oughtn't to try to find ought, then
they should feel remorse according to how we would reasonably expect the victim to be
doing. This is the best way to be sensitive to the victim's feelings when one is not
aware of them.
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8.3.2 Summary
Remorse is appropriate because it is part of being properly concerned for the victims of
our wrongdoing. Appropriate remorse is sensitive to the suffering and feelings of the
victim: we should feel remorse if the victim is both suffering and feeling badly, or if
they are suffering and clearly ought to feel bad. If the victim recovers, so that we
would no longer say their life was made worse by our wrongdoing, then remorse is no
longer appropriate. If the victim is able to accept what has happened to them (and if
this  acceptance is  not inappropriate)  then remorse is  no longer appropriate.  If  the
wrongdoer  knows  whether  the  victim is  suffering  and  how they  are  feeling,  their
remorse  should  be  sensitive  to  the  victim's  actual  state.  If  the  wrongdoer  doesn't
know,  then  their  remorse  should  instead  be  sensitive  to  how  the  victim  would
reasonably be expected to be doing.
Page 122 of 140
Part Three: Problem Cases
Chapter 9: The easy answer revisited
9.1 Overview of part two
9.1.1 Four emotional responses to wrongdoing
I have so far defended analyses of four emotions: guilt, shame, regret and remorse.
Guilt: To feel guilty is to take oneself to have acted wrongly, to feel bad about this, and
to be negatively motivated to respond somehow to what one has done.
Shame:  To  feel  shame is  to  take  an  adverse  ethical  view of  oneself,  and  to  feel
strongly bad about it.
Regret: To feel regret is to take it that something has gone or is going in some way
wrong or badly, and to feel bad about it. If one also takes oneself to be in some way
responsible for what one regrets, one feels agent-regret.
Remorse:  To feel remorse is to take it that someone has been wrongly harmed in a
way one is responsible for, and to feel bad about this in a sympathetic or empathetic
way.
The purpose of these analyses is to distinguish sharply between the different ways we
can  feel  bad  about  our  wrongdoing,  since  these  will  be  appropriate  in  different
circumstances and for different reasons. It is clear that my analyses of guilt, shame
and remorse describe ways we can actually feel and which are actually distinct. There
is a straightforward difference between bad feelings that motivate us somehow, those
that focus on our self-evaluation, and those that concern the suffering of others. In
turn, each of these are more specific than simply feeling regret.
It might be objected that the price of this conceptual clarity is to stray too far from
ordinary use. Do our ordinary claims about guilt, shame and remorse really imply that
everyone feeling guilty is motivated somehow, that shame always involves an ethical
evaluation, or that remorse is always about the harm we have caused? There are two
responses to be made here. First, the analyses can be defended as faithful to ordinary
use because they classify cases correctly. This was a large part of my defence of the
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analyses  in  Part  Two.  Second,  the  purpose  of  the  analyses  is  to  provide  a  clear
conceptual framework for my normative arguments. This does not require complete
faithfulness to ordinary usage: if ordinary usage is sometimes muddled, a revisionary
way of thinking will be more useful, so long as it is not so revisionary as to mislead us
by distorting our intuitions. My analyses are not misleading in this way. We have all
experienced  the  emotions  I  have  described.  We  have  all  felt  an  uncomfortable
motivation  to  apologise  for  something  we  did  wrong,  we  have  all  had  strong,
unpleasant feelings about our failures or vices, and we have all felt sorry about hurting
somebody. By attending to these real experiences as well as our linguistic intuitions,
we will not be mislead.
9.1.2 Why feel bad?
I have argued that each of these emotions is appropriate in the right circumstances. 
Guilt is appropriate after wrongdoing if a response is owed to somebody else, because
in  such  a  case  it  would  be  disrespectful  not  to  feel  guilty.  Once  the  agent  has
responded properly, further guilt is no longer appropriate. Guilt is not appropriate if no-
one else is owed a response – for example after slight or self-regarding wrongdoing –
because respectfulness doesn't require guilt in these cases.
Shame is the appropriate response to serious wrongdoing or vice. In such cases feeling
shame is  a  part  of  what  it  is  for  the  agent  to  value their  ethical  standing and to
maintain an attitude of self-respect. In response to a less serious failing feelings of
ambition, acceptance or regret can acceptably take the place of shame, so shame is
not appropriate. Shame is less likely to be appropriate if the agent lacked control over
their action or is unable to do anything to address their vice. This is because lacking
control in this way often means that the agent's failing is less serious.
Remorse is the appropriate response to the harm caused by wrongdoing, and is part of
being properly concerned for  the victims of  our wrongdoing.  Remorse ought to  be
sensitive to the suffering and feelings of the victim: the agent should feel remorse if
the victim is both suffering and feeling bad, or if they are suffering and clearly ought to
feel  bad.  Harms  serious  enough  to  worsen  the  victim's  life  irrevocably  will  make
remorse appropriate until the victim is able to accept what has happened, or if the
victim cannot accept what has happened, forever.
Regret is the broadest emotion I have analysed. Someone who feels guilt, shame or
remorse will also be feeling regret, because taking ourselves to have acted wrongly,
failed ethically, or harmed someone are all ways of taking something to have gone
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badly. Regret is therefore appropriate if guilt, shame or remorse is appropriate. Regret
can also be an appropriate middle ground between the strong reaction of shame and
the mild reactions of acceptance or ambition. When regret is appropriate in this way,
the reason to feel regret is based on the same consideration that provided a reason for
us to act correctly in the first place. If the consideration and our ignoring it could affect
how our life goes, then that matters to how we should feel.
9.2 Easy cases explained
We are now in a position to defend and make rigorous the easy answer.  The easy
answer is that after you have acted wrongly you should feel bad, and the worse your
wrongdoing, the worse you should feel.  Then, you should return to normal feeling,
either after reacting properly, or simply after enough time passes. I shall first apply the
arguments of Part Two to an ordinary case where the easy answer seems to do well, to
show that  my position  provides  an  explanation  of  the  easy  answer.  This  step  will
defend the easy answer from the worry that feeling bad is pointless, and will develop it
into a more detailed account. The second step is to use my position to resolve the
problem cases. Because my account explains the easy cases while also resolving the
problem cases, we have good reason to endorse it.
Suppose Sue has broken her promise to Peter. Should she feel bad? This will depend on
the details of the case, particularly on how important the promise was, what effect her
breaking it had on Peter, and whether Sue is a faithful or unfaithful person generally.
If  the promise was important  enough then Sue will  owe Peter  some response.  For
example, if Sue had promised to repay money Peter had loaned her in time for him to
pay  his  tax  bill,  but  carelessly  forgot  to  do  so,  landing  Peter  with  a  fine  for  late
payment, then she ought to cover Peter's fine as well as just paying back the loan.
Because Sue owes Peter a response, she ought to feel  guilty. Not to feel  that way
would be disrespectful to Peter. On the other hand, if Sue's promise-breaking had no
important effect – for example, if she promised to repay Peter by Friday, forgot, and
promptly repaid him on Saturday morning, causing him no inconvenience – then she
doesn't owe Peter a response to her wrongdoing, and so guilt is not appropriate. This is
the result we expect: we agree that there's no need to feel guilty over every little thing
we get  wrong,  but  we  do  expect  people  to  feel  guilty  in  more  serious  cases.  My
account explains this: it is only in important cases that we owe somebody a response,
and it is only when we do owe somebody a response that feeling guilty is required by
reasons of respect.
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The effect of breaking the promise is the main factor affecting whether or not remorse
is appropriate: if Sue has made Peter's life turn for the worse, if she had caused him to
suffer, then she ought to feel remorse, because she ought to be concerned about Peter
after causing him harm. It's unlikely for her broken promise to have this sort of effect
on Peter; small costs such as being fined by the tax office tend not to worsen our lives.
But it is possible: imagine that Sue's late repayment means that Peter cannot service
his mortgage, so that he loses his family home. In that extreme case, Sue should feel
remorse. We can also imagine cases of broken promises that damage relationships,
and worsen lives in that way; this is the sort of promise-breaking that we would call a
betrayal. If Sue and Peter are close friends, but their friendship is badly damaged by
her promise-breaking, then Sue ought to feel remorse. Once again, this is what we
expect: it sounds odd to say that someone should feel remorse for a broken promise,
but in a particularly serious case we agree that they should.
To decide whether shame is appropriate, we should consider both Sue's character and
the seriousness of what has happened. If Sue is a thoroughly vicious liar shame will be
appropriate. Such a vice is a serious failing, and if Sue is to maintain an attitude of self-
respect and continue to care about her ethical standing, she must feel ashamed of
such a failing.  Sue should feel  ashamed of  her  vice whether  or  not  the  particular
promise made to Peter was an important one or not. Thinking of the particular promise,
Sue should feel ashamed of breaking it if it is important enough to be considered a
serious ethical failing on its own – serious enough that it would call into doubt Sue's
self-respect or concern for living well if she were not ashamed of it. On the other hand,
if the particular promise is not very serious, and if Sue broke her promise through the
sort of occasional absent-mindedness that is an inescapable human frailty, shame is
clearly an over-reaction. Sue should simply accept that she will never be perfect, and
understand that her failing in this case is a small one. Between these two extremes are
cases in which Sue is only a little vicious. For example, she might be generally an
honest person, but with the tendency to make promises too lightly and to back out of
them when she realises she oughtn't really have made them. Or she might have good
intentions but frequently suffer from weakness of will regarding her promises. In these
cases ambition or regret will be more appropriate than shame, unless Sue's small vice
is very longstanding. This is what we expect: as with remorse, shame seems too strong
a  reaction  for  most  cases  of  promise-breaking,  but  does  seem  appropriate  if  we
imagine a very serious case, or if we imagine someone who is thoroughly unfaithful.
The account of Part Two also explains how long Sue should feel bad. Intuitively, we are
confident that Sue should not feel bad forever, but we aren't sure how long she should
feel  bad  for,  or  what  determines  when  she  should  return  to  normal  feeling.  By
considering the different ways in which Sue might feel bad and the reasons for them,
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we can provide a clearer picture.
If guilt is appropriate for Sue, it will be for as long as she still owes a response to Peter.
Once she has acted as she ought to, guilt is no longer appropriate. This means that if
Sue reacts to her broken promise properly guilt will not be appropriate for very long
(unless the response she owes Peter is difficult to carry out). Guilt will also cease to be
appropriate if Peter chooses to forgive her and release her from her obligations to him.
If Sue doesn't respond appropriately and Peter doesn't forgive her, then guilt will be
appropriate for as long as she still owes Peter the response. Just how long this will be
will depend on our account of what people are owed and why. One plausible option is
that duties of recompense come with an expiry date. If Sue breaks her promise to
repay Peter £5, once many years have passed it may not be true anymore to say that
she ought to repay him. In this case, when Sue no longer owes Peter the money she no
longer ought to feel guilty. Another plausible view is that even after many years have
passed Sue still owes Peter the money, but it is no longer very important whether she
returns  it.  In  this  case,  she  ought  not  to  feel  guilty,  because  her  wrongdoing  in
continuing to keep the money is no longer serious enough. Both of these implications
are plausible.
If remorse is appropriate for Sue, it will be until either Peter recovers or until he is able
to  accept  what  has happened.  This  will  depend on the details  of  the case,  but  in
general  the worse the effect of  Sue's broken promises,  the longer remorse will  be
appropriate.  If  shame is  appropriate because of  Sue's vice,  then she ought to feel
ashamed until she is able to reform her character. If shame is appropriate because this
particular promise-breaking was a very serious matter, then it will be appropriate for
as long as this is true. This will depend on how the broken-promise fits into Sue's life: if
she becomes and remains a virtuous, faithful person and puts her promise-breaking
behind her, this makes the promises she broke less serious for her. We all sometimes
fail to act as we should, but most failings, even quite serious ones, can be recovered
from, and once one has recovered it is not appropriate still to evaluate oneself poorly.
In a case where guilt,  shame and remorse are all  appropriate,  the fact  that  those
different  responses  will  be  appropriate  for  different  lengths  of  time  explains  our
intuition that  we ought to feel  gradually less bad,  until  our  bad feeling fades out.
Suppose Sue acted viciously, destroying her friendship with Peter, and that she owed
him an apology – a real, sincere apology, not just an admission of wrongdoing. At first,
she ought to feel guilty, ashamed of herself, and remorseful for hurting Peter. If she
apologises quickly, she oughtn't to feel guilty for long; however, if the apology cannot
save the friendship, she still ought to feel remorse, and if she is still vicious, she still
ought to feel ashamed. Seeing what her unfaithfulness can cause, Sue might work
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hard to change her character. Once she has made enough progress at this that she has
good reason to feel confident and ambitious, she oughtn't to feel ashamed any longer.
But Sue's self-improvement doesn't mean Peter feels any better, so remorse is still
appropriate. Once Peter recovers (or, if they are no longer in touch, once it would be
reasonable to expect that Peter had recovered) then Sue oughtn't to feel remorse. It is
true that, overall, Sue ought to feel less bad over time; this is because she has less to
feel bad about. But it was not automatic or guaranteed that this would be the case: it
depended  on  Sue  responding  well,  improving  herself,  and  on  Peter  being  able  to
recover.
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Chapter 10: Problem Cases
I will now consider two sorts of problem case. I will in each case explain why they are
puzzling, present the resolution of them that my account provides, and then argue that
this  resolution  is  acceptable.  There  are  two  payoffs  here:  first,  we  learn  what  is
appropriate in the problem cases. Second, showing that my account can resolve the
problem cases provides further reason to endorse it.
10.1 The out-of-character killing
The  first  sort  of  problem case  I  will  consider  is  one  in  which  an  agent  has  done
something very badly wrong, but in which there is little to be done about it. The agent
cannot  do much to  make up for  what they have done because the wrongdoing is
irreversible and not suitable to be compensated for. They don't need to do much to
reform themselves, because their action is out-of-character:
Smith is an ordinarily decent person. He's no moral saint,  but nobody would finger him as particularly
vicious either. One day he witnesses a driver lose control of his vehicle outside a school, narrowly missing a
child before crashing into a tree. Smith goes to help the driver and finds him reeking of alcohol. Smith,
enraged, strikes the driver on the head with a nearby rock, killing him. When they find out what happened,
Smith's friends are horrified. They can hardly believe it: such a violent outburst is completely unlike Smith.
Smith has clearly done something very badly wrong. It was reasonable to be angry at
the driver, but obviously not to react by killing him. However, if we elaborate a little
further on a few details, surprisingly little action is required by Smith. Suppose Smith's
victim was a lonely man who left behind no friends or family. Smith isn't required to
apologise or make amends to the victim; this is impossible now that he is dead. Since
there are no family or friends in the picture, Smith cannot be required to apologise or
make amends to them either. Smith can turn himself in to the police, and apologise to
his own friends and family, but that seems to be all there is to do in direct response to
the killing. Similarly, with a few further assumptions we can see that there is not much
that Smith needs to do to reform his character and assure us he will not re-offend. We
already know that Smith isn't generally prone to violence or excessive anger. Suppose
also that Smith finds the killing itself viscerally unpleasant, that he realises how wrong
it was straight away, resolves immediately never to do anything like it again, and that
he does indeed turn himself in. If we knew all this, we would be confident that Smith
will not kill again.
This is a problem case for the easy answer. We are confident that Smith should feel
very bad, because his wrongdoing is so serious. But we are puzzled when it comes to
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how long Smith should feel bad for. On the one hand, we think bad feeling should be
connected to action, but everything Smith ought to do comes so quickly and easily
that for him to return to normal feeling as a result seems too quick. On the other hand,
the thought that Smith should feel bad forever, or for a very long time, is troubling if
we cannot explain when and why normal feeling will be appropriate again (or why it
never will  be).  It  also appears disconnected to action, and prompts the worry that
feeling bad is just futile, pointless suffering.
My account will resolve this difficulty by connecting some, but not all, of what Smith
should be feeling to the actions he ought to take in response to his wrongdoing, and by
providing an explanation of how he ought to feel in the longer term.
10.1.1 Guilt, Shame, Regret and Remorse in Smith's case
What  does  my  account  mean  for  Smith?  In  the  immediate  aftermath,  many  very
intense feelings will be required of Smith. He ought to feel intense guilt. While there is
not much Smith can do in response to the killing, it is very important that he does it.
He also won't initially know that the driver has no family or friends. Just as important
from the start will be an intense remorse: killing the stranger obviously causes them
great and wrongful harm.
Smith will also be required at first to feel some intense shame. First, he has wrongly
killed the driver, and even if this is completely uncharacteristic of Smith it is still a very
significant failing. Secondly, while we can describe the case so that it is clear that
Smith will be able to avoid future killing, this is not so transparently true for Smith, and
so he should consider carefully whether the killing reveals something about himself:
perhaps he has a hidden streak of wrath that he wasn't aware of before. For as long as
this worry is reasonable, shame about it is appropriate because it is such a serious
matter.
That so many intense and differently focused emotions are required of Smith in the
immediate aftermath of his action is why we would expect him to be more or less a
wreck at first. It also explains why our strongest intuition about the case is just that he
should feel very bad.
How does the reaction required of Smith change as time passes?
If,  after  the  killing,  Smith  acts  as  he  should  then  he  will  be  able  to  respond
appropriately fairly soon. At this point, it will no longer be the case that he ought to
feel  guilty,  because  that  would  be  for  him  to  feel  as  if  there  were  some  further
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response required of him which in fact there is not. Similarly, he will fairly swiftly be
able to ensure and recognise that he will not commit any further killings. At this point,
Smith can confidently judge that he does not have a murderous or wrathful character,
and so shouldn't feel ashamed about his character anymore.
However, Smith still ought to be ashamed of what he has done. A wrongful killing like
Smith's is a serious failure even if it is an isolated incident. Smith should continue to be
ashamed of it, for so long as it is serious enough that it would call into doubt Smith's
self-respect or concern for his ethical standing if he did not. Whether Smith could live
the rest of his life well enough that it would one day be appropriate for him to accept
what he did, or soften his attitude to regret rather than shame, is a difficult question. It
is plausible that the answer is no; the issue turns on what it takes for Smith to maintain
proper self-respect and concern for how his life goes.
The impact on the driver of being killed by Smith is permanent. He is dead, and so
possibly beyond being affected at all. Even if one can be helped or harmed after one's
death, it remains clear that nothing that occurs after the driver's death will make it
true that he wasn't seriously harmed by Smith. Similarly, because he has been killed,
the driver will not be able to accept what has happened to him (and nor would we
expect him to if that were possible). Therefore, Smith will always be required to feel
remorse.
10.1.2 Advantages of my account of Smith's case
The first advantage of my account is that the emotions it considers appropriate for
Smith focus his attention on what is most important to him. Smith's case is an unusual
case:  he  has  done  something  seriously  wrong  with  severe  consequences,  but  he
doesn't seem like a deeply vicious person, and there doesn't seem to be much to be
done about it afterwards. On my account, in the medium term, Smith ought to feel
remorseful and ashamed of what he has done, and so ought to be attentive to what he
has done and the consequences it has had, particularly for the driver. But Smith ought
not to feel guilty or ashamed of his character in the medium term, and so ought not to
be focusing his  attention on what there is to be done about the murder or  on his
character flaws. This distribution of attention, while it seems unusual at first, matches
the unusual details of the case. Were Smith to feel guilty for longer, or ashamed of his
character, he would be distracted by emotions that are unfitting in his case.
My account also finds a balance between our different intuitions about Smith's case:
our confidence that he ought to feel very bad, and our worry that his feeling bad may
be futile. It  does so by expecting Smith to feel  very bad, and for a long time, but
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explaining that it is important that Smith feels bad in the right way.
My account does not allow Smith to ever fully  leave behind what he did,  because
remorse, and perhaps shame for what he has done, will always be required of him.
Smith must in these ways acknowledge and feel the weight of what he has done, and
our  confidence that he ought to feel  very  bad is  vindicated.  By focusing on these
particular  responses we can explain  why they are not  futile  or  pointless:  they are
required because Smith ought to be concerned for the driver, and for how his own life
has gone. Smith can feel these emotions at the same time as recognising it is too late
to do anything about them, because they are focused on what has happened, and the
consequences of it.
On the other hand, my account does not require Smith to feel guilty, or ashamed of his
character, except in the short term. This is because these feelings would be futile in
Smith's case. We ought to feel guilty when we owe somebody a response for what we
have done, because not to feel guilty in such a case would be disrespectful to them.
Smith (once he has turned himself in) is not in such a case. There is nothing for him to
do, so to be painfully trying to do something would be futile. We ought to feel ashamed
of our character when it is bad, and when there is something we ought to do about
that. But Smith's character is not bad, and once he is in a position to be confident of
that, there is no reason for him to feel otherwise. This makes my account in a sense
freeing for Smith: he is not required to torture himself with unfitting bad feelings that
would spur him towards impossible responses. But we can make this point without
letting him off the hook, because we are still in a position to insist, with good reason,
that he feel remorse.
10.1.3 Objections to my account of Smith's case
I have claimed that Smith oughtn't to feel guilty for very long, (so long as he swiftly
turns himself in). This is an odd-looking result. Is it really correct?
Part of this apparent oddness may arise because my analysis of guilt is of a narrower,
more focused emotion than we might have expected. On a broader analysis of guilt,
for instance of simply feeling bad about having acted wrongly, the remorse that my
account  requires  of  Smith  would  qualify  as  guilt.  This  part  of  the  oddness  is  not
problematic for my account. My analysis of guilt is narrow and somewhat revisionary,
as  revealed  in  Smith's  case,  but  this  is  warranted because  the  added detail  does
capture  something  ethically  important:  whether  we  feel  spurred  to  respond
appropriately  to  what  we have done.  In  many cases responding appropriately  and
simply feeling bad, for example by feeling regret, is not enough. The agent also ought
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to feel driven to respond appropriately, which is to feel guilt as I have analysed it. This
was the substance of my objection to Harman's arguments against guilt in Chapter
Five.
Another part of the oddness is just the oddness of Smith's case, and this is also benign.
Usually, when one has done something badly wrong, the proper response cannot be
completed so quickly or easily. For example, were the driver to have had family and
friends, Smith would have been required to apologise to them and perhaps to try to
explain  himself  or  seek forgiveness.  This  would not  have been a simple matter or
something that could be dealt with quickly; Smith would have to carefully consider
what to say and how to approach them in order not to make things worse. If the family
were to ask something reasonable of him – perhaps to do some work for the driver's
favourite  charity  –  Smith  would  have  to  do  that  too.  Only  once  Smith  had  done
everything he ought to in response would it be appropriate for him to stop feeling
guilty.
The final part of the oddness is that, in a case of such a serious crime, it is better to err
on the side of too much bad feeling rather than too little, which makes any suspicion of
letting Smith off too lightly seem suspect. For Smith not to feel extremely bad after
killing the driver would be highly vicious and something that we would condemn. For
Smith to feel worse than is actually appropriate would be a much less serious vice, and
we would be unlikely to criticise him much at all for this. This part of the oddness is
relieved by attending to my whole account, which requires Smith to feel remorse and
shame. These things considered, we can confidently say that guilt  isn't  required in
Smith's case except as a short term response.
A related objection is that my account seems to make guilt less appropriate for more
serious crimes. If Smith had only badly wounded the driver, leaving him hospitalised,
this would not be so bad as killing him, but Smith would have been required to feel
very guilty for a long period. Worse, this Smith could then get out of the requirement
feeling guilty by killing the driver at a later date – because once he is dead, Smith
doesn't owe him anything! My response is that it is only reasonable to expect more
serious crimes to warrant more guilt if guilt is taken as a broad, catch-all emotional
response to one's crime. But I am not taking guilt that way, and with good reason. We
can consider on my account whether more serious crimes warrant more bad feeling by
considering regret, which I understand to include guilt, shame, and remorse, as well as
other ways of feeling bad. This gives the correct result that Smith ought to feel worse
about killing the driver: while less guilt is required in this case, more remorse and more
shame are  required,  and will  be  required  for  longer.  The  changes in  remorse  and
shame are more significant, because these attend to what has been done, and the
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harm it has caused, and we think that these are the more significant aspects of the
situation, which ought to feature most prominently in Smith's emotional response.
On the other hand, it might be objected that my account asks for too much bad feeling
from Smith, with no end in sight, because of the requirement for Smith to feel remorse
forever. Despite the severity of what has occurred, we want Smith to be in some sense
able to move on and live the rest of his life virtuously. Unending remorse seems to
make this a difficult prospect.
To deal with this objection we must remember that feeling remorse forever doesn't
mean feeling remorse constantly. It is not the case that in his every waking moment
Smith ought to be feeling remorse. Not only would this be far more than would be
required to show respect and concern for the driver, it would also crowd out other
emotions that Smith ought to feel. The claim that remorse will always be appropriate
for Smith is instead the claim that there won't come a point after which it is true that
Smith oughtn't to feel any more remorse for the killing. This allows that sometimes
Smith should feel not remorse but something else, or that sometimes Smith oughtn't
to  feel  anything  in  particular.  Over  the  long  term  Smith  ought  to  feel  remorse
periodically,  at  times  when  nothing  more  urgent  is  demanding  his  attention,  and
certainly when he directs his attention towards what happened. Remorse should be a
part of Smith's life, but it oughtn’t to prevent Smith from living the rest of it well.
Finally, it might be objected that I focus too much on remorse, in a way that makes my
account hostage to some particular details of Smith's case. I've argued that remorse is
appropriate only if we have wrongly harmed somebody, or at least have good reason
to think that we did. But suppose we adjust the case so that killing the driver is not to
harm him, or at least not to harm him very much. We can imagine that the reason he
was drunk-driving is that he hoped he would be killed in an accident, that his life was
going so poorly that he really did have good reason to want to die, and that Smith
would  realise  this  because  of  a  suicide  note  left  in  his  glove-compartment.
Alternatively, suppose that the driver was already fatally wounded in the crash, so that
he would have died anyway. If Smith really had killed the driver without harming him
very much, he oughtn't to feel very much remorse on my account. But is this the right
result?
First  of  all,  we should keep in mind that Smith still  ought to feel  very bad on my
account. He still wrongfully killed the driver, and that is still a serious ethical failing
that he ought to be ashamed of for a long time, until his coming to accept what he did
or to only regret it would be consistent with his self-respect and his concern about his
ethical standing. This doesn't fully address the objection though, because remorse is a
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big part of what Smith is feeling, and so a Smith who didn't feel much remorse would
be feeling significantly less bad. However, this change is appropriate if Smith really
didn't  harm the driver very much.  In support  of  this  view,  imagine how we would
expect Smith to feel if he discovers in the glove compartment not a suicide note, but a
picture of the driver with his three young children. Isn't it appropriate for this discovery
to make Smith feel worse? This is explained by my account of remorse: Smith ought to
be concerned for the driver's children as well as the driver himself, so he should feel
remorse for the harm caused to them as well. The consequences of Smith's action are
very important, and the worse they are, the worse he should feel.
10.2 Cases involving luck
I have in mind cases of what Nagel calls resultant luck, particularly where the agent's
wrongdoing is  modest,  but will  nonetheless have serious  consequences if  they are
unlucky.  I  will  draw on Nagel's  example  of  a  parent  who leaves  their  child  briefly
unattended in the bath:
'If one negligently leaves the bath running with the baby in it, one will realize, as one bounds up the stairs
toward the bathroom, that if the baby has drowned one has done something awful, whereas if it has not one
has merely been careless.'108
How is the parent to feel about this? On the one hand, we expect the parent to feel
drastically worse if the baby is drowned (not only because they will be grief-stricken,
but  because they  will  blame themselves  more).  But  on  the  other  hand,  since  the
parent was just as careless even if  their baby is unharmed, we feel  uncomfortably
pressured to say that they should blame themselves the same amount, however the
case turns out.
10.2.1 My account applied to moral luck cases
Once again, I approach these cases by distinguishing the different ways in which the
parent could feel bad about what they have done.
First of all, if the parent is unlucky and their baby drowns, they should feel a great deal
of remorse, because they have greatly harmed their child. Even though the outcome is
unlucky, they have wrongfully harmed their baby and they are responsible for this.
However,  the  lucky  parent,  whose  baby  was  not  drowned,  oughtn't  to  feel  this
remorse, because their baby wasn't harmed.
108Nagel, Thomas, 'Moral Luck', in his Mortal Questions, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979, pp. 24-38. p31 
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How much shame is  appropriate  will  also  depend on  how things  turn  out.  This  is
because having negligently drowned one's baby is a terrible thing to have done, and if
that is what has happened the parent ought to be very ashamed of it. Having risked
drowning one's baby is also a serious matter, but not to the same extent.  What it
means for the parent's life depends on its context: if it is part of a pattern of bad
parenting it makes the parent's life much worse. If it is an isolated mistake quickly
learnt from, the parent's life doesn't seem marred by it. If the baby is safe, the event
seems like a shock that can be recovered from. This is the sense in which Nagel is right
that if the baby is fine, one has been merely careless. What this means for the lucky
parent is that they should feel ashamed of what they have done at first, but so long as
they learn from their mistake that shame can soon be left behind. This is not the case
if the baby drowns.
The parent may also feel ashamed about their character. In this regard, whether the
baby drowns doesn't change how much shame is appropriate, for it doesn't change the
parent's character. We know the parent is negligent to some degree. If their negligence
is  a  serious  vice,  because  it  is  extreme  or  longstanding,  then  they  ought  to  be
ashamed of it. Not to feel ashamed would be to lack self-respect and proper concern
for their character. But if they are only a little negligent and have not been negligent
for  long,  shame  would  not  be  appropriate.  In  the  case  that  the  baby  is  fine,  an
ambitious reaction of confidently wanting to improve would be better: “never again!”,
the parent will resolve. But even in the event that the baby drowns, if the parent really
is only a little negligent, they shouldn't feel ashamed of their negligence. They should
feel  remorse,  and  they  should  feel  ashamed  of  drowning  their  baby,  but  it  isn't
appropriate for them to also feel ashamed of their slight negligence. This is because
the minor negligence itself  isn't  shameworthy. However,  we wouldn't  say that they
should feel ambition to improve, because we think that feeling should be crowded out
by the remorse and shame they ought to feel. Our thought is that their character is not
very important compared to what they have done, so they shouldn't feel  anything
about their character. (This all assumes that the parent knows how negligent they are.
If this is not the case, the fact that they have just drowned, or nearly drowned, their
baby gives them a good reason to think their negligence is serious, making shame
about their negligence more appropriate.)
Guilt will be appropriate if there is something to be done in response to the parent's
wrongdoing which they owe to somebody, so that it would be disrespectful not to feel
guilty. For the lucky parent, the main thing to do is to ensure that the baby won't be
forgotten in the bath again, for example by developing a new routine in which they
bathe with their child, and then to curb their risk taking more generally if there is a
wider problem. As well as this, the parent will owe an apology to anyone else who is
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responsible for the child. How strong their guilt should be will depend on how negligent
they were, since apologising and correcting for a worse negligence is more important.
How long the parent should feel guilty for will depend on how difficult it is for them to
get into better habits. For the unlucky parent, a more intense guilt will be required,
because they will have something much worse to apologise for. They also ought to
curb their risk taking, especially if they have other children, but as with Smith's case,
and the case of the lucky parent, their guilt may not be required for very long. The
apology can be offered quickly, and the shock of what has happened may mean that it
is easy for them to change their habits. 
10.2.2 Resolving the puzzles of moral luck cases
The overall picture is that the unlucky parent ought to feel much worse than the lucky
parent. Only the unlucky parent ought to feel remorse, and the unlucky parent should
feel more ashamed of what they have done, and for longer. Both parents should feel
guilty, but the guilt of the unlucky parent ought to be more intensely felt. However, an
important  qualification  is  that  both  parents  should  feel  equally  ashamed  of  their
character, and that neither parent should feel ashamed of their character if they know
that they are only slightly careless.
This provides a clean resolution of the puzzling aspect of the case. Our thought that
the unlucky parent should feel much worse is vindicated, but by acknowledging that
both parents should feel the same way about their character we explain the pressure
that we felt to say each parent should blame themselves just as much. Both parents
should take the same view and feel  the same way about their  negligence.  This  is
appropriate, because their negligence is the same in each case. But by distinguishing
the different ways in which the parents ought to feel bad, my account makes clear that
feeling the same way about their negligence doesn't imply that the parents ought to
feel the same way about what has happened, about what they have done, or about
what they ought to do next.
It might be objected that we are not really so confident that the unlucky parent should
feel much worse, and that my treatment of the case is therefore too harsh on them. In
support of this objection, consider that we would expect the unlucky parent's friends
and family to try to console them and make them feel less bad, and perhaps in doing
so to encourage them to see their case as more similar to the case of the lucky parent.
We do have this expectation, but it doesn't support the conclusion that the unlucky
parent ought to feel no worse than the lucky parent: it supports the conclusion that the
unlucky parent ought not to feel too bad, but probably will, given the circumstances
and what we know about parenting and human nature. It would not be surprising for
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the unlucky parent to lose sight of the fact that they aren't really a terribly vicious
person, and that their character is similar to the lucky parent's (and, given human
frailty, quite similar to most parents'.) We would console the unlucky parent to try to
make them feel less bad, but not to try to make them feel just the same as would have
been appropriate  if  their  child  hadn't  died.  If  the  unlucky  parent  really  didn't  feel
remorse or shame for  what they had done, then we would either criticise them or
worry about them. We wouldn't feel relieved that they were reacting much better than
most parents would.
10.3 Conclusion
Though we are inclined to think those who have acted wrongly should feel bad, we also
worry that feeling bad may be futile – that it may only make things worse. To deal with
this  worry,  I  have argued that we ought to feel  bad not as a way to secure good
outcomes, but because feeling bad is a part of what it is to be respectful and to value
our ethical standing. My account is to be accepted because it explains the cases we
are confident  about  and resolves  the cases we find puzzling.  My treatment  of  the
problem cases revealed that it is important to carefully distinguish the different ways
in which we feel bad about our wrongdoing.
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